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Introduction 
For a long time Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) was regarded as a 
mere classic of modern jurisprudence and international law with little 
relevance for the understanding of the history of Western moral or 
political thought. In recent years this situation has, however, changed 
significantly, and there has appeared a number of studies dealing with 
Pufendorf.1 Behind this new interest in Pufendorf has been above all 
1 	 Pufendorf is scarcely mentioned in George Sabine's A History of Political 
Thought and totally omitted from Alasdair Maclntyre's A Short History of Ethics. 
On the other hand, Pufendorf is one of the few authors to whom the recent 
Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 devotes a separate article 
(Dufour 1991). Other monographs and articles in which Pufendorf appears as a 
significant figure include Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of 
Property. Grotius to Hume. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991: Horst 
Denzer, Moralphilosophie und Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf. München 1972; 
Alfred Dufour,"La notion de loi dans 1'Ecole du Droit nature moderne. Etude sur 
le sens du mot loi chez Grotius, Hobbes et Pufendorf," Archives de Philosophie 
du Droit, 25, 1980; Simone Goyard-Fabre, "Pufendorf, adversair de Hobbes", 
Hobbes Studies 2, 1989; Istvan Hont, "The language of sociability and commerce: 
Samuel Pufendorf and the theoretical foundations of the "Four-Stages Theory" in 
The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. Anthony 
Pagden, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987; Leonard Krieger, The 
Politics of Discretion. Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural law. Chicago 
University Press. Chicago, 1965; Pierre Laurent, Pufendorf et la loi naturel. Vrin, 
Paris, 1982; Hans Medick, Naturzustand und Naturgesichte der bürgerlichen 
Geselschaft. Die Ursprünge der bürgerliche Sozialtheorie als Geschichts-
philosophie und Sozialwissenschaft bei Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke und Adam 
Smith. Göttingen, 1981; Michael Nutkiewicz, "Samuel Pufendorf: Obligation as 
the Basis of the State", Journal of the History of Ideas 21, 1983; Fiametta 
Palladini, Discussioni seicentesche su Samuel Pufendorf scritti latini: 1663-1700. 
Bologna, 1978; Samuel Pufendorf, disceplo di Hobbes. Per una reinterpretazione 
del giusnaturalismo moderno. Bologna, 1990; Sieglinde Othmer, Berlin und dies 
Verbreaitung des Naturechts in Europa. Kultur und sozialgeschichtliche Studien 
zu Jean Barbeyracs Pufendorf-Ubersetzungen und eine analyse seiner 
Leserschaft. Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Komission zu Berlin beim 
Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin, Band 30, Berlin, 1970; 
J.B. Schneewind, "Pufendorf's place in the history of ethics", Synthese, 72, 1987; 
Michael Seidler, Introduction in Samuel Pufendorfs "On the natural state". 
Lewiston, 1991; Richard Tuck Natural Rights Theories; Their Origin and 
Development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979; "The `Modem' 
School of Natural Law", in The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern 
Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987; 
James Tully, Introduction in Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991; Hans Wetzel, Der 
Natrurrechtslehre Samuel Pufendorfs. Ein Beitragezur Ideengesichte des 17. und. 
18. Jahrhunderts. Berlin, 1958. 
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his important position in the transformation of European moral and 
political thinking which took place in the early modem period. 
Together with Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679), and John Locke (1632-1704), Pufendorf was the most 
prominent developer of the so-called modem theory of natural law and 
contractual political theory. Moreover, while he nowadays appears a 
minor figure in relation to Hobbes and Locke, from the 1670's to the 
second half of the eighteenth century he was by far the most widely 
read of the above mentioned writers. Pufendorf's massive main work, 
De jure naturae et gentium (On the laws of nature and nations, 1672), 
and its text-book version, De officio  hominis et civis (On the duties of 
man and citizen, 1673) appeared in numerous editions and were 
translated into all major European languages. Knowledge of Pufendorf 
was regarded as an integral part of an all-round education, and while 
his views were seldom accepted as such, his theory was seen as a 
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paradigmatic example of a distinctively modem approach to moral and 
political issues. 
This work does not deal with the eighteenth-century reactions to 
Pufendorf's theory. Nor does it attempt to give a portrait of his 
natural-law doctrine as a whole. A central and influential part in 
Pufendorf's system was his theory of the contractual origin of social 
institutions such as property, money, family, and the state. These 
themes are not treated in the present work.'- Instead I shall concentrate 
on Pufendorf's account of natural law as a theory of morality. 
Pufendorf's theory of natural law was one of the most significant 
and influential early articulations of a novel understanding of morality 
which started to gain support from the seventeenth century onwards. 
At least until the sixteenth century most moral philosophers held that 
the principal subject matter of morality is human excellence. It was 
thought that there is a way of living which is objectively the best and 
most satisfying for a human being, and that this forms the central 
object of moral reflection. This assumption was apparent in the 
writings of classical moral philosophers as well as in medieval and 
Renaissance ethical theories based on classical models. These were 
concerned not so much with norms as with describing the character of 
highest human good and the dispositional features — virtues — which a 
person must possess in order to be an excellent human being. 
However, human excellence was the central issues also in the Thomist 
tradition of natural law, in which moral norms were identified with 
dictates of practical reason which guide human beings towards a way 
2 	 A general introduction to Pufendorf's theory can be found in Seidler 1990, Tully 
1991, and Dufour 1991. 
of living which brings them the highest worldly happiness and is most 
perfect to their species.3  
Much of modem moral thinking, at least before the current revival 
of the so-called virtue ethics, has understood morality in a way which 
differs significantly from the classical model described above. It has 
been thought that the question of highest human good and the best 
way of living is not a moral issue, but rather a matter of individual 
inclinations and preferences. The moral domain of human life has 
been seen as consisting mainly of the norms or principles one should 
follow in interpersonal relations. Virtue, which in classical ethical 
thinking was regarded as the capacity to live in a way which is the 
most rewarding for a human being, has been understood merely as a 
habitual disposition or willingness to obey the correct principles in 
one's interaction with other people. This idea of the domain of 
morality is most often associated with Kant's deontological moral 
theory and its modem versions. However, the other major trend of 	 13 
modern moral philosophy, utilitarianism, has also seen the principal 
task of moral theory as giving foundations for principles which people 
ought to follow in their behaviour towards other human beings. 
The rudiments of this modem understanding of morality were 
articulated in the seventeenth-century theory of natural law. It can be 
found shortly sketched in Grotius' influential treatise on international 
law, De iure belli ac pacis (On the laws of war and peace, 1625). To 
be sure, Grotius still remarked that of the various manners of living 
practiced by human beings some are better than others. However, in 
distinction to the classical ethical tradition he gave no moral 
significance to this fact, stating only that of these many ways of living 
"each is free to select that which he prefers" .4 Natural law — i.e. the 
moral norm which obligates all human beings regardless of their 
religion and nationality — consists of rules which are indispensable for 
maintaining peaceful and ordered social life between individuals. The 
same basic idea of the domain of natural law was presented by Hobbes 
in his political theory. Hobbes also accepted as given that human 
beings have different conceptions of the preferable way of living, 
depending on their personal dispositions, education, and cultural 
background. And as is well known, Hobbes was even more convinced 
than Grotius that the central problem of the human condition was how 
3 	 On the general character of medieval and Renaissance ethical theories, see 
Wieland 1982a, 1982b, and Kraye 1988. On the Thomist tradition of natural law, 
see Crowe 1977, Luscombe 1982, and Trentman 1982. 
4 	 IBP I.3.8: "Sicut autem multa sunt vivendi genera, alterum altero praestantius, et 
cuique liberum est ex tot generibus id eligere quod ipsi placet; ita populus eligere 
potest qualem vult gubemationis formam." 
to maintain peaceful co-existence between these diversely inclined 
individuals. What he defined as natural law was, then, a set of rational 
principles on the basis of which human beings are able to establish a 
peaceful social order.5  
Pufendorf shared this new idea of the moral domain of human life. 
In his theory, natural law consisted of norms which enable human 
beings, who not only have different ways of living according to their 
personal dispositions and inclinations but also possess a strong 
tendency to hurt each other, to maintain a peaceful and ordered social 
life. There were, however, a number of features in Pufendorf's theory 
which distinguished him considerably from Grotius and Hobbes. The 
most apparent of these was the magnitude of his enterprise. As 
theories of morality, the accounts of natural law presented by Grotius 
and Hobbes were quite restricted. In the case of Grotius this was so 
partly because the main issue of De iure belli ac pacis dealt with was 
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international law, partly because of Grotius' conviction that the 
content of natural law can be known with sufficient certainty by 
examining what norms are accepted among all civilized nations. 
Hobbes' account of natural law, in tum, was not even meant to be a 
moral theory in any conventional sense of the term. In Hobbes' 
political theory the principles of natural law were dictates of reason 
which guide human beings to establish a sovereign civil power but 
which as such offered no independent criterion for evaluating the 
rectitude of human acts. According to Hobbes, human acts could be 
right or wrong only within a civil society as they were either allowed 
or forbidden by the sovereign. His theory of natural law was, in other 
words, a description of the process of ratiocination which leads human 
beings (if they are rational) to establish a sovereign civil power and in 
this way to create an intersubjective criterion for the rightness and 
wrongness of human acts. 
Pufendorf adopted the basic idea of Hobbes' theory of the origin of 
the state but rejected firmly his "legal positivism". According to 
Pufendorf, there is a pre-political moral obligation to cultivate 
peaceful sociality (socialitas) with other human beings. Moreover, this 
obligation serves as the foundation for an abundance of more 
particular duties that regulate human interaction both outside any 
institutional context and in relation to social institutions such as 
property, family, and the state. Furthermore, Pufendorf refuted 
Grotius' idea that the content of natural law could be deduced from 
the consensus of civilized nations, founding his own theory on an 
5 	 On the development of the modem idea of morality in seventeenth century 
natural-law theory, see Schneewind 1990, 1991, 1993a, and 1993b. 
analysis of the requirements human nature sets for the maintenance of 
sociality. All this made many contemporaries regard De jure naturae 
et gentium as the first full-length presentation of modern moral 
philosophy. 
While many features in Pufendorf's theory aroused critique even 
among his advocates, the overall idea that the central function of 
morality is to regulate conflicts between human individuals found 
support in eighteenth-century Europe. David Hume expressed a 
popular attitude when he said (somewhat ironically, perhaps): 
"Morality is a subject that interests us above all others: We fancy the 
peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it."6 And it 
has been maintained that even Kant, despite his radically novel 
account of the origin of moral judgements, understood the domain 
morality along the lines put forwards in seventeenth-century theories 
of natural law.7 In any case, the more general idea that the moral 
aspect of human life is concerned principally with correct behaviour in 
interpersonal relations became predominant in the liberal tradition. 
* * * 
The aim of this work is to explicate the understanding of morality 
which guided Pufendorf's theory of natural law. In Part one I will deal 
with the general framework within which Pufendorf formulated his 
idea of natural law. My starting point here are Pufendorf's remarks 
concerning the history of his discipline, especially his dissatisfaction 
with Aristotelian moral theory and the pre-eminent position he gave to 
Grotius as the founder of the systematic study of natural law. 
The sharp break Pufendorf posited between previous moral 
philosophy and Grotius was not much commented on in older 
Pufendorf-scholarship, which was more interested in the differences 
between Grotius and Pufendorf. Recently, however, especially Richard 
Tuck has emphasized that Pufendorf's identification with Grotius and 
the sense of novelty he attached to Grotius' enterprise are of central 
importance for understanding the character of Pufendorf's idea of 
natural law.8 Tuck has suggested that behind Pufendorf's historical 
account of his discipline was above all a concern about moral 
skepticism. By this Tuck is referring to moral relativism which 
6 	 A Treatise of Human Nature III.1.1, p.456. 
7 	 See Schneewind 1992, I993b. 
8 	 Richard Tuck, "The `Modem' School of Natural Law", in The Languages of 
Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden. Cambridge. 
1987. 
15 
enjoyed some popularity in early modern Europe, finding its most 
influential expression in the works of "new humanists" such as Justus 
Lipsius, Michel Montaigne and Pierre Charron. According to Tuck, 
what connected Grotius and Pufendorf (as well as Hobbes) was that 
they shared the humanist critique towards traditional ethical theories 
but were at the same time disturbed by the claim, associated often with 
the ancient sceptic Carneades, that there is no natural law common to 
all human beings, and that conventional moral norms can, therefore, 
be violated whenever the interest of the state or the utility of the 
individual so require. What made Pufendorf regard Grotius, Hobbes, 
and himself as participants in the same enterprize was a shared 
attempt to refute relativism by founding a system of natural law on the 
one inclination the universality of which the relativists did not deny: 
the desire for self-preservation. And Tuck holds, together with some 
other recent commentators, that in Pufendorf's theory the cultivation 
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of sociality received its status as the fundamental principle of natural 
law from its position as a necessary means for satisfying the natural 
human desire for self-preservation. 
In the third chapter of Part one I will suggest an alternative context 
for Pufendorf's theory. I agree with Tuck in so far as Pufendorf saw 
the refutation of Carneadean relativism as an important issue. I do not 
think, however, that this concern was constitutive for Pufendorf's 
theory of natural law or that it was his reason for holding Grotius to be 
founder of the study of natural law. My thesis is that although 
Pufendorf departed radically from the theories of natural law put 
forward by seventeenth-century Lutheran theologians, his 
understanding of the general character of natural law is still best 
understood against his Lutheran background. Following Luther's 
doctrine of the law, Pufendorf saw natural law as a rule which God has 
ordered on the whole of the corrupt human species in order maintain 
an ordered social life and in this way to ensure the survival of 
humankind. What made Pufendorf dissatisfied with the Aristotelian 
tradition of moral philosophy was that instead of dealing with the 
rules and institutions which enable the irreparably corrupt human 
beings to live peacefully together, it had concentrated on presenting 
personal or local preferences concerning the character of a truly 
excellent human being. Grotius' position as the founder of the study of 
natural law followed, then, from the fact that he made the 
requirements of ordered social life an independent subject of study. 
In Part two I deal with Pufendorf's demonstrative account of 
natural law, above all the argumentation by which he deduces the 
cultivation of sociality (socialitas) as the fundamental principle of 
natural law. Here I challenge the view, presented recently by several 
commentators, according to which Pufendorf derived the requirement 
of sociality from the natural human inclination for self-preservation. I 
do not, however, support the mora traditional view that Pufendorf 
would have regarded the cultivation of sociality itself as a natural 
inclination. My thesis is that unlike Grotius and Hobbes, who shared 
the traditional idea that natural law is recognized by reflecting on the 
principal tendencies which govern human behaviour, Pufendorf 
thought that human reason understands, even without the Bible and 
the knowledge of the fall, that the human species is now corrupt and 
inclined to act against God's will. This means that the content of 
natural law cannot be derived simply from the predominant tendencies 
which govern human behaviour. What for Pufendorf offered the 
starting point for the discipline of natural law was the idea that there is 
God who has created the human species and who, therefore, obviously 
wants the human species to survive and prosper by using those unique 	 17 
intellectual abilities given to them. Observation concerning the 
inclinations which dominate the corrupt human species — like self-love 
and a strong concern about personal security — became relevant to 
Pufendorf when he wanted to demonstrate that in order to ensure this 
end God has imposed on human beings an obligation to cultivate 
sociality towards each other. This procedure makes understandable 
why Pufendorf felt free to criticize Hobbes' method of deducing 
natural law from the requirement of individual self-preservation, and it 
also explains several other distinctive features in Pufendorf's account 
of natural law. 
The third theme of my work is Pufendorf's view of the normative 
character of natural law. On this issue his disagreements with Grotius 
and Hobbes are well-known. In De iure belli ac pacis Grotius 
supported the idea that the acts which fall within the area of natural 
law are morally good or bad in themselves. Of course, Grotius did not 
question that natural law is also a command of God and that this fact 
constitutes an elemental part of its obligating power. He maintained, 
however, that natural law deals with acts which are morally good or 
bad "in themselves and by their own nature" and therefore enjoined or 
forbidden by God.9 From this he deduced that natural law would offer 
normative criterion for human behaviour even in the hypothetical 
situation where there is no God. 
Even though the last mentioned remark gave rise to a lively 
discussion in seventeenth-century Europe, Grotius' view of the nor- 
9 	 IBP I.1.10. 
mative character of natural law was still rather conventional and won 
him the favour of many "traditionalists" such as Leibniz.10 Hobbes' 
views on this issue, on the other hand, were highly provocative and 
incompatible with the prevailing ways of thinking. For Hobbes 
rejected not only moral realism but also the whole idea that there 
would be some pre-political criteria for the rightness and wrongness of 
human acts. According to him, "every action in its own nature is 
indifferent" and becomes right or wrong, just or unjust only within 
civil society, when it is either allowed or forbidden by the sovereign." 
Outside such a context, Hobbes maintained, there is no intersubjective 
criteria for the rectitude of human acts. 
Pufendorf also rejected Grotius' moral realism, agreeing with 
Hobbes that in themselves all human acts are morally neutral, neither 
right nor wrong. Human behaviour can be characterized as morally 
good or bad only in so far as it agrees or disagrees with the commands 
18 
	
	
of a superior, i.e. an authority who can impose an obligation on human 
beings. What Pufendorf did not accept in Hobbes' position was the 
idea that the mere command of the civil sovereign could do the job. 
Like Hobbes, Pufendorf held that civil power is based on contracts. In 
Pufendorf's eyes, however, this indicated that the morally obligating 
power of civil laws necessarily rested on a pre-political obligation to 
keep covenants. And the only possible source for this obligation was, 
according to Pufendorf, the command of God.12 
Thus, in general terms Pufendorf put forward the so-called divine 
command theory of morality. There was, however, a feature in 
Pufendorf's theory of obligation which made his exact position on this 
issue seem somewhat unclear and problematic. This was his remark 
that a superior is someone who possesses, among other things, "just 
causes" for his power to command.13 When Pufendorf added that this 
requirement is fulfilled not only in the case of legitimate civil 
sovereigns but also in the case of God, he gave the impression that 
there is some criterion of justice which justifies God's power over 
human beings, and which is, therefore, independent of God's 
commandments. This has made many commentators, most notably 
Leibnii, to accuse Pufendorf's theory of circularity, whereas 
Pufendorf's most famous advocate, the Swiss Jean Barbeyrac, 
explained that Pufendorf's position was based on a distinction 
10 	 On Leibniz's positive evaluation of Grotius, see Leibniz Political Writings (ed. 
and tr. Patrick Riley. Cambridge 1972), p.71. 
I 1 	 De dye XII.1. 
12 	 JNG II.3.20. 
13 	 JNG I.6.9; OHC I.2.5. 
between two types of justice, of which the one that characterizes 
God's power over human beings is not dependent on God's own 
commandments. In the first chapter of Part three I will defend a thesis 
that neither of these interpretations is accurate. Despite some 
admittedly confusing formulations in his theory of obligation 
Pufendorf supported a genuine divine command theory of morality, in 
which the ultimate source of all morality and justice are the precepts 
of God. 
The second chapter of Part three deals with sources of the 
disagreement between Grotius and Pufendorf on this issue. It is 
sometimes suggested that what made Pufendorf reject Grotius' moral 
realism was his commitment to divine voluntarism, i.e. to the view 
that God is totally free to impose any kind of a moral law he wants. In 
my opinion, however, the central issue of disagreement between 
Grotius and Pufendorf was the origin of morality as a human 
phenomenon. Grotius based the moral goodness and badness of those 	 19 
acts which fall into the domain of natural law on the classical 
teleological idea that since human beings are distinguished from other 
animals by their unique intellectual and social faculties, it can be 
deduced that it belongs to human nature to live a peaceful and 
rationally organized social life. For Pufendorf, on the other hand, even 
such a limited teleological conception of human nature was 
inconceivable. In his eyes the fact that human beings are equipped 
with unique intellectual faculties could serve as the basis of moral 
conclusions only with the further premise that there is a God who has 
given these abilities to the human species with a certain purpose in 
mind. 
In the third chapter of Part three I ask why Pufendorf rejected the 
possibility that the normative character of natural law could be based 
on its utility. What makes this question worth asking is Pufendorf's 
insistence that acts which agree with natural law are advantageous 
both to general well-being of the human species and to one's personal 
happiness and security, while acts which disagree with this law have 
the contrary effect. It can be wondered, therefore, why he denied so 
wholeheartedly the possibility that human reason would recognize 
these acts as morally good or bad by contemplating the non-moral 
good and bad they produce. My answer is based on the observation 
that despite Pufendorf's forceful rhetoric on this issue, he did not think 
that those advantages which are most effectively reached by observing 
natural law would be something which all human beings by nature 
desire above everything else. On the contrary, the idea of happiness, 
on which Pufendorf founded the utility of natural law, was itself 
normative and, therefore, in need of justification. 
In the last part of my work I turn to Pufendorf's views concerning 
natural law as a social institution. Much of modern moral philosophy 
has been based on the assumption that all normal adults are, or at least 
are capable of being, competent moral agents, who are able to form 
moral judgements autonomously by using their personal mental 
faculties. One of the central tasks of an ethical theory is then to 
explicate the principles on which human beings more or less tacitly 
rely when they form moral judgements. In Pufendorf we find a 
significantly different idea of the task of moral philosophy. For him 
the central purpose of the discipline of natural law was to prove the 
content of natural law with a demonstrative certainty. And it was 
obvious to Pufendorf that the method by which this could be done was 
not only incomprehensible to the vast uneducated majority, but that it 
also had scarcely anything to do with the manner in which people in 
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reality adopt their moral convictions and form moral judgements. 
However, Pufendorf's works on natural law include numerous remarks 
concerning what we would nowadays call moral sociology, and these 
make it possible to construct his conception of an average moral agent. 
With this purpose in mind, I examine Pufendorf's account of the 
manner in which people adopt and hold their moral convictions; his 
remarks concerning the role the pursuit for security and the desire to 
be esteemed by others has in motivating people to follow the precepts 
of natural law; and, finally, Pufendorf's reasons for holding that a 
tranquil civil life is possible only if the precepts of natural law are 
backed up with a collectively shared fear of God's punishment. 
Pufendorf's Life and Works 
Pufendorf was born in 1632 into the family of a Lutheran pastor in the 
village of Dorchemnitz bei Thalheim, Saxony.' He grew up in the 
middle of a conflict which ruined vast areas of the German heartland - 
the Thirty Years' War. And it is a commonplace to remark that this war 
and its long-felt consequences were a central motive for the quest for 
peace and social stability which governed Pufendorf's intellectual 
activities. 
In 1650 Pufendorf at his fathers request went to the University of 
Leipzig to study theology. However, he soon got bored with Lutheran 	 21 
orthodoxy and became more interested in the humanities, natural 
science, and jurisprudence. The result was a shift to the University of 
Jena in 1656, where he studied natural law and moral philosophy 
under the guidance of the eccentric mathematician and philosopher 
Erhard Weigel, who later also taught Leibniz. In Jena Pufendorf 
became familiar with the avant-garde of seventeenth-century thought 
expressed in the writings of Descartes, Galileo, Grotius, and Hobbes. 
In 1658 Pufendorf took a post as tutor in the family of a Swedish 
diplomat in Copenhagen. Soon a war broke out between Sweden and 
Denmark and Pufendorf was imprisoned with his master's family (the 
master himself managed to flee). In captivity he wrote, without the 
help of books, his first exposition of natural law, Elementorum 
jurisprudentiae universalis (Elements of universal jurisprudence). 
After his release, Pufendorf followed his master to Holland, where this 
work was published in 1660. During his stay in Holland Pufendorf 
met Spinoza, who he disliked both as a philosopher and as a person.2 
He also made acquaintance of Peter de Groot, the son of Hugo 
Grotius. 
In 1661 Pufendorf was nominated to the post of associate professor 
of international law and philology at the University of Heidelberg. In 
Heidelberg he wrote several minor treatises, the most notable of which 
was De statu imperii Germanici (On the constitution of the German 
empire), in which he, under the pseudonym of Severinius de 
1 	 Pufendorf's life has never been documented in any detail. The following 
summary is based on Krieger 1967, Laurent 1982, and Seidler 1990. 
2 	 Spinoza's views on the state of nature are strongly criticized in JNG 1684 II.2.3 
and III.4.4. 
Monzambano, heavily criticized the constitutional system of the 
German empire. This work, which was generally attributed to 
Pufendorf, caused a scandal. It was forbidden in German universities 
and even condemned by the Pope. This, however, did not prevent it 
from becoming one of the best sellers of late seventeenth-century 
Europe. 
In 1670 Pufendorf received a full professorship in natural and 
international law at the University of Lund, where he had been invited 
by the king of Sweden, Charles XI. Two years later he published his 
major work on natural law, De jure naturae et gentium, and in the 
following year a textbook version of his theory, De officio hominis et 
civis. The theory presented in these two works departed radically from 
the prevailing Lutheran orthodoxy and was heavily criticized by 
theologians both in Sweden and Germany. The result was what has 
sometimes been called the greatest intellectual debate in seventeenth- 
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century Europe.3 During the 1670's Pufendorf's wrote several answers 
to the accusations made against his theory, which were collected in 
1686 under the title Eris scandica (Scandinavian polemics).4 Before 
that, in 1684, he published the second, considerably extended version 
of De jure naturae et gentium. It is sometimes suggested that because 
of the strong critique directed against him, the additions Pufendorf 
made to this edition were deliberately less controversial than the views 
presented in the first version. In Part two I shall argue, however, that 
the basic structure of Pufendorf's theory were the same in both 
editions. 
By the time Pufendorf published the second edition of De jure 
naturae et gentium his career as a university professor had already 
ended. This happened in 1676 when Denmark captured Lund, after 
which Pufendorf moved to Stockholm to become a councillor and 
state historian to Charles XI. Hereafter his literary activities were 
dedicated chiefly to political history, first in Sweden and from 1688 
onwards also in Brandenburg, where he worked as a historian and 
councillor to Frederick William I and later to Frederick III. His most 
significant work in this field was a comparative history of major 
European states, Einleitung zu der Historie der vorhnehmsten Reiche 
and Staaten so itziger Zeit in Europa sich befinden (Introduction to the 
history of the principal realms and states as they currently exist in 
Europe, 1682-6 ). This work was quite popular during the eighteenth 
3 	 On this debate, see Fiametta Palladini Discussioni seicentesche su Samuel 
Pufendorf scritti latini: 1663-1700. Bologna 1978. 
4 	 Another collection of essays, Dissertationes academicae selectiores, was 
published in 1675. 
century when it was translated into French, English, and even into 
Russian. To the French version editors added chapters on the more 
distant countries which Pufendorf had not dealt with and the work 
became a model for Enlightenment encyclopedias of comparative 
politics. 
While working as a historian, Pufendorf made two forays into 
religious issues. The first one of these was motivated by the revocation 
of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in 1685. The oppression of 
Protestants in France forced Pufendorf to sharpen his views 
concerning the extent to which religion should be subordinated to 
political power. The result was De habitu religionis christianae ad 
vitam civilem (On the nature of Christian religion in relation to civil 
life, 1687), in which attempted to show the actions of the French 
monarch as illegitimate without at the same time championing full-
scale religious toleration. The other theological work was Jus feciale 
divinium sive de consensu et dissensu protestantium (The law of 	 23 
covenants, or on the consensus and dissension among Protestants), in 
which Pufendorf presented a rational basis for the unification of the 
Protestant churches.5 This work was published posthumously in 1695. 
Pufendorf died in 1694 during a sea voyage from Stockholm, where 
he had just received a barony from Charles XI. 
Until the second half of the eighteenth century Pufendorf was the 
most widely read modern moral and political theorists in Europe. The 
number of the editions made of his works on natural law is impressive. 
Of De jure naturae et gentium at least forty-five editions appeared 
during the first hundred years after its publication. Most of these were 
in Latin, French, and English, but the work was also translated into 
German and Italian. The short De officio hominis et civis was 
understandably even more popular with over seventy editions 
including a Russian translation in 1726, commissioned by Peter the 
Great. A significant role in the spread of Pufendorf's ideas was played 
by Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744), a Swiss Protestant who translated 
both works into French (De jure 1706, De officio 1707), supplying the 
major work with an extensive commentary. It was above all the 
"Barbeyracian" version of Pufendorf's theory which became generally 
known to educated classes in eighteenth-century Europe.6 By the 
5 	 On Pufendorf views on ecclesiastical and theological issues, see Rabe 1958, 
Krieger 1965, and Laurent 1983. 
6 	 On Barbeyrac and the spread of his translations, see Othmer 1970. Pufendorf's 
position in the French speaking world is treated in Dufour 1986, while Derathe 
1950 and Goldschmidt 1983 analyzes Rousseau's relation to Pufendorf. 
Pufendorf's influence was powerful also in Scotland, where Gershom 
Carmichael's commentary on De officio hominis et civis had a central place in 
second half of the eighteenth century the overall view on morality and 
politics which was championed by Grotius and Pufendorf had become 
so much the collective property of European thinking that writers 
increasingly found Pufendorf's views either too self-evident or too 
old-fashioned to be worthy of serious comment. Finally, the new 
concerns which were actualized by the rise of subject-centered 
Kantian philosophy made Pufendorf seem hopelessly unsophisticated 
and transformed him from one of the founders of modern moral 
philosophy into a mere classic of jurisprudence and international law.7 
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university education. As a result, writers such as Francis Hutcheson, David 
Hume, and Adam Smith formulated their ideas within an Pufendorfian 
framework. On this, see Buckle 1991, Forbes 1982, Haakonsen 1981 and 1990, 
Hont 1987, Hont and Ignatief 1983, James 1990, James and Silverthome 1983a 
and 1983b, Mautner 1986, Medick 1973, Stein 1980. On Pufendorf's influence in 
Sweden, see Lindberg 1976 and 1986. 
7 	 On this shift, see Tuck 1987, pp.99-102. 
Part one 
The Idea of Natural Law 
When comparing natural law with other types of law which govern 
human conduct Pufendorf defines it as "the most common rule of human 
action, according to which every human being as a rational animal 
should order his actions." It is "universal, inasmuch as all mankind is 
bound to observe it, and perpetual, inasmuch it is not, like positive laws, 
subject to change "1 Moreover, it is a rule which can be discovered by 
reason alone, without any divine revelation, because of its agreement 
with human nature.2 This idea of an unchanging and universal norm of 
human behaviour based on human nature and recognizable by natural 
reason links Pufendorf's theory to the long series of reflections on 
natural law starting with the ancient Stoics. However, while Pufendorf is 
well aware that the notion of natural law has a long history, he maintains 
that the systematic study of this law is a very recent phenomenon. The 
discipline of natural law is something which has been "long neglected 
and practically ignored" and has only recently "finally begun to lay 
claim to its own dignity."3 In the following three chapters my aim is to 
explicate the conception of natural law which lies behind this sense of 
novelty which Pufendorf attaches to his enterprise. 
THE NOVELTY OF THE DISCIPLINE OF 
NATURAL LAW 
In declaring that the systematic study of natural law is a recent 
phenomenon, Pufendorf does not mean that natural law would have 
1 	 JNG II.3.1: "[C]onsequens est ut dispiciamus de communissima actionum 
humanarum regula, ad quam quilibet homo, ut est animal rationale, sese 
componere tenetur. Earn regulam juris seu legis naturae vocabulo insignere usu 
invaluit; quam legem universalem vocare possis, quo ad eandem universum genus 
mortalium sit obstrictum; perpetuam, quod mutationi, sicut positivae leges, non 
sit obnoxia." 
2 	 JNG 1.6.18, 11.3.20. 
3 	 JNG Praefatio. 
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been totally unknown or unexplored in previous times. On the 
contrary, the central principles of this law have governed the majority 
of human customs and actions in all ages,4 and many ancient 
discussions on moral issues, like the Bible or the Digest, have 
included the rudiments of natural law. Nevertheless, there had been no 
systematic presentation of natural law before the seventeenth century. 
The main problem with earlier moral philosophy was its failure to 
distinguish adequately the rules common to all human beings from 
positive legislation — either divine or civic — peculiar to some 
restricted group.5 To be sure, Pufendorf holds that such defects did not 
characterize the ancient Stoic writers, who understood rightly the 
universal character of natural law and also held a correct general 
insight of its content. They had presented remarks which, "when 
slightly revised", could have easily formed "a solid body of natural 
law".6 In the preface to the second edition of De jure naturae et 
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	 gentium Pufendorf even speculates about possibility that something 
"more finished and sublime than our own moral teachings" could be 
found in writings of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. 
However, the teachings of the Stoics had been neglected in scholastic 
philosophy, which Pufendorf sees as the principal reason for the 
undeveloped state of the study of natural law. The scholastics had not 
only ignored the Stoic doctrines but — what was even worse — had 
given Aristotle an indisputable status among philosophers. This had a 
most degenerating effect on the study of natural law. This was so, first, 
because in his practical philosophy Aristotle had totally ignored the 
requirement of universality set for this discipline. His works on ethics 
contained hardly anything other than a treatment of the peculiar 
virtues7 of the citizen in certain Greek city-states, while his Politics 
was mostly concerned with the various constitutional arrangements of 
the Greek states. These were, Pufendorf remarks, most serious defects 
in a discipline "which ought to be useful for the whole of mankind."8 
Another serious consequence from the authoritative position given 
to Aristotle was the opinion, supported by "the majority of scholars", 
that demonstrative knowledge is not possible in moral questions in 
4 	 Eris scandica p.163 (Specimen controversiarum I.1): "tus naturale, humano 
generi coaeuum, quod omni tempore populorum mores et negotia ex pleraque 
parte rexit, ..." 
5 	 Eris scandica p.164-166 (Specimen controversiarum I.2-3). 
6 	 Eris scandica p.166 (Specimen controversiarum I.4.) 
7 	 Actually Pufendorf speaks of duties (officia) not virtues, which constitute the 
principal subject-matter of Aristotle's ethical works. However, for Pufendorf 
virtue means nothing but a habitual disposition to perform one's duty. See JNG 
1.4.6. 
8 	 Eris scandica p.166 (Specimen controversiarum I.4.) 
which everything relies solely on probable opinions. According to 
Pufendorf, this view has "inflicted an immense injury" on the study of 
natural law. It had made "scholars to investigate but diffidently into 
that which they believed rested on slippery foundation" and offered 
those who have neglected the moral sciences altogether the plausible 
excuse "that they were founded on no certain demonstrations and 
could be treated in a rough and ready fashion. "9  As a result, "most of 
those who have thus far announced their intention to discus moral 
philosophy have believed that they have expounded the greatest part of 
the science when they have explicated the names of the eleven 
virtues.")  
Hence, despite the valuable contribution made by the Stoics, there 
had been no truly systematic study of natural law before the 
seventeenth century. Although Pufendorf is anxious to emphasize his 
own position as the holder of the first university chair dedicated to this 
subject, he does not claim himself to be the first exponent in this field 
of study. This honour he gives to Hugo Grotius. With his De iure belli 
ac pacis, Grotius was the first who "accurately distinguished the laws 
of nature from positive laws, and put them in a systematic order."II 
And with regard to a large part of the discipline, his contribution had 
been so substantial that he "had left all others nothing more than the 
task of gleaning after him." Nevertheless, Grotius' work had not been 
devoted to natural law as such but to the norms which ought to govern 
international relations. Consequently, he had not only made some 
obvious errors but also omitted several issues entirely and treated 
many others only superficially. Therefore, Pufendorf thinks that 
instead of presenting a mere commentary of Grotius' work it is 
necessary "to lay all the material a second time on the anvil, and to 
reshape it into a different form."I2 
9 	 JNG I.2.1: "Inolita dudum plerosque eruditorum tenet persuasio, disciplinis 
moralibus deesse illam certitudinem, quae scientiae aliae, et cumprimis 
mathematicae gaudent; eo quod in illis locum non habeant demonstrations, ex 
quibus solis liquida scientia, metuque erroris vacua provenit; sed quae circa 
easden cognoscuntur, probabili duntaxat opinione constrare. Quae res quidem 
immane quantum nocuit nobilissimis, vitaeque humanae maxime necessaris 
disciplinis. Inde enim factum, ut suspenso fere brachio docti excolerent, quae tam 
lubrico inniti fundamento credebant: et plausibilis heic negligentibus excusatio 
suppetebat, certis demonstrationibus ista hautquidquam contineri, sed crassa 
duntaxat Minerva posse tractari." 
10 	 JNG I.4.6: ".., cum hactenus plerique, qui philosophiam moralem se tradituros 
professi sunt, magnam disciplinae suae partem, explicatis undecim virtutum 
vocabulis, repraesentasse se crediderint." 
11 	 Eris Scandica p.163 (Specimen controversarium 1.1.): "Verum, qui naturalia iura 
a positivius accurate discemeret, et ista in pieni systematis rotunditatem disponere 
aggrederetur, ante Hugonem Grotium nemo extitit." 
12 	 JNG Praefatio. 
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Besides Grotius there have been but few significant contributions to 
the study of natural law. In the preface to De jure naturae et gentium 
Pufendorf names only two Englishmen, John Selden (1554-1654) and 
Thomas Hobbes.13 Moreover, while Pufendorf praises Selden for 
showing abilities which could have given him "a position second to 
none", in practice he sees Selden's contribution as rather insignificant. 
Selden's main problem was his idiosyncratic attempt to base a 
presentation of natural law on the so-called preacepta Noacharium — 
the law which God gave to Noah's sons after the Flood — which he 
reconstructed from Hebrew literature, especially from the Talmud.14 
Pufendorf does not deny that God has with great probability given 
early human beings some announcement concerning natural law. 
However, by concentrating on the Hebrew tradition Selden has failed 
to offer an account of natural law founded on natural reason.15 
Hobbes' contribution to the study of natural law, on the other hand, 
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has been truly substantial. His "works on the science of politics have a 
great deal that is of the highest value, and no one who understands 
such matters would deny that he has so thoroughly explored the 
structure of human and civil society that few before his time can in 
this field be compared with him."I6 By this Pufendorf does not mean 
that he would accept Hobbes' theory in its entirety. However, even 
Hobbes' errors are valuable since they make one think about matters 
which most probably would otherwise never occur to one's mind. In 
this way his errors provide "the foothold by which moral and political 
science can be led to the highest peak".'7 Such estimations were, of 
course, highly controversial in a time when Hobbes was commonly 
seen as an Epicurean atheist whose theory undermined most of the 
things on which human societies ought to be founded.'8 Pufendorf 
shares this evaluation in so far as Hobbes' religious teachings are 
concerned. By his abominable theories in this field Hobbes "has 
turned many against him, and not without reason." Yet, even this 
13 	 In the essay Speculum controversiarum (originally published in 1678 and later 
included in Eris scandica) Pufendorf mentions a third Englishman, the theologian 
Richard Cumberland, whose anti-Hobbesian De legibus naturae was published in 
the same year as Pufendorf's main work. On Cumberland, see Kirk 1987. 
14 	 Selden's major work was the De lure Naturali et Gentium juxta Disciplinam 
Erbarorum (On the Law Nature and Nations according to the Hebrean Teaching) 
published in 1640. On Selden's theory, see Tuck 1991 and 1993 pp.205-221. 
15 	 Eris scandica pp. 163-164 (Specimen controversiarum I.1.) 
16 	 JNG Praefatio. 
17 	 Eris scandica p. 168 (Specimen controversiarum I.6.). 
18 	 On such reactions in England, see Minz 1962. The same attitute was dominant on 
the Continent. The accusation of Hobbism was one of the main charges against 
Pufendorf in the confrontation which arose after the publication of De jure 
naturae et gentium. 
concession to the prevailing opinion is not totally unqualified, for 
Pufendorf adds that Hobbes seems to have been "censured with the 
greatest scorn by those who have read and understood him the least."'9 
The method by which Pufendorf demonstrates natural law will be 
treated in Part two. Before that, I will try to answer what conception of 
natural law makes Pufendorf see Grotius as the first scholar who had 
adequately distinguished natural law from other laws and why he also 
regards Hobbes as a significant contributor to this field of study. The 
incentive for these questions comes above all from the disagreements 
these three writers had in questions concerning the normative 
character of natural law. As has already been mentioned, Grotius 
maintained that what distinguishes natural law from other laws was 
the fact that it is concerned with acts which are in themselves, 
independent of all imposition, morally good or bad and therefore 
allowed or forbidden by God. From this he concluded that natural law 
would have some place as a normative criterion of human behaviour 	 29 
even if there were no God. Pufendorf, in contrast, declares that all 
human behavior is as such morally neutral and can be morally good or 
bad, right or wrong, only in so far as it is permitted or prohibited by 
God.20 It can be wondered, therefore, why he insists so forcefully that 
Grotius was the first who had accurately separated natural law from 
other laws. 
What makes the esteem Pufendorf shows towards Hobbes 
somewhat puzzling is his commitment to the idea of natural law as an 
universal moral standard by which the laws and customs of individual 
nations as well as the behaviour of states in international conflicts can 
be morally evaluated. For even though Hobbes had used the term 
"natural law" in his political theory, it can be argued that he had 
stripped the word of most of the normative connotations it 
conventionally had. Hobbes not only claimed that in the state of nature 
(i.e. outside civil societies) natural law is just a dictate of reason which 
gives no objective criteria for right and wrong.21 He also maintained 
that within civil society the rightness and wrongness of human acts are 
totally dependent on the commands of the sovereign and that the pacts 
by which civil power is created leave no criteria by which the 
sovereign can be said to be acting justly or unjustly towards his 
subjects.22 This "legal positivism" buried in Hobbes' theory was not 
unnoticed by Pufendorf. On the contrary, he repeatedly criticized 
19 	 JNG Praefatio. 
20 	 JNG I.2.6; 1I.3.4; II.3.20. See below chapter 3.2. 
21 	 De Give 12.1. 
22 	 De cive 5.7. Leviathan chap.17, p.227. 
Hobbes for his claim that before the establishment of states there were 
no criteria for right and wrong.23 And even though the practical 
conclusions of Hobbes' political theory were by no means 
disagreeable for Pufendorf, he was not ready to swallow the idea that 
there are no moral standards by which actions of the civil sovereign 
can be evaluated.24 But as we have seen above, even errors of this 
magnitude did not prevent Pufendorf from presenting Hobbes as the 
second most important figure in the development of the discipline of 
natural law. 
THE REFUTATION OF MORAL 
RELATIVISM 
30 	 It seems, thus, that correct views concerning the nonnative character 
of natural law are not, in Pufendorf's eyes, the central requirement for 
making a contribution to the study of this law. This point has been 
endorsed recently by Richard Tuck in his interpretation of the modern 
school of natural law. According to Tuck, the appreciation Pufendorf 
showed towards Grotius and Hobbes did not follow from any 
agreement with so called "foundational" questions, but from the fact 
that these three shared a common concern which distinguished them 
radically from all previous theorists of natural law. This was the 
commitment to overcome contemporary moral scepticism by 
identifying the content of natural law in one way or another with the 
requirements of self-preservation 25 Since Tuck's account is both an 
attempt to explain Pufendorf's views concerning the history of his 
discipline and an interesting interpretation of the modern school of 
natural law in general, it is worthwhile to examine it in more detail. 
By moral scepticism Tuck refers to the relativist attitude to moral 
issues which enjoyed some popularity in Europe from the end of the 
sixteenth century and which found its most influential expression in 
the works of Justus Lipsius, Michel Montaigne and Pierre Charron. 
23 	 See, for example, JNG II.3.20, 
24 	 JNG VII.2.9-11. 
25 	 Richard Tuck "The `Modem' School of Natural Law", in The Languages of 
Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden. Cambridge, 
1987. Tuck deals with the idea that the modern theory of natural law developed as 
an attempt to overcome scepticism also in "Grotius, Cameades and Hobbes", 
Grotiana, n.s. 4., 1983; Hobbes, Oxford 1989; "Grotius and Selden", in 
Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 ed. J.H.Bums and Markie 
Goldie. Cambridge, 1991; Philosophy and Government 1572-1651. Cambridge, 
1993. 
These writers strongly criticized the idea that certain moral views 
would somehow be natural for human beings. Paying attention to the 
huge variety of human laws and customs they rejected the idea of a 
universal natural law which offers the foundation for civil laws. "The 
laws are maintained in credit," wrote Montaigne, "not because they are 
just but because they are laws. That is the mystical foundation of their 
authority; they have no other."26 Consequently, there were no criteria 
by which the laws and customs of different states could be morally 
evaluated. 
The central practical conclusion men like Montaigne and Charron 
drew from these observations was that a wise human being, who is 
principally concerned with protecting himself from harm, does not 
take any moral conviction too seriously, but rather adjusts himself to 
the laws and customs which happen to prevail in his country. 
However, the great diversity of moral beliefs was also used to justify 
the much more disturbing claim that acting against the conventional 
rules of justice is congenial for human beings and nations whenever 
this appears to be beneficial to their own interests. This attitude was 
usually attributed to the ancient sceptic Cameades, whose views on 
moral issues were known mainly through the following summary in 
Lactantius 's Divinarum Institutionum: 
Men impose laws upon themselves for utility. These vary according 
to their customs, and among the same people often undergo 
changes as times change; and there is no law of nature. For all 
creatures, men as well as animals, are impelled by nature toward 
their own utility. Consequently, there is no justice, or if such there 
were, it would be supreme folly, since one does damage to oneself 
if one takes care of the advantage of others ... If all nations which 
have flourished from domination, even Romans who are masters of 
the whole world, would wish to be just, that is, restore other's 
possessions, they would have to return to cottages and to sink into 
scarcity and misery.27 
Tuck holds that Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf all shared 
Montaigne's and Charron's distrust of traditional ethical theories. 
26 	 Essais, Book 3, ch.13. 
27 	 Divinarum institotionum, V.16: "Jura sibi homines pro utilitate sanxisse, scilicet 
varia pro moribus, et apud eosdem pro temporibus saepe mutata; jus auteur 
naturalem esse nullum: omnes homines, et alias animantes ad utilitates nuas 
natura ducente fem; proinde aut nullam esse justitiam, aut, si sit aliqua, summam 
esse stultitiam, quoniam sibi noceret, alienis commodis consulens.... Omnibus 
populis, qui florerent imperio, et Romanis quoque ipsis, qui totius orbis 
potirentur, si justi velint esse, hoc est, si aliena restituant, ad casas esse 
redeundum, et in egestate ac miseriis jacendum." 
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However, they were simultaneously disturbed by the popularity of the 
Carneadian position and wanted to refute it. This concern was 
expressed at the beginning of the Prolegomena to De iure belli ac 
pacis, where Grotius remarked how "there is no lack of men" who 
think that the laws which govern relations among states have no reality 
apart from an empty name. And instead of dealing with "a crowd of 
opponents" he chose to take Carneades as the main representative of 
this position 28 No worries of this sort can, of course, be found in 
Hobbes, who denied the idea that something deserving the name "law" 
could govern international relations. Tuck holds, however, that Hobbes 
expressed discontent with the Carneadean position in his argument 
against the "the Poole", i.e. a person who believes that acting unjustly 
is sometimes advantageous for personal well-being.29 Finally, in De 
jure naturae et gentium Pufendorf devoted two paragraphs of the 
chapter dealing with the foundations of natural law in order to refute 
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those for whom the diversity of human customs has given an "excuse 
for alleging that there is no such things as natural law, and that all law 
has arisen from the convenience of individual states, and cannot be 
measured in any other way." 30 
According to Tuck, it was above all the importance Pufendorf 
placed on the argument against Cameadean relativism which made 
him feel that there was a fundamental division between the ancient 
and medieval natural-law writers and the modern ones. If one "is 
principally alert to the problem of moral scepticism," Tuck remarks, 
"then it is true that both ancient and medieval moral philosophy will 
prove unsatisfactory." This is because "no major work of ethics 
devoted explicitly to refuting the sceptic survives from antiquity, and 
medieval natural-law thinking is conspicuous by its lack of awareness 
that full-blooded moral scepticism was an intellectual possibility." 
28 	 IBP Prolegomena (§ 3-5). 
29 	 Tuck relies on the following passage in Leviathan, ch.15, p.101: "The Foole hath 
sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and sometimes also with his 
tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans conservation, and contentment, being 
committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do 
what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not to make; 
keep, or not to keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones 
benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be Convenants; and that they are 
sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called 
Injustice, and that the observance of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether 
Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the same Foole hath said in his heart 
there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to 
every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conducteth to such a 
benefit, as shall put a man in condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise, and 
revilings, but also the power of other men." 
30 	 JNG II.3.10-11. 
Consequently, "the simple deduction which Montaigne and Charron 
made from the observed fact of radical moral disagreement, that 
perhaps there could be no universal standard of right and wrong, was 
something to which men at the beginning of the seventeenth century 
had to think up their own response.."31 What, then, made Pufendorf 
regard Grotius and Hobbes as his predecessors was that they had 
refuted the Cameadean position by integrating "the laws of nature into 
a system based on self-preservation".32 
Grotius had formulated the new theory first in a manuscript he 
wrote in 1604/5. This remained unpublished until the nineteenth 
century, when it appeared under the title De iure pradae 
commentarius. In this early work Grotius' conscious aim was to show 
that a universal moral law, albeit a very restricted one, can be 
established on principles which even the sceptics cannot deny. His 
starting point was the Stoic idea of the primacy of self-preservation in 
human behaviour, which Cicero in De finibus had expressed in the 	 33 
following words: 
Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of its birth 
strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse 
bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct 
for self-preservation and for the maintenance of itself in the best 
condition possible to it in accordance with its nature 33 
This was something neither Cameades nor any modem sceptic had 
denied. According to Tuck, Grotius' new theory of natural law 
followed, then, from the realization that "the sceptic could be 
answered once the full implications of his acceptance of the principle 
of self-preservation had been thought out."34 
In De iure pradae these implications were expressed within a 
framework of the divine command theory of morality. Grotius not 
only maintained that "what God has shown to be his will, that is law," 
but he explicitly denied the claim that God wills something because it 
is already just.35 The Stoic idea of the primacy of self-preservation 
was applied when Grotius turned to the question of how God's will is 
known. 
Since God fashioned creation and willed its existence, every 
individual part thereof has received from Him certain natural 
31 	 Tuck 1987, p.115-116. 
32 	 Tuck 1987, p.113. 
33 	 De finibus V.24. Translation from Tuck 1993, pp.6-7. 
34 	 Tuck 1987, pp.110-111. 
properties whereby that existence may be preserved and each part 
guided for its own good, in conformity, one might say, with the 
fundamental law inherent in its origin. From this fact the old poets 
and philosophers have rightly deduced that love, whose primary 
force and action was directed to self-interest, is the first principle of 
the whole natural order. Consequently, Horace should not be 
censured for saying, in imitation of the Academics [i.e. Cameades], 
that expediency might perhaps be called the mother of justice and 
equity. For all things in nature, as Cicero repeatedly insists, are 
tenderly regardful of self, and seek their own happiness and 
security. This phenomenon can be observed not only in the human 
race, but among the beasts also, and even in and with inanimate 
objects, being a manifestation of that true and divinely inspired 
self-love, which is laudable in every phase of creation.36 
On these grounds Grotius derived two fundamental laws of nature: "It 
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shall be permissible to defend [one's own] life and shun that which 
threatens to prove injurious" and "It shall be permissible to acquire for 
oneself, and retain, those things which are useful for life." He 
especially emphasized how these two principles were something 
which nobody had seriously questioned: 
Moreover, no member of any sect of philosophers, when embarking 
upon a discussion of the ends, has ever failed to lay down these two 
laws first of all as indisputable axioms. For on this point the Stoics, 
the Epicureans, and the Peripatetics are in complete agreement and 
apparently even the Academics have entertained no doubt.37 
Grotius also mentioned two other general laws of nature besides those 
mentioned above: "Let no one inflict injury upon his fellows" and 
"Let no one seize possession of that which has been taken into the 
possession of another." However, the precise manner in which these 
are known to be commands of God remained unclear as Grotius failed 
to explain how they follow from the desire for self-preservation.38 
As mentioned above, De iure pradae remained unpublished until 
the nineteenth century. Hence, in Pufendorf's eyes, Grotius' position 
as the founder of the systematic study of natural law was based solely 
on De iure belli ac pacis. And the theory of natural law Grotius 
presented in this work differed in two respects significantly from the 
one put forth in the early manuscript. Now both the argument against 
35 	 De lure pradae, p.8. 
36 	 De lure pradae, p.9. Translation from Tuck 1993, pp.172-173. 
37 	 De lure pradae, pp.10-11. Translation from Tuck 1993, p.173. 
38 	 See Tuck 1993, pp.173-174. 
Carneades and the theory of natural law were based on the idea that it 
belongs to human nature to desire for peaceful and rationally 
organized society. Moreover, Grotius abandoned the divine 
voluntarism he had advocated in De iure pradae, supporting now the 
rationalist position that natural law is concerned with acts which are 
just or unjust in themselves and therefore necessarily commanded or 
forbidden by God.39 
Tuck holds, however, that the novelties in the main work did not 
prevent Pufendorf from perceiving that Grotius' reply to Carneades 
was "to stress the importance of self-interest."40 This was so because 
despite the seemingly radical changes Grotius made to his theory in 
De iure belli ac pacis, he did not abandon the original idea presented 
in the early manuscript41 Grotius still cited approvingly Cicero's 
description of the natural primacy of self-preservation in human 
behaviour.42 Moreover, although he now remarked that the claim, 
according to which expediency is the mother of justice, is not true "if 
we want to speak accurately," he still held that observing natural law is 
beneficial for individual survival. Utility is "added to natural law: for 
in order to make us more eager to cultivate society, the author of 
nature wished that as individuals we should be weak, and should lack 
many things needed in order to live properly."43  
This idea of the correspondence between natural law and the 
requisites of self-preservation was, of course, explicitly affirmed by 
Hobbes. In De cive he defined natural law as "the dictate of right 
reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or 
omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as 
in us lies."44 
 What distinguished Hobbes from Grotius was his claim 
that outside civil societies the laws of nature do not offer an 
intersubjective criterion for right and wrong. This view followed, 
according to Tuck, from the fact that Hobbes took seriously the 
epistemological scepticism which bothered many philosophers in the 
first half of the seventeenth century. Hobbes admitted that while 
people otherwise have most various conceptions of what is good and 
39 	 These aspects of Grotius' mature theory will be examined in chapter 3.2. 
40 	 Tuck 1987, p.109. 
41 	 Tuck 1987, pp.112-113. 
42 	 1BP I.2.1. 
43 	 IBP Prolegomena: "Quod ergo dicitur non Carneaditantum, sed alns, Utilitas justi 
prope mater et aequi, si accurate loquamur, verum non est: nam naturalis juris 
mater est ipsa humana natura, quae nos etiam re nulla indigeremus ad societatem 
mutuam appetendam ferret. ... Sed naturali juri utilitas accedit: voluit enim 
naturae auctor nos singulos infirmos esse, et multarum rerum ad vitam recte 
ducundam egentes, quo magis ad collendam sociatatem rapemerur." 
44 	 De cive 2.2. 
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bad, they grant, if they are consistent, that everybody has the right to 
defend themselves against wanton violence. The problem was that in 
so far as human beings govern their conduct unrestricted by any 
external force, it remains for each individual to decide what is 
dangerous for him and what means are necessary for ensuring his 
safety. And Hobbes held that in such a situation an intersubjective 
answer to this question was even in principle impossible 45 Therefore, 
so long as everybody is free to estimate the requirements of his safety 
independently, there is "an irreconcilable conflict over the practical 
circumstances in which the right of self-preservation should be 
exercised"46 Such a state of affairs can be removed only by creating 
an artificial consensus, i.e. a civil sovereign to which people renounce 
their natural right to decide about the means of self-preservation. 
Pufendorf did not accept Hobbes' account of the amoral character 
of the state of nature. What he did share, according to Tuck, was 
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Hobbes' idea that natural law is identical with the requirements of 
self-preservation. This idea Tuck finds affirmed in JNG II.3.15, where 
Pufendorf deduces what he calls the fundamental principles of natural 
law: 
It is clear that man is an animal most desirous of his own 
preservation, in himself exposed to want, unable to exist without 
the help of his fellow-creatures, most fitted to advance the mutual 
good, and yet at times malicious, petulant, and easily irritated, as 
well as quick and powerful to do injury. For such an animal to stay 
alive it is necessary that he be sociable, that is, be willing to join 
himself with others like him, and conduct himself towards them in 
a way which does not give them any cause to do him harm, but 
rather gives them a reason to preserve and increase his advantage. 
And so the fundamental law of nature is that every man, so far as in 
him lies, should cultivate and conserve towards others peaceful 
sociality.47  
Tuck holds that Pufendorf's starting point in this passage was by and 
large the same which Grotius had adopted in De iure pradae. How 
God wants human beings to behave can be gathered from the fact that 
he has made them principally concerned with their own preservation. 
Sociality as the fundamental principle of natural law follows, then, 
from the fact that it is a necessary prerequisite for self-preservation. 
According to Tuck, it was this conception of natural law which made 
Pufendorf regard Grotius as the founder of the whole discipline. 
45 	 Tuck 1993, pp.306-307. 
46 	 Tuck 1993, p.348. 
47 	 JNG II.3.15. The Latin text is cited below in p.63. 
Despite their disagreements on the so-called foundational questions, 
they both "believed that what was right (honestum), was so because it 
was fundamentally profitable (utile) to an individual in need of 
protection from his fellow men." Correspondingly, "it was because 
Pufendorf believed this that he could speak of Hobbes with such 
approval, and bracket his name with Grotius."48  
It is not possible for me to evaluate Tuck's interesting interpretation 
of the modem theory of natural law in its entirety. In so far as Grotius 
is concerned, I can only say that while the position Tuck gives to the 
desire for self-preservation in the theory Grotius put forward in De 
iure belli ac pacis appears as somewhat one-sided to me,49 his account 
certainly makes better sense of Grotius than the traditional view which 
sees a continuity between Grotius and the scholastic tradition of 
natural law. I also find conceivable the idea that in his account of the 
state of nature, where there are no intersubjective criteria for right or 
wrong, Hobbes took the Carneadean position very seriously.5o 
As for Pufendorf, it is evident that he also was concerned about the 
popularity of Carneades' views. In De jure naturae et gentium 
Pufendorf devotes two paragraphs in the theoretically central chapter 
II.3. to refute the Carneadean position. Behind this view Pufendorf 
sees the ambiguity of the word "utility", which refers both to 
immediate but short-term and less instantaneous but lasting 
advantages. His main argument against Carneades is that in reality 
observing natural law is congenial with long-term utility.51 This 
argument is temporarily withdrawn in the essay De statu hominum 
naturali, which was included in the collection Dissertationes 
academicae selectiores (1675).52 Here, Pufendorf remarks that 
although the word "utility" can be understood in a way which makes it 
compatible with natural law, it should still be avoided in the 
connection of natural law, because the short-term idea of utility has 
become so dominant in common usage 53 However, in the second 
48 Tuck 1987, p.105. The idea that Pufendorf's theory was formulated in order to 
refute Cameadean relativism is affirmed also in Hont 1987, p.259, and Seidler 
1990, p.49. 
49 	 See below chapter The disagreement with Grotius. 
50 Tuck has suggested that even Hobbes' mechanistic natural philosophy was 
inspired by an attempt to refute epistemological scepticism (Tuck 1989, pp.40-
50, Tuck 1993, ch.7). This view is criticized in Sorel 1988 and Zagorin 1993. I 
am not able to take a stand on this issue. It seems to me, however, that it is 
separable from the question whether Hobbes' political theory was affected by the 
Cameadean position. 
51 	 JNG II.3.10-11 
52 	 A modern edition and English translation of this essay can be found in Samuel 
Pufendorf s "On the natural state", ed. and tr. Michael Seidler. Lewiston, 
Queenston, Lampeter, 1990. 
53 	 De statu § 10. 
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edition of De jure naturae et gentium Pufendorf gives new force to his 
original argument, stating now quite straightforwardly, pace 
Cameades, that actions which agree with natural law "procure some 
advantage and reward for a man, and contribute to his happiness," 
whereas actions repugnant to these rules "may at times return some 
utility, and more often some pleasure, which however never endures 
for long, and is followed by a throng of much greater ills."54 
However, although Pufendorf obviously regards the refutation of 
Carneades as a question of considerable importance, I do not think 
that the wish to overcome Carneadean relativism played that kind of 
constitutive role in Pufendorf's theory of natural law as Tuck seems to 
suggests. Nor do I think that it was Pufendorf's reason for holding 
Grotius as the founder of the discipline of natural law. As Tuck 
himself points out, the last mentioned idea cannot be found in 
Pufendorf's works but was first expressed by Jean Barbeyrac in his 
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	 introduction to the French translation of De jure naturae et gentium.55 
This, I think, is no coincidence. In the first place, even though 
Pufendorf repeatedly emphasizes the utility of natural law for 
individual security, he does not derive sociality as the fundamental 
principle of natural law from the instinct for self-preservation. The 
detailed proof for this claim will be presented in Part two. Before 
doing that, I aim to show that Pufendorf's general conception of 
natural law and his account of the history of his discipline are, in fact, 
best understood in the context of his Lutheran background. 
PUFENDORF'S LUTHERAN 
INHERITANCE 
Luther is well-known for his hostility towards Aristotelian and 
Thomist ethical teachings. In his eyes, classical ethical doctrines 
taught by the scholastics only drew away attention from the invaluable 
teachings of Christ. However, unlike Calvin, who held that the fall 
had made human beings completely unable to reach a knowledge of 
right and wrong independently of God's revealed word, Luther did not 
deny the existence of natural morality altogether. On the contrary, he 
maintained that every human being is aware of a moral law which is 
54 	 JNG 1684 II.3.10. 
55 	 Tuck 1987, p.107-108. 
identical with the Decalogue and the demand of love declared in the 
Gospel. It is important to notice, however, that Luther's understanding 
of the character of natural moral law differed radically from the 
Thomist doctrine. 
A fundamental feature in the Thomist theory of natural law was the 
idea that there is a correspondence between natural law and natural 
human inclinations. Human reason recognizes natural law by 
reflecting on the proclivities which are natural for the human species. 
Together with other animals human beings are inclined to self-
preservation, the propagation of the species, and the raising of the 
offspring. Thus, human reason comprehends that natural law orders all 
those means which are necessary for achieving these ends. Human 
beings also possess, according to Aquinas, the distinctively human 
tendency to seek happiness by using their unique intellectual abilities. 
Happiness, in turn, is to be found mainly in the knowledge of God. We 
understand, therefore, that natural law orders us to seek such a 
knowledge. When human beings follow these inclinations they 
participate in the eternal law, i.e. in the rational principle which has 
always existed in God's mind and which God followed when he 
created the world.56 
In Luther we fmd a drastically different idea of what natural law is 
all about 57 Luther not only rejected Aquinas' rationalist conception of 
law, adopting the voluntarist position according to which the source of 
law is not some eternal rational principle but God's will.58 He also 
maintained that there is a radical discrepancy between the way God 
wants human beings to behave and the manner in which they are 
inclined to act. Before the fall, when they still were images of God, 
human beings obeyed the law spontaneously. However, as a result of 
the fall human beings are now totally dominated by sin and disinclined 
to observe the law God has imposed on them. Only those who have 
received God's grace and are governed by the Holy Spirit are able to 
follow this law for its own sake. Others — false Christians and Pagans 
— hate the law in their hearts and are truly concerned only with their 
personal advantage. This does not mean that they are unable to fulfil 
the letter of the law in their external behaviour. However, when they 
do so, it happens only for selfish reasons, either because they think 
that by doing so they will be able to win some personal gain or 
because they want to avoid punishments which might follow from the 
56 	 See Copleston 1962, ch.33, § 5, pp.406-408. 
57 	 The following exposition of Luther's doctrine of the law is based on Herbert 
Olsson's Schöpfung, Vernunft und Gesetz in Luthers Theologie. Uppsala, 1971. 
58 	 Olsson 1971, pp.119-123. 
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violation of the law. All this indicates, of course, that the law cannot 
be recognized by reflecting on natural human inclinations. That all 
human beings still know the law follows, according to Luther, from 
the fact that God constantly upholds in their souls an awareness of its 
demands.59 
A noteworthy feature in Luther's doctrine of natural law is that by 
maintaining that the origin of the law is in God's will he did not mean 
that the law is a totally arbitrary command without any purpose. On 
the contrary, Luther named two reasons why God has ordained the law 
on human beings. This doctrine of the two uses of the law was 
analogous with his famous Zwei-Reiche-Lehre, according to which 
there are two orders through which God governs humankind: the 
spiritual and the temporal. In his spiritual kingdom God governs 
Christians through his revealed word. This government is not 
concerned with the external life of human beings but only with their 
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salvation, which they achieve through redemption. In the weltliche 
Reich, on the other hand, God governs by means of secular rulers to 
which he has entrusted the power of the sword. The main function of 
this temporal government is to maintain social order and to ensure the 
earthly existence of human beings. It is, therefore, concerned mainly 
with the external behavior of human beings, not with the inner 
condition of their souls.60 
In accordance with the doctrine of the two regiments, Luther 
declared that God has ordained the law on human beings with two 
purposes in mind: spiritual and civic. The spiritual purpose of the law 
is to make human beings aware of their own fundamental sinfulness 
and so to seek the mercy of God. This happens when they understand 
that by themselves they are unable to fulfil the demand of love 
imposed by the law. According to Luther, all human beings have a 
hunch of their own sinfulness. However, this feeling becomes an 
active force only when a person has internalized the message of the 
Gospel. In practice, therefore, the spiritual purpose of the law 
functions only among the members of God's eternal government. The 
civic purpose of the law, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
whole of the human species. It consists of maintaining social order 
among those who are not governed by the Holy Spirit. This end the 
law achieves through the fact that false Christians and Pagans also 
believe that there is God and that God demands them to observe the 
law they know in their hearts. They also believe that God will reward 
those who observe the law and punish those who violate it. 
59 	 Olsson 1971, pp.7-17, 157-174. 
60 	 On the doctrine of the two regiments, see Cargill Thompson 1969. 
Consequently, they often act in a way which externally agrees with the 
law. While such behaviour does not grant them salvation — as this 
cannot be achieved trough deeds at all but only through God's grace — 
it makes possible an ordered social life.61  
Thus, Luther both affirmed the existence of natural morality and 
held that this has an important function in worldly life. He did not, 
however, see any need to have a separate moral philosophy in addition 
to the Christian doctrine taught in the Bible. On this issue 
Melanchthon held a different view, making a strict distinction between 
moral philosophy and the Christian teaching presented in the Gospel. 
According to Melanchthon, the task of moral philosophy is the 
explication of natural law, i.e. those rules which are needed to 
maintain discipline among the human species.62 In doing this moral 
philosophy is concerned solely with the external acts of human beings 
and tells nothing of the requirements of salvation. The Gospel, on the 
other hand, is concerned with the inner condition of human souls and 
deals with issues which are relevant to salvation. It has nothing new to 
offer to moral philosophy, because Christ had not come on Earth in 
order to teach moral precepts which were already known by reason but 
to remit sins and deliver the Holy Spirit of those who believed in 
him.63  
In his moral philosophy Melanchthon retained the traditional idea 
of the correspondence between natural law and natural human 
inclinations, albeit in a somewhat curious way. Like Luther, 
Melanchthon saw human beings as predominantly disinclined to 
observe the moral law. However, whereas Luther thought that human 
beings have lost totally their character as imago Dei, Melanchthon's 
assessment of human nature was a bit more positive. Even though the 
fall had corrupted in human beings the spiritual understanding of God, 
it had left them an ability to know that there is a God who has created 
the human species in his own image. And this understanding of the 
uncontaminated human nature gives human beings the standard by 
which they can judge the external propriety of human acts. However, 
61 	 Olsson 1971, pp.66-94, pp.174-190. 
62 	 Opera omnia, vol. xiv, co1.167 (Ethica doctrine elementa): "[Philosophia 
moralis] est explicatio legis naturae, demonstrationes ordine in artibus usitato 
colligens, quantum ratio judicare potest, quarum conclusiones sunt virtutum, seu 
praecepta de regenda disciplina in omnibus hominibus, congruentia cum 
decalogo, quantenus de externa disciplina concionatur." 
63 	 Opera omina, vol. xvi, co1.281 (Ennarationes aliquid liberorum Ethicorum 
Aristotelis): "Non enim venit Christus in mundum, ut praecepta de moribus 
doceret, quae iam ante norat ratio, sed ut remitteret peccata, ut credentibus in 
ipsum donaret Spiritum sanctum." 
64 	 Opera omnia, vol. xiv, co1.28-30 (Philosophie moralis epitomes). 
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in order to formulate a fully adequate moral philosophy human beings 
also need knowledge of the Bible. For although some idea of God and 
the central precepts of natural law are imprinted in the minds of every 
human being — wherefore also heathen philosophers like Aristotle 
have presented moral views which are worth studying by Christians — 
without the Bible corrupt human beings can have only an insufficient 
understanding of God and, therefore, of the human being as an image 
of God. Consequently, a comprehensive explication of natural law is 
possible only for those familiar with the Holy Scriptures.65  
* * * 
The idea that it is the uncontaminated human nature which offers the 
foundation for natural law became widely accepted in the Lutheran 
world during the seventeenth century. It was often connected — 
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following Melanchthon's example — with a rationalist conception of 
the law and a keen interest in Aristotle's ethical and political theory. 
As a result, the idea of natural law among Lutheran theologians 
became a mixture of Aristotelian practical philosophy and Biblical 
exegesis and had many similarities with the Thomist tradition. At the 
same, time there were many who rejected the whole Melanchthonian 
distinction between moral philosophy and the teachings of the Gospel, 
holding that moral issues cannot be dealt independently of the 
question of salvation 66 
Pufendorf's clearest and most detailed statement on the issues 
which were discussed in the Lutheran tradition of natural law can be 
found in the preface to De officio hominis et civis, where he presents, 
in order to defend himself against the critique theologians had directed 
towards his main work, "some remarks directed towards 
understanding the character of natural law in general and towards a 
careful delineation of it boundaries." Pufendorf's main point in the 
preface is that there is a strict distinction between the discipline of 
natural law and what he calls moral theology. The discipline of natural 
law deals with rules which regulate the external behaviour of human 
beings in order to maintain social order among the whole of the 
human species, whereas moral theology is concerned with human 
beings as members of God's eternal kingdom. This, of course, 
resembles Melanchthon's distinction between moral philosophy and 
65 Opera omnia, vol. xiv, co1.30 (Philosophie moralis epitomes); co1.391 
(Ennarationes aliquid liberorum Ethicorum Aristotelis). 
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On the theory of natural law in Lutheran orthodoxy, see Josefson 1950, Linberg 
1976, pp.37-47. 
the teachings of the Gospel. However, a closer examination of 
Pufendorf 's argument reveals a number of significant differences 
between him and Melanchthon. 
Melanchthon's distinction between the Gospel and moral philosophy 
was based mainly on the different practical concerns of these two 
doctrines. The message of the Gospel deals with the salvation of human 
souls, whereas moral philosophy has as its subject-matter the external 
rules of behaviour which make possible an ordered worldly life. While 
Pufendorf agrees with this, the point behind his own distinction 
between the discipline of natural law and moral theology is principally 
epistemological. Pufendorf separates moral theology not only from the 
discipline of natural law but also from that part of theology "which 
explains the articles of our faith."67 This means that moral theology 
does not deal with all issues relevant to the salvation of human souls, in 
which respect faith in Christ plays of course the central role. Moral 
theology is a moral discipline which instructs "a Christian man, whose 
purpose should be not only to pass honourably through this life, but 
who expects the fruits of piety after this life, and who so has his 
citizenship in the heavens, while here he lives merely as a pilgrim or 
stranger."68 In other words, moral theology teaches what God expects 
from those to whom he has given his revelation and who therefore have 
hopes of being saved. Its source of information is, of course, what God 
has commanded in the Holy Scriptures. The Bible, in turn, tells 
relatively little about the actions which are usually judged in human 
courts and is more concerned with deeds which — in Seneca's words — 
are "beyond the scope of the statutes." This is so because what God 
requires from the Christians is not only the external propriety of their 
acts but above all that they have the right inner motive for obeying his 
commandments. Consequently, the chief task of moral theology is "to 
conform the mind and its internal motion to the will of God; and it 
condemns actions which seem externally to be correct but which 
proceed from an impure heart. "69 
67 OHC Prefatio: "Tenia Theologia moralis habetur, illi parti Theologiae 
contradistincta, quibus credendam exponuntur." 
68 OHC Prefatio xii: "Ast Theologia moralis hominem Christianum informat. cui 
propositum esse debet non hanc solum vitam honeste transire; sed qui fructum 
pietatis post bane vitam maxime expectat, quique adeo politeia suum in coelis 
habet, heic autem viatoris duntaxat aut peregrini instar gerit." 
69 OHC Prefatio: "Ast Theologiae morali non sufficit exteriores hominis mores 
utcunque ad decus compofuissse; sed in eo maxime laborat, ut animus, ejusque 
motus interni ad placitum Numinis fingantur: illa ipsa actiones improbat, quae 
extrinsecus quidem recte se videntur habere, ab animo tarnen impuro promanant. 
Quae ratio etiam videtur, quare in divinis libris haut ita frequenter agatur de illis 
actionibus, quae poenis fori humani sunt sancitae, aut circa quae, uti Seneca 
loquitur, sunt extra publican tabulas." 
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The discipline of natural law also has as its subject matter the 
manner in which God wants human beings to behave in worldly life. 
However, whereas moral theology deals with the peculiar duties God 
has imposed on Christians through the Bible, the discipline of natural 
law studies those duties which God has ordered on the whole of 
humankind. This means, above all, that the discipline of natural law 
must be restricted to that which can be known by natural reason. And 
Pufendorf holds it evident that human reason alone cannot any 
knowledge of the true requirements of salvation. These can be known 
only through the Bible.70 As a result, from the Christian point of view 
the discipline of natural law is "confined within the orbit of this life" 
and directs a human being only in so far as "he has to lead this life 
socially with others"?' This, in turn, indicates that the discipline of 
natural law does not try to penetrate to "what is hidden in the soul and 
which gives no external effect or sign", but is concerned mainly "with 
44 	 forming men's external actions. "72 
Pufendorf's instance that the discipline of natural law must be 
based solely on natural reason gives easily the impression that he is 
championing for a new non-confessional morality which ought to 
replace the rival Christian confessions as public morality. This view 
has been supported recently by James Tully. According to him, 
Pufendorf saw the religious differences over which the Europeans had 
fought so many wars as being irreconcilable. What Pufendorf aimed 
at, therefore, was to propose to Europeans "a new morality" which 
would be "independent of the confessional differences which divided 
them, yet also permit belief in and practice of these rival religions 
within the moral framework."73  
It is suspect, however, whether Pufendorf regarded the prevailing 
religious division in Europe really as irreparable. At least his last 
work, the posthumously published Jus feciale divinae, was explicitly 
70 	 OHC I.4.8: "Ratio quippe humana sibi relicta jam ignorant, pravitatem, quae in 
facultatibus et inclinationibus hominis cemitur per culpam humanam provenisse, 
Deique offensam et aetemum exitium meren: eoque et necessitas Salvatoris, 
ejusque officium et meritum, nec non promissa Dei humano genen facta, et quae 
alia inde dependent, eandem latent: per quae so salutem aetemam hominibus 
proveniere, ex divinis literis constat." 
71 	 OHC Praefatio: "Illud porro discrimen longe maximum est, quod finis disciplinae 
juris naturalis tantum ambitu hujus vitae includatur, adeoquea ea hominen formet, 
prout hanc vitam cum aliis sociabilem exigere debeat." 
72 	 OHC Prefatio: "Ex quo illud fluit, ut, quia forum humanum circa extemas tantum 
hominis actiones occupatur, ad ea autem, quae intra pectus latitant, nec aliquem 
effectum, aut signum foras produnt, non penetret, adeoque nec circa eadem sit 
solicitum; jus quoque naturale magnam partem circa formandas hominis 
exteriores actiones versetur." 
73 	 Tully 1991, xviii. 
devoted to the unification of the Protestant sects. And even though 
Pufendorf in this work remarked that no unification is possible 
between the Protestant and the Catholic churches, this was so not 
because of some insuperable disagreement on spiritual issues but 
because of the worldly interests of the Catholic clergy.74 What is 
certain, in any case, is that Pufendorf did not think that the moral and 
political doctrine one recognizes by natural reason is neutral in regard 
to the competing Christian sects. This opinion is expressed clearly in 
the essay De concordia verae politicae cum religione Christiana (On 
the Harmony of True Politics with the Christian Religion), which 
Pufendorf included in Dissertationes academicae selectiores, 
published in 1675. Here he remarks that sects which have departed 
from the true and original Christian doctrine, above all Catholicism 
and Calvinism, contain elements which are incompatible with the true 
political doctrine.75 The true Christian doctrine, on the other hand, is 
in prefect agreement with the political theory based on natural law.76 	 45 
And although Pufendorf does not explicitly say it in De concordia, the 
character of his political theory together with the religious views he 
expresses in other writings makes it obvious that he identifies this true 
doctrine with Lutheran teaching.77 
Furthermore, Pufendorf does not merely see Lutheran doctrine as 
compatible with natural law. He also maintains that the promotion of 
Lutheran Christianity is the most effective way to advance the 
observance of natural law and social tranquility. This special affinity 
between natural law and the Lutheran doctrine is affirmed already in 
his works on natural law, albeit not in explicit terms. When Pufendorf 
in De jure naturae et gentium discusses the duty the sovereign has to 
habituate the citizens to observe the laws of their country, he remarks 
that in this process the Christian religion, where it is practiced, has the 
greatest single effect. This, however, is so only on the condition that 
the Christian doctrine taught by the clergy is "pure" and "free from the 
false inventions of men". In that case it contains "in addition to the 
teachings which lead to eternal salvation the most perfect moral 
74 	 See Krieger 1965, p.245. 
75 	 Dissertationes academicae selectiores, p.449 (De concordia, § 11). These 
erroneous religious tenets include the Catholic doctrine of the church, which 
teaches that the clergy is independent of civil authority; the Calvinist dogma that 
human life is totally predetermined; and the Puritan doctrine of conscience, which 
maintains that true believers receive direct information from God and are, 
therefore, entitled to resist the commands of the civil power. See Krieger 1965, 
pp.222-226. 
76 	 Dissertationes academicae selectiores, p.430 (De concordia § 1). 
77 	 Pufendorf offers an unqualified confession of his Lutheran faith in Eris scandica 
pp.18-19 (Apologia § 6). On the character of Pufendorf's Lutheranism, see 
Krieger 1965 pp.244-254. 
precepts which dispose the human soul in a special way to lead a good 
civil life".78 In the second edition Pufendorf adds that this is the 
reason why in all Christian states the task of habituating citizens to 
observe natural law has been entrusted to the clergy. And he finds 
nothing objectionable in this practice, provided that the taught 
Christian doctrine is pure. It is only the dogmatic part of natural law 
which, in Pufendorf's opinion, should be left to the specialist of this 
field.79 The same view is repeated in De officio hominis et civis, where 
Pufendorf declares that moral theology "does most effectively 
encourage a good quality of civil life since the Christian virtues, too, 
do as much as anything to dispose men's minds to sociality."80 
Therefore, the best way for the sovereign to accustom his subjects to 
observe the law is to "ensure that the pure and sincere Christian 
doctrine flourishes in the state, and that the public schools teach 
dogmas consistent with the purpose of the state."81  
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It seems, thus, that Pufendorf's aim is not to replace Lutheran 
Christianity as the public morality where it prevails, but rather to 
complement it by a rational understanding of the duties God has 
imposed on all human beings. The central issue of disagreement 
between him and Melanchthon is not the role Christian doctrine 
should play in everyday social life, but the theoretical question as to 
how the law God has imposed on the whole of humankind should be 
deduced. 
As mentioned already, Melanchthon had founded his theory on the 
idea that God had originally created human beings in his own image. 
In moral philosophy one deduces natural law by reflecting on the 
character of uncontaminated human nature. Pufendorf, in contrast, 
maintains that "a man must now be regarded by the discipline of 
natural law as one whose nature has been corrupted and thus as an 
78 	 JNG VII.9.4: "Ut autem ist hoc obstineatur, in rebuspublicis Christianis plurimum 
confert ipsa religio christiana, sincera illa, et ab humanis commnetis purgata, per 
pios et cordatos ministros dosctrine et exemplo inculcata; quippe quae praeter 
dogmata ad salutatem aetemam facientia continet prefectissima praecepta 
moralia, queis cumprimis ad bene tolerandam vitam civilem animi mortalium 
disponuntur, et quae eadem tarnen legibus ita commode sanciri non possunt." 
79 	 JNG 1684 VII.9.4: "Quam ob causam in omnibusm quas novimus, civitatibus 
Christianis pars paraenetica juris naturalis ministris Ecclessia exrecandam est 
commissa; cujus tarnen pars dogmatica ad illos proprie pertinet, qui ei disciplinae 
peculiariter addiciti sunt." 
80 	 OHC Prefatio: "Etsi cum illae ipsae virtutes Christianae animos hominum ad 
socialitatem quam maximum disponant, Theologia quoque moralis honestatem 
vitae civilis efficacissime promoveat." 
81 	 OHC II.11.4: "Ad quem finera quoque facit curare, ut doctrina Christiana, pura 
illa et sincera, in civitate vigeat; ac in scholis publicis tali dogmata tradantur, quae 
cum fine civitatum conveniunt." 
animal seething with evil desires."82 He offers two reasons for this. 
The first one of these is epistemological. Since God has imposed 
natural law on the whole of human species, the discipline dealing with 
it must be based on premises which can be known by natural reason 
alone. Natural reason, in turn, does not have any recollection of the 
uncontaminated human condition and the fall which led the human 
species to its present state. While "no one is so imperceptive as not to 
be aware of the unruly and deviant passions in himself', human reason 
alone is unable to know that "this rebellion of passions" was not the 
original condition in which God created the human species but that it 
"came by the fault of the first man." This can be known only through 
the Bible, wherefore "it would be improper to try to deduce natural 
law from the uncorrupted nature of man. "83 
The other reason why uncontaminated human nature cannot serve 
as the basis for natural law is that alone it cannot give us sufficient 
information of the character and content of this law. This is so because 
natural law has a wholly different character in the present corrupt state 
of the human species than it had before the fall. To be sure, Pufendorf 
remarks that "the main principles of the law" are the same in both 
incorrupt and corrupt states. These are identical with the law declared 
by the Savior: love God and love your neighbour. "The whole natural 
law may be derived from these principles in man's corrupt as well as 
in his uncorrupted state. ... For sociality too, which we have laid as the 
foundation of natural law, can readily be resolved into love of one's 
neighbour." The significant thing is, however, that "many of the 
particular precepts are different because of the difference in the human 
condition. Or rather, the same sum of the law may be divided into 
different (but not contradictory) precepts according to the different 
conditions in which those who must obey it live."84  By this Pufendorf 
82 	 OHC Prefatio: "Uncle illud patet, necessarium esse, ut in disciplina jusris naturalis 
homo nunc consideretur, prout ipsius natura est corrupta, adeoque prout est 
animal multis pravis cupidinibus scatens." 
83 	 OHC Prefatio: "Nam etsi nemo tam stupidus sit, quin in seipso inordinatos ac in 
devia tendentes affectus deprehendat: tarnen nisi divinae literae praelucerent, 
nemini jam constare posset, istam affectuum rebellionem per culpam primi 
hominis provenisse. Et consequentur cum jus naturale ad ea non abeat, quo ratio 
pertingere nequit, incongruum foret, idem ex natura hominis integra velle 
deducere." 
84 	 OHC Prefatio: "[N]um igitur lex diversa fuerit in statu naturae integrae, and vero 
eadem? 	 Ubi paucis responderi potest responderi potest: summa legis capita in 
utroque statu esse eadem: sed multa praecepta particularia propter diversitatem 
conditionis humanae vanare; seu potius, eadem summam legis per diversa, (non 
tarnen contraria) praecepta sese explicare, prout diverso sese modo habuit homo, cui 
illa lex observanda. Summa legis Salvator noster ad duo capita redegit: dilige DEUM. 
et dilige proximum. Ad haec capita referri potest universa lex naturalis, tam in integro, 
quam in corrupto statum hominium, ... Nam socialitas, quam nos pro fudamento juris 
naturali substravimus, commode in dilectionem proximi resolvi potest." 
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means two things. In the first place, there are many social institutions 
and other phenomena in the present corrupt state which did not exist 
in Paradise (as examples Pufendorf mentions property, money, death 
and scarcity). Therefore, before the fall there could have been no 
moral laws related to such things. Even more significant is, however, 
the fact that the fall had caused a drastic change in human inclinations 
and made it necessary to introduce an abundance of rules which 
restrict human behaviour. Pufendorf illustrates this change with the 
example of two boys who have been entrusted to someone for their 
education. One of the boys is "modest, scrupulous and afire with love 
of letters." The other in turn is "dissolute and saucy, more in love with 
lewd desires than with books." For both boys "the sum of their duty" 
is the same: to learn letters. However, the particular precepts by which 
the two boys can be made to achieve this end are considerably 
different. In the case of the decent boy with an inclination for learning, 
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it is enough that one gives him "a schedule and plan of studies to 
follow." For the mischievous young man, on the other hand, such 
measures are far from sufficient. He must also be "admonished with 
the direst threats not to run around, not to gamble, not to sell his 
books, not to plagiarize other students's work, not to carouse, not to 
run after prostitutes."85 
The point of the example is obvious. Before the fall human beings 
were inclined to love both God and each other. Natural law was what 
Pufendorf calls an "affirmative precept", i.e. a reinforcement of an 
already existing inherent tendency. In their present condition, on the 
other hand, human beings not only lack the natural tendencies they 
possessed in Paradise but are also actively inclined to disobey God and 
violate each other. In one of his most gloomy statements Pufendorf 
remarks how "there is in human nature an innate wickedness that 
enjoys harming others as much as possible, and that can never be 
entirely extirpated or corrected." And even though this pure desire to 
violate other people "does not disclose itself in just any occasion,86" 
85 	 OHC Prefatio: "Sunt alicujus informationi commissi duo pueri, sed dispari plane 
idole. Unus modestus est, verecundusque, et magno literarum amore flagrans. 
Alter dissolutus petulans, foedas potius libidines, quam libros amat. Summa 
officii utrique eadem, literas addiscere. Sed peculiaria praecepta disparia. Prior 
enim sufficit injuxisse, quae studia, quo tempore, quave ratione tractare debeat. 
Alten praeter haec accerima sub comminatione vetandum, ne circumcursitet, ne 
alea ludat, ne libros vendat, ne in exercitiis componendis aliena vitula aret, ne 
pergraecetur, ne scorta consectetur." 
86 	 De statu § 17: "Et quanquam insita mortalibus malitia, quae sese quam maxime in 
noxam aliorum effundere gaudet, nunquam penitus heic exuatur et corrigatur; 
tarnen quia illa non quavis occasione sese vult expromere, saepe etiam volentem 
facultas destituit " 
human nature is full of other immutable characteristics which make 
people most prone to hurt each other and disturb the social order.87 
Consequently, in the present condition natural law consists mainly of 
"negative precepts", i.e. restrictive imperatives which demand of 
human beings to behave in a way which they are not otherwise 
inclined to do. 
It should be noted that Pufendorf admits that "every affirmative 
precept implicitly contains a prohibition of its opposite." For example, 
"he who is told to love his neighbour is by that very fact forbidden to 
inflict on him anything inconsistent with that love."88  Thus, in 
principle the few affirmative precepts which prevailed in the incorrupt 
state included all those negative precepts which now obligate the 
corrupt human species. Pufendorf holds, however, that the 'mere 
reflection on the character of uncontaminated human nature tells us 
nothing of the concrete content of those negative precepts which are 
needed in the present corrupt state. In order to define these rules we 
must, according to Pufendorf, first know how corrupt human beings 
are inclined to behave and what are the things they must, therefore, be 
forbidden to do. 
The foregoing means that even if we should take as our starting 
point the idea that God originally created human beings in his own 
image, we would still have to examine the character of corrupt human 
nature in order to recognize natural law. And Pufendorf is eager to 
point out that the Decalogue, which Melanchthon and his seventeenth 
century followers regarded as the summary of natural law, is in fact 
expressed mainly in negative terms and clearly presupposes corrupt 
human nature. Already the first commandment, Pufendorf remarks, 
"certainly seems to assume that man is prone to believe in idolatry and 
polytheism." But of course such inclinations did not characterize the 
uncontaminated human beings, "whose knowledge of God was 
transparent, and who consequently enjoyed His familiar (so to speak) 
revelation."89 There are similar assumptions concerning corrupt human 
87 	 See especially JNG II.1.6. 
88 	 OHC Prefatio: "Etsi enim quodvis praeceptum affirmativum virtualiter contineat 
interdictum omnis oppositi; (v.g. qui jubetur diligere proximum, eo ipso vetatur 
inferre illi omnia, quae dilectioni repugnant.)" 
89 	 OHC Prefatio: "Praesertim cum pleraque praecepta ipsius Decalogi, prout verbis 
negativis concepta sunt, naturam hominis corruptam manifeste praesupponant. Sic 
v.g. primum praeceptum utique praesupponere videtur hominem ad idolatriam et 
polytheoteta credendam proclivem. Si enim ponas hominem, integra adhuc natura 
praeditum, in quo liquida Dei erat cognitio, et qui subinde velut familiari ejus 
revelatione fruebatur: non video. quomodo tali in mentem venire potuerit, aliquo 
sibi fingere, quod loco veri Dei, aut cum eo colere velet, aut credere in eo Numen 
finesse, quod ipse finxerat." 
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nature behind the commandments which deal with relations between 
human beings: "For all that you needed to tell man as he was created 
in the beginning by God was to love his neighbour — he was inclined 
to do so in any case by nature. "90 Thus, the restrictive commandments 
presented in the Decalogue become understandable only if we assume 
that human beings have now become inclined to violate the life and 
property of other people. 
Now we have come to what I think is the focal point for 
understanding Pufendorf's general conception of natural law. His 
remark that the discipline of natural law must regard human nature as 
corrupt has been usually understood to mean that instead of deriving 
natural law from the inclinations of the incorrupt human nature the 
whole fabric of natural law must be somehow deduced from the 
proclivities which now govern human behaviour. It has been thought, 
in other words, that in deriving the content of natural law Pufendorf 
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follows the model put forward by Grotius and Hobbes. As is well 
known, these two writers rejected Aristotle's and Aquinas' 
conceptions of human nature. This, however, did not mean that they 
followed Luther in abandoning the idea of the correspondence 
between natural law and human inclinations. Like Aquinas, both 
Grotius and Hobbes held it as obvious that human reason recognizes 
the content of natural law by contemplating natural human 
inclinations. What in this respect distinguished these two writers from 
the Thomists was their much more restricted view of the inclinations 
which can serve as a basis for natural law. In the Prolegomena to De 
iure belli ac pacis, Grotius based the fundamental natural law to 
conserve society on the idea that it belongs to human nature to desire 
to live in rationally organized society with other members of one's 
species. Hobbes, in turn, founded his idea of natural law — "the 
Dictate of Reason, conversant about those things which are either to 
be done, or omitted for the constant preservation of Life, and 
Members" — on the assumption that human beings seek self-
preservation with a similar "compulsion of nature" as by which "a 
stone moves downward."91  
It has been customary to assume that Pufendorf also derives his 
fundamental principle of natural law, the cultivation of sociality, from 
some predominant natural human inclination. What has caused 
disagreement among commentators is mainly the question of what this 
inclination is. According to a more traditional view, Pufendorf gathers 
90 OHC Prefatio: "Homini enim, qualis intio a Deo conditus erat, sufficiebat 
simpliciter injunxisse, ut proximum suum diligeret; ad quod natura proclivis erat." 
91 	 De cive 1.7., 2.1. 
the fundamental principle straightforwardly from a natural tendency to 
sociality. A number of recent scholars, on the other hand, have 
maintained that the starting point of Pufendorf's theory is the instinct 
for self-preservation, and that the requirement of sociality is derived 
from the central role it plays in the maintenance of personal safety and 
survival.92 
It seems to me, however, that Pufendorf's theory is more intimately 
connected to his Lutheran background than what has hitherto been 
thought to have been the case. By this I do not mean, of course, that 
Pufendorf's theory of natural law would be somehow directly 
dependent on the Lutheran confession. Pufendorf obviously wants to 
present a strictly non-confessional moral theory founded solely on 
natural reason. What I maintain, however, is that Pufendorf's 
understanding of moral law, human nature, and the relationship 
between these two relies strongly on a Lutheran world-view. This 
means not only that he sees natural law as a rule God has ordered on 
all human species in order to govern their external behaviour in 
worldly life. Pufendorf also thinks that human reason, even when it is 
unaware of the divine revelation, is able to comprehend that human 
beings are predominantly disinclined to obey God's will. This means, 
in turn, that no natural proclivity, not even the instinct for self-
preservation, can be regarded as a sign of the manner God wants 
human beings to behave. In other words, unlike Grotius and Hobbes, 
Pufendorf rejects not only the Aristotelian conception of human nature 
but also the idea of the correspondence between natural law and 
predominant natural inclinations. What offers him the starting point 
for the discipline of natural law is the idea that since God has created 
the human species and equipped it with exceptional intellectual 
abilities, it is obvious that God wants the human species to survive and 
to advance their well-being by using their unique capabilities. 
Observations concerning the predominant human inclinations — like 
the strong desire for self-preservation — become significant to him 
when he tries to prove the concrete content of the rules which are 
needed for achieving this end. 
Before turning to the argument by which Pufendorf deduces the 
fundamental principle of natural law it should be noted that the 
interpretation I have outlined above is fully compatible with 
Pufendorf's account of the history of his discipline. If one holds 
evident that natural law consists of rules needed for maintaining 
peaceful social coexistence between corrupt human individuals, it is 
92 	 See below pp.65-66. 
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small wonder that one finds Aristotle's ethical theory and the various 
doctrines of natural law built up on it to be deeply unsatisfactory. As is 
well known, the principal subject-matter in Aristotelian theory were 
the dispositions which characterize a truly excellent human being. 
When even Aristotle himself admitted that in reality most people do 
not possess these dispositions,93 it his hardly surprising that in 
Pufendorf's eyes Aristotle had exceptionally little to offer to the study 
of natural law. What Aristotle had presented was a culture-bound 
opinion of the personal characteristics an ideal Greek citizen ought to 
possess. And descriptions of such local preferences contribute scarcely 
anything to a discipline which is interested in defining the rules and 
institutions without which real, irreparably wicked human beings are 
unable to maintain peaceful social coexistence. 
The esteem Pufendorf shows towards Roman Stoics such as Seneca 
and Aurelius follows, then, from the value these writers gave to the 
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	 benefits following from peaceful social interaction.94 Grotius' position 
as the founder of the discipline of natural law, on the other hand, is 
due to the fact that he was the first who restricted natural law to the 
necessities of an ordered social life and made these an independent 
object of study. Compared to this achievement the fact that Grotius 
presented erroneous views concerning the normative character of 
natural law is of minor significance. Similarly, that Hobbes can be 
regarded as a contributor to the study of natural law follows from the 
fact that he also identified natural law by and large with the concrete 
requirements of tranquil social life. This idea was manifested most 
clearly at the beginning of De cive, where Hobbes declared that the 
aim of his work is to define "what are the conditions of society, or of 
human peace; that is to say (changing the words only), what are the 
fundamental laws of nature. +95 Hobbes' special merits were the many 
insights he offered into the behaviour of corrupted human beings and 
especially the method by which he showed how vital sovereign civil 
power is for peaceful social life. One of his errors, on the other hand, 
was his attempt to derive natural law from the instinct for self-
preservation, an undertaking Pufendorf wholeheartedly rejects, as we 
shall see shortly. 
93 	 On one occasion Aristotle even remarks that "the mass of mankind are evidently 
quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable for beasts." NE 1095b14-20. 
94 	 See the citations in JNG II.3.15. 
95 	 De Cive 1.1. The original latin version goes: "... quae sint societatis sive pacis 
humane conditioner, hoc est, mutato tantum nomine, quae sint natuare leges 
fundamentales, ..." 
Part Two 
The Theoretical Justification 
of Natural Law 
Above I argued that Pufendorf not only sees natural law as a command 
of God but also holds that because of the corrupt character of human 
nature the manner in which God wants human beings to behave cannot 
be derived from the inclinations which govern human behaviour. In 
what follows my aim is to show that this assumption is presupposed in 
the argument by which Pufendorf derives the fundamental principle of 
natural law. I will start with an excursion into Pufendorf's views 
concerning the study of natural law as a scientific discipline. My 
purpose here is not to offer a comprehensive account on this issue but 
merely to make understandable Pufendorf's preoccupation with the 
idea that the scientific presentation of natural law must take as its 
starting point one fundamental normative principle. In the second 
chapter I will deal with the central difficulties related to the view that 
Pufendorf derives this principle from the desire for self-preservation or 
self-interest in general. I will then examine those passages in which 
Pufendorf explicitly rejects the idea that one can derive natural law 
from natural human inclinations. In the fourth chapter I will show that 
already in the early Elementa Pufendorf founded, albeit in a somewhat 
confusing way, natural law on the idea that God wants human beings 
to live in a distinctively human way. Finally, I will defend a thesis that 
the same presupposition lies behind the deduction of the fundamental 
principle in De jure naturae et gentium. 
53 
THE SCIENTIFIC PRESENTATION OF 
NATURAL LAW 
Following the traditional Aristotelian practice, Pufendorf uses the 
word "scientia" in two different senses. In the stricter sense of the 
term, science is indubitable knowledge of the permanent features of 
the universe. It is "certain and clear knowledge which is constant 
everywhere and at all times." Such a knowledge is attained by 
demonstrations. A proposition is demonstrated when it can be 
gathered by a syllogistic deduction from premises which fulfil two 
conditions. First, they must either "require no further proof, but merit 
belief upon their own evidence", or be reducible back to such self-
evident verities. Second, the premises must declare a necessary (i.e. a 
permanent) relationship between the predicate and the subject-term of 
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the demonstrated proposition.' Besides this strict sense Pufendorf uses 
the word "scientia" also as a synonym for the word "disciplina". This 
refers to an organized body of knowledge concerning some particular 
topic such as mathematics, medicine, or politics. In this sense of the 
word science does not necessarily consists of demonstrable truths, but 
can equally well be an ordered collection of knowledge which does 
not possess such certainty and necessity. 
A distinctive feature in Pufendorf 's thinking is his conviction that 
we can have truly demonstrative knowledge of natural law.2 By 
claiming this he opposed not only sceptical humanists like Montaigne 
and Charron, who denied the possibility of all certain knowledge, but 
also the great majority of contemporary scholars who held that while 
demonstrative certainty is indeed possible in some other fields of 
study, ethics and politics can be termed sciences only in the looser 
sense of the word. In seventeenth century Germany this idea of the 
1 	 JNG I.2.3: "Scientia est illud, quod per demonstrationem quaerimus, id est, 
cognitio certa, liquida, undiquaque et perpetuo sibi constans." I.2.2: "Demonstrare 
igitur nobis est, rerum propositarum certitudinem necessariam e certis principiis 
tanquam suis causis indubitato cognoscendam syllogistice deducere." I.2.3: 
"Easdem quoque opportet esse primas, idque ut vel ulterior probatione non 
indigeant, sed ipsa sui evidentia fidem mereantur; vel ut demum ultimo ad 
aliquam primam veritatem reduci queant.... Causae denique conclusionis ideo 
sunt, quod rationem contineant, quare in propositione demonstrabili praedicatum 
subjecto necessario competat." 
2 	 The idea that we have demonstrative knowledge of morality was of course not 
totally unprecedented in the seventeenth century. In De homine, (ch.10) Hobbes 
had maintained that knowledge of right and wrong can be demonstrated a priori, 
because human beings themselves have created the criteria of right and wrong. 
namely laws and contracts. This idea is rejected by Pufendorf, who holds that the 
principles of right and wrong were imposed by God (JNG I.2.4). 
non-demonstrable character of moral knowledge was often justified by 
the somewhat curious idea that the objects of scientific knowledge 
must be somehow necessarily existing entities. One obvious source for 
this view was the Italian philosopher Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1589), 
one of the most distinguished late-Renaissance Aristotelians, whose 
Opera logica had a considerably influence on the formation of the 
seventeenth century German school-philosophy.3 Zabarella's view on 
this issue was based on a remark Aristotle makes in the sixth book of 
Nicomachean Ethics, according to which, the object of demonstrative 
knowledge is necessary and eternal.4 This Zabarella understood to 
mean that demonstrative knowledge is possible only of natural entities 
which either have always existed or come into existence through those 
necessary and eternal causes which operate in nature. From this he 
concluded that since human acts are consequences of free human 
volition and therefore contingent and arbitrary, they cannot be objects 
of demonstrative knowledge.s 
Pufendorf does not deny the idea that the objects of scientific 
knowledge are necessary and eternal. On the contrary, he refers 
approvingly to the very same passage in Nicomachean Ethics by 
which Zabarella justified his position.6 However, unlike Zabarella, 
Pufendorf finds no reason to conclude that demonstrative knowledge 
is possible only of necessarily existing entities. The source of this 
erroneous belief is, according to him, the common saying that the 
subject of a demonstrative syllogism must be necessary. From this it 
has been concluded that in a demonstrative syllogism the subject term 
must refer to a necessarily existing entity. According to Pufendorf, the 
subject of the demonstration is not, however, the subject term of the 
conclusion but the demonstrated proposition as a whole. It makes no 
difference, therefore, whether the subject term refers to a necessarily 
existing or contingent entity. What is crucial is that the predicate of the 
demonstrated proposition belongs necessarily to the entity referred to 
by the subject term.? Thus, the fact that human acts are contingent 
3 	 On Zabarella's influence on the formation of German Aristotelism, see Petersen 
1921, especially pp.195-218. 
4 	 Nicomachean Ethics VI.3. 1139b19-24. 
5 	 On Zabarella's conception of science, see Mikkeli 1992. pp.25-35. 
6 	 JNG 1.2.3. 
7 	 JNG I.2.2: "Origo erroris inde potissimum promanavit, quod cum subjectum 
demostrationis necessarium esse debere dicatur, id illi hoc modo sint interpretati, 
quod in syllogismo demontrativo subjectum conclusionis, praedicato 
contradistinctum, debeat esse ens necessario existens.... Enimvero subjectum 
demostrationis non est simplex aliquis teorimus, sed integra enunciatio, cujus 
necessaria veritas ex certis principiis syllogistice deducitur. Ubi quidem parum 
interest, an subjectum propositionis demontrabilis necessario existat, vel non; sed 
sufficit, si posita ejus existentia certae ipsi affectiones necessario competant, 
easque eidem competere ex indubiis principiis ostendi queat." 
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entities arising from free decisions does not prevent them from being 
the subject-matter of demonstrative knowledge. 
There was also another, far more generally shared argument by 
which the non-demonstrative character of moral knowledge was 
justified in the seventeenth century. This did not rely on the 
metaphysical status of human acts but on the irregularity which 
characterizes human affairs. The locus classicus for this view was the 
much quoted passage in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics. There 
Aristotle remarked that things studied in the science of politics (which 
included ethics) exhibit variety and fluctuation. As an example he 
mentioned wealth and courage, which are usually beneficial for 
human happiness, but which have nonetheless proved destructive for 
many individuals. From this Aristotle gathered that when we speak of 
issues like this the truth must be indicated roughly and in outline. And 
if the premises are true only in most cases, we must accept that the 
56 	 conclusions are no better.8 
Whether Aristotle meant by these remarks that ethics and politics as 
disciplines (as distinct from practical wisdom, which is concerned 
with proper behavior in particular situations) include no demonstrative 
knowledge is an open question. For in Analytica posteriora he said 
that inferences in which the premises and conclusions are true only in 
most cases can be called demonstrative.9 However, in the seventeenth 
century it was customary to think that science consists of propositions 
which are always true, wherefore the irregularities in human affairs 
make truly scientific knowledge unattainable in moral issues. Such a 
view was a commonplace in humanist ethical and political literature, 
where it was associated principally with the impossibility of 
predicting the result of human acts. It was also shared, at least to some 
extent, by Grotius, who in De iure belli ac pacis remarked that 
Aristotle had been right in holding that certainty cannot be found in 
moral question to the same degree as in mathematical science, because 
in human affairs the smallest changes in circumstances can alter the 
outcome of one's behavior.10 
As we saw above, Pufendorf by no means contests the idea that 
science consists of propositions which are always true. Nor does he 
deny that in so far as we are concerned with the maximization of 
personal or communal well-being the effects of our acts are always 
uncertain. Hence, he is ready to admit that our estimations concerning 
the most beneficial manner of behaving can never possess 
8 	 Nicomachean Ethics 1094b 14-23. 
9 	 Analytica posteriora 1.30. 87b19-27, 2.12. 96a8-19. 
10 	 IBP II.23.1. 
demonstrative certainty." Correspondingly, the information given in 
moral and political literature which is concerned with "the successful 
management of one's own actions and those of others, with an eye to 
the security and utility primarily of the public,"12 does not constitute a 
science in the strict sense of the term. It is based on "axioms drawn by 
a dexterous observation and collection of the customs of men and the 
events of human history." Because of the endless variety of human 
dispositions, and because the smallest things can change radically the 
outcome in human affairs, axioms of this kind cannot have the 
firmness required for infallible demonstrations.13 
The situation is, however, quite different in the discipline of natural 
law. For the aim of this field of study is not to give instructions in the 
maximization of personal or communal well-being, but to define rules 
of behavior which human beings must observe in order to maintain 
peaceful social life. In other words, the discipline of natural law is 
concerned with human acts only in so far as they have a tendency 
either to sustain tranquil coexistence between human beings or to 
provoke turmoil among them. And Pufendorf holds that in this respect 
a considerable number of human acts have effects which are totally 
necessary.14 Therefore, the discipline of natural law "rests on a 
11 	 In JNG I.2.4 Pufendorf identifies such estimations with practical wisdom as this 
was defined by Aristotle in Nicomachean ethics (NE VI.5. 1140b4-5): "A true 
and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things which are good or 
bad for man." He also cites approvingly Aristotle's definition of a prudent human 
being as someone who is able to "see what is good for themselves and good for 
men in general." (1140b9-10) In reality there is a considerably difference 
between Pufendorf's idea of prudentia and Aristotle's conception of practical 
wisdom. The latter was concerned with actions in which the reason why the act is 
executed is not distinct from the activity itself, because the act as such is a 
constituent in good human life. (1140b6-7, 114a6-36) For Pufendorf, on the 
other hand, prudentia is only an ability to form intelligent calculations concerning 
the means by which individual or communal security and prosperity can be most 
effectively ensured in concrete situations. 
12 JNG I.2.4: "..; non leve tamen discrimen intra duas illarum preacipuas licet 
deprehendere, quarum una versatur circa rectitudinem actionum humanarum in 
ordine ad leges, altera circa dextram gubernationem actionum suarum et 
alienarum, ad securitatem et utilitatem potissimum publicam." 
13 	 JNG I.2.4: "Atque haec sua dogmata superstruit axiomatibus formatis ex dextra 
morum humanorum atque eventuum in rebus humanis observatione et collatione. 
Isla tarnen axiomata tam firma esse non videntur, ut inde demonstrationes 
indubiae deduci queant, propter insignem lubricitatem, et inconstantiam, quae 
subinde in hominium ingeniis occurrit; et quod eventus rerum saepenumero levi 
momento impulsi in diversum cadant." 
14 	 JNG I.2.5: "Et si vel maxime actiones humane ideo morales dicantur, quod sint 
non necessariae, sed liberae; ex eo tarnen non consequitur, positis certis principiis 
non posse competere illis actionibus ejusmodi affectiones, quae de its indubio 
possint demonstrari. Sane enim constat, actus, de quibus naturali lege disponitur, 
intrisecam habere vim ad socialitatem; etsi ut isti actu existant, libera hominum 
voluntas efficiat." 
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foundation from which one can deduce genuine demonstrations, 
which are capable of producing a solid science."15 
The foregoing explains why demonstrative knowledge of natural 
law is in principle possible. It does not, however, tell us why 
Pufendorf does not simply present the various rules needed in peaceful 
social life but is so preoccupied with defining what he calls the 
fundamental principle of natural law. An answer to this can be found 
from his views concerning the character of scientific presentation and 
the premises on which the demonstrative account of natural law must 
be grounded. 
Pufendorf contemplates these issues above all in a letter he sent in 
1663 to Baron Boineburg, who had requested him to write a major 
study on natural law.16 In this letter Pufendorf remarks that there are 
two proper structures for scientific disciplines. The first is that used by 
mathematicians "who love to deduce a great number of conclusions 
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from a few principles." The second is that utilized by those who study 
natural phenomena. In the latter case one makes general conclusions 
by observing and collecting numerous individual instances. This can 
be called the inductive method, although Pufendorf does not use the 
expression in this context.17 
Pufendorf writes to Boineburg that many have urged him to use the 
latter method in the presentation of natural law. In practice this would 
mean that one first investigates what all individual nations have 
regarded as just. Then one declares as natural law those principles that 
all nations have in common.'$ The model for such a procedure had 
been offered by Grotius, who in De iure belli ac pacis distinguished 
two possible ways of proving that some rule or other belongs to 
natural law. The first method, which Grotius characterized as a priori, 
15 	 iNG I1.4: "Ast illa disciplina, quae considerat, quid in actionibus humanis sit 
rectum et pravum, et cujus praecipuam partem nos jam tradere instituimus, 
omnino ejusmodi fundamentis nititur, ut exinde genuinae demonstrationes, quae 
solidam scientiam parere sint aptae, deduci quaent." 
16 	 A modem edition of these letters can be found in Fiammetta Palladini "Le due 
lettere di Pufendorf al barone Boineburg: Quella nota e quella perduta." Nouvelles 
de la Republique des lettres, 1984, I, pp.119-144. 
17 	 First letter to Boineburg, lines 140-146: "Mea sententia duae heic dantur viae, 
quarum alterutram secuti deprehenduntur qui disciplinas in iustam formam 
redegerunt. Unam secuti sunt potissimum mathematici, qui ex paucis principiis 
immensam vim conclusionem elicere amant; alteram ingressi sunt, quibus res 
naturales investigare cordi fuit, scilicet ut ex observatione et collatione plurium 
singularium tandem aliquod generale concluderent decretum. 
18 	 First letter to Boineburg, lines 146-150: "Posteriorem han viam in hac quoque 
materia insistendum esse nonnulli me admonuerunt; colligndum esse nimirum 
quid apud singulas gentes iustum habentur, et in quod omnes et singulae 
consentiant, id demum pro iure universali declarandum." 
consisted of showing that the rule in question is in necessary 
agreement with the rational and social nature of human beings. The 
other, a posteriori proof entailed, on the other hand, showing that all 
or, at least, all civilized nations have believed that the principle in 
question is a part of natural law. Grotius admitted that this kind of 
proof does not give us the same absolute certainty than the a priori 
method does. Nevertheless, he maintained that if some rule can be 
shown to be generally seen as a part of natural law, this makes it most 
probable that the precepts actually belong to natural law.19 If 
numerous human beings in different places and different times affirm 
the same principle, there must be some universal reason for doing so. 
And in questions concerning human conduct the reason cannot be 
anything other than a common agreement between nations or a right 
conclusion based on the principles of nature; the former indicates the 
law of nations and the latter natural law. Grotius admitted, however, 
that most writers have confused the terms "the law of nations" and 
"natural law". Therefore, the distinction between these two cannot be 
drawn from the authors themselves. If there is some generally 
prevailing view which cannot be deduced from certain principles, it 
must be included among the laws of nations.20 This, of course, left the 
status of the a posteriori method as a means of proving natural law 
rather unclear. For it indicated that while using this method one must 
already know whether the rule in question can be proved by the a 
priori method. 
That Pufendorf finds Grotius' a posteriori-method worthy of 
serious consideration follows from his assumption that natural law 
consists of rules which are necessary for the maintenance of peaceful 
social life. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to presume that at least the 
most important of these precepts have been somehow recognized and 
observed in every existing society. However, both in his letter to 
19 	 IBP I.1.12: "Esse autem aliquid juris naturalis probari solel tum ab eo quod 
primus est, tum ab eo quod posterius, quarum probandi rationum illa subtilior est, 
haec popularior. A priori, si ostendatur rei alicujus convenientia aut 
disconvenientia necessaria cum natura rationali ac sociali: a posteriori vero, si non 
certissima fide, certe probabiliter admodum, juris naturalis esse colligitur id quod 
apud omnes gentes, aut moratiores omnes tale esse creditur." 
20 	 IBP Prolegomena (§ 40): "Usus sum etiam ad juris hujus probationem testimoniis 
philosophorum, historicorum, poetarum, postremo oratorum: non quod illis 
indiscrete credendum sit; solent enim sectae, argumento, causae servire. Sed quod 
ubi multi diversis temporibus ac locis idem pro certo affirmant, id ad causam 
universalem referri debeat: quae in nostris questionibus alfa esse non potest, quam 
aut recta illatio ex naturae principiis provedens, aut communis aliquis consensus. 
Illa jus natuare indicat, hic jus gentium: quorum discrimen non quidem ex ipsi 
testimoniis (passim enim scriptores voces juris naturae et gentium permiscent) sed 
ex materiae qualitate intelligendum est." 
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Boineburg and later in De jure naturae et pentium Pufendorf presents 
several reasons for thinking that the inductive method is not able to 
offer premises which make possible a truly demonstrative presentation 
of natural law. 
In the first place, Pufendorf agrees with the critique Hobbes had 
directed against the idea that natural law could be proved by referring 
either to the consent of the whole of mankind or to the agreement of 
the most wise and learned nations. Hobbes' argument against the 
former view was the simple observation that in practice human beings 
often follow most various and even contradictory moral convictions. 
The problem with the latter view, on the other hand, was that it left 
undetermined "who shall be the judge of the wisdom and learning of 
all nations."21  Similarly, Pufendorf remarks that it is difficult to find 
even one single precept which would have been universally accepted 
in all times.22 This problem cannot be solved by excluding the 
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barbaric nations and concentrating on the civilized ones, as Grotius 
had proposed. For no nation "with enough judgement to preserve its 
existence" is ready to admit that it is barbaric.23 And the things which 
Europeans usually regard as the criteria of civilization — higher 
learning and a sophisticated way of living — do not divide nations into 
those who observe natural law and those who disobey it. There are 
nations which follow natural law although they have no literary 
culture, whereas "learning is not always accompanied by good 
manners." Correspondingly, nations with a highly sophisticated life 
style are often surpassed in the incorruption of manners by those 
which are content with a more simple way of living.24 
Besides the problems following from the variety of moral 
convictions there are also unsurpassable epistemological difficulties in 
the inductive method. In the first place, there is the necessarily limited 
character of human knowledge: "For who knows the language of all 
people both ancient and modern, not to mention their customs and 
21 	 De cive 2.1. 
22 	 JNG II.3.8. By claiming this Pufendorf does not contradict the assumption that 
the principles of natural law have govemed the majority of human activities at all 
times. What he has in mind is that there is hardly any single moral rule which 
would have prevailed in every human society. 
23 	 JNG II.3.7. 
24 	 JNG II.3.7: "Nec desunt, qui literas, quibus non excolendis tantam operam 
impedimus, cavillantur, velut subsidium nostrae hebetudinis; cum quorundam 
aliorum ingenia, citra cultum literarum, naturali bonitate enitescant; ad bonam 
mentem paucis opus sit literis. Neque semper literae bonos mores sortiuntur 
comites. Sed quaedam nationes operoso adparatu inanium aut superfluarum rerum 
vehementer sibi placent, despectis iis, quibus simplicior vita degitur. Atque saepe 
apud hos, quam fillos, major morum innocentia." 
institutions?"25 And even in the case of the well-known nations 
problems are caused by the fact that these are governed not only by 
the law of nature but also by customs and positive laws. For this 
reason it is not always easy to decide what exactly are the rules which 
some particular nation includes in natural law. Furthermore, when 
some custom or positive law has been long established people easily 
start to regard it as a law of nature.26 As a result, they often include 
among the laws of nature principles which are not absolutely 
necessary for human society.27 
Hence, no summary of the rules which different nations include in 
natural law can give us premises which would "merit belief upon their 
own evidence" and could so be used as the starting point of a 
demonstrative account of natural law. This is, in Pufendorf's eyes, a 
sufficient reason for concluding that the scientific presentation of 
natural law must follow the procedure used by mathematicians. In 
practice, however, the structure of his presentation of natural law 
differs in two ways from that of the mathematical sciences. 
First, whereas in mathematical sciences there are several equally 
important axioms, the discipline of natural law is established on one 
fundamental principle "which no sane person can question and from 
which everything which is universal and constant in justice can be 
deduced."28 Of course, by this Pufendorf does not mean that natural 
law could be deduced from this one principle alone without any further 
knowledge. What he has in mind is that the scientific presentation of 
natural law must be grounded on one normative principle. Besides this, 
we have numerous descriptive observations concerning the nature and 
the condition of the human species, by which we can show what 
particular precepts are needed in order to fulfil the general requirement 
declared in the fundamental normative principle. Pufendorf never 
explains why the number of the fundamental normative principles 
25 	 JNG II.3.7. 
26 JNG II.3.9: "Sed aliud incommodum commitatur sententiam i11am de eruendo 
jure naturali ex moribus gentium; quod nulla videatur inveniri natio, quae nudo 
jure naturae regatur; sed quaelibet leges sciptas aut non scriptas eidem habeat 
superadditas, quibus utitur, quando ipsi cives inter se negotii quid haben.... Unde 
non ita facile est perspicere, quid illae nationes pro naturali, quid pro positivo et 
civili jure habuerint. Quid quod saepe inolita diu consuetudo naturalis rationis 
faciem mentitur?" 
27 	 First letter to Boineburg, lines 178-180: "lode haud absurde quis inferat, multas 
leges quae nobis tanquam per naturam traditae habentur, ad sociatatem humanam 
ita absolute non esse necessarias." 
28 	 First letter to Boineburg, lines 190-193: "Reiecta itaque hac methodo ego 
mathematicos potissimum heic sequendos censuerim, scilicet ut immotum aliquod 
principium et quod nemo sanus in dubium vocare ausit constituatur, ex quo 
quicquid perpetui et universalis sit juris deducatur." 
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must be limited to one. It can be assumed, however, that he sees the 
existence of two or more such principles as a weakness in a science 
which deals with the rules of human conduct. For this would leave 
open the question which one of the principles ought to be followed in 
case they happen to contradict each other.29 
Another feature which distinguishes the presentation of natural law 
from mathematical sciences is the epistemological status of the 
fundamental normative principle. In mathematical sciences the axioms 
are analytical truths the validity of which is neither necessary nor 
possible to justify by some more evident truths. Thus, they most clearly 
belong to those principles which "require no further proof, but merit 
belief upon their own evidence". And as we saw above, Pufendorf 
holds that the discipline of natural law must and can also be based on 
such first verities. Nevertheless, although he often insists that the truth 
of his fundamental principle is something which no sane person can 
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deny, he does not claim that it would be immediately self-evident. The 
fundamental principle of sociality is a proposition the truth of which is 
"grounded on manifest and certain demonstrations.."30 And the first 
task of the discipline of natural law is to deduce the fundamental 
principle itself from some even more evident truths. 
THE PROBLEM OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLE 
What, then, are those manifest verities on which Pufendorf bases the 
fundamental principle of natural law? It has been customary to think 
that an answer to this question can be found rather easily in JNG 
I1.3.14-15, where Pufendorf deduces this principle. 
Pufendorf opens the discussion by remarking that "there seems to 
us no more fitting and direct way to investigate natural law than 
through careful consideration of the nature, condition, and inclinations 
of man."31  He then mentions four inherent human features which are 
significant in this respect. The first one is the tendency of each human 
29 	 In the early Elementa Pufendorf names two fundamental principles of natural law. 
But as we shall see in chapter 2.3., he actually derives these two from one, even 
more fundamental, precept. 
30 	 Eris scandica, p.187 (Specimen controversiarum IV.1): "...; sed eius [principii 
fundamentalis] veritas et existentia manifestis et certis demonstrationibus utique 
subnitatur." 
31 JNG II.3.14: "Nobis nulla via proprior videtur, et magis adposita, ad 
investigandum jus naturalae, quam ipsam hominis naturarv, conditionemque, et 
inclinationes accuratius contemplari." 
being "to love most of all himself, to preserve himself by all possible 
means, and always to seek that which he sees as good for himself, and 
to avoid what he sees as bad."32  The second is the inborn weakness 
(imbecillitas) which makes the survival and well-being of human 
beings dependent on the assistance they receive from other people. The 
third is the ability of human beings not only to survive, but also to 
increase their well-being considerably by the mutual exchange of 
goods and services. The fourth significant feature is the fact that 
human beings are able, and often willing, to inflict great harm and 
injury on other members of their species, either because of their 
corrupted desires, or because they are forced to defend themselves 
against the injuries of others. 
From these human characteristics Pufendorf deduces the 
fundamental principle by the following argument (the passage is from 
the original 1672 edition): 
After the preceding remarks it is easy to discover the fundamental law of 
nature. It is clear that man is an animal most desirous of his own 
preservation, in himself exposed to want, unable to exist without the help 
of his fellow-creatures, most fitted to advance the mutual good, and yet at 
times malicious, petulant, and easily irritated, as well as ready and well 
able to do injury. For such an animal to be safe it is necessary that he be 
sociable [sociabile], that is, be willing to join himself with others like 
him, and conduct himself towards them in a way which does not given 
them any cause to do him harm, but rather gives them a reason to preserve 
and increase his advantage. And so the fundamental law of nature is that 
every man, so far as in him lies, should cultivate and conserve towards 
others peaceful sociality [socialitas]. And since he who obligates man to 
an end obligates him as well to the means without which the end cannot 
be attained, everything which necessarily makes for sociality is 
understood to be commanded by natural law, while all that disturbs or 
destroys it is understood to be forbidden 33 
32 	 JNG II.3.14: "Id igitur primo homo habet commune cum omnibus animantibus, 
queis sensus sui inest, ut seipsum quam maxime amet, seipsum studeat omnibus 
modis conservare, quae bona sibi videntur nitatur adquirere, mala repellere." 
33 	 JNG 1I.3.15: "Ex hisce positis facile est fundamentum legis naturalis invenire. 
Scilicet manifesto adparet, hominen esse animal sui conservandi studiosissimum, 
per se egenum, sine suisimilium auxilio servari ineptum, ad mutua commoda 
promovenda maxime idoneum; idem tarnen saepe malitiosum, petulans, et facile 
irritabile, ac ad noxam inferendam promtum, ac validum. Ejusmodi animali, ut 
salvum sit, neccesarium est, ut sit sociabile, id est, ut conjugi cum sui similibus 
velit et adversus fillos ita gerat, ut ne isti ansam accipiant eum laedendi, sed potius 
rationem habeant ejusdem commoda servandi, aut promovendi. Inde 
fundamentalis lex naturae isthaec erit: cuilibet homini, quantum in se, colendam et 
conservandam esse pacificam adversus alios socialitatem. Ex quo consequitur, 
quia qui obligat ad finem, simul obligare intelligitur ad media, sine quibus finis 
non potest obtineri; omnia, quae ad istam socialitatem necessario faciunt, jure 
naturali praecepta, quae eandem turbant aut abrumpunt, vetita intelligi." 
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How should we understand this passage? Some commentators have 
suggested that Pufendorf here declares that there is in human beings a 
natural tendency towards a peaceful and social way of living. They 
have assumed, in other words, that Pufendorf deduces the duty to 
cultivate sociality straightforwardly from a corresponding natural 
inclination.34 The main problem with this interpretation is that in De 
jure naturae et gentium Pufendorf makes it perfectly clear that he does 
not find any inherent tendency in human beings to act in a peaceful 
and amicable manner towards other people in general. On the contrary, 
he remarks repeatedly that we possess a corrupt nature, which makes 
us prone to violate other members of our species more than any other 
anima1.35 Human beings can be called sociable creatures only in the 
sense that in total solitude their life is most miserable, and that "men 
are so constituted as to render mutual help more than any other 
creature, just as no other creature can suffer more injury from man 
64 	 than can man himself."36 
The foregoing has made several commentators think that in the 
passage cited above the words "sociabile" and "socialitas" do not 
refer to any natural human inclination but to moral imperative derived 
from the requirements of individual self-preservation. According to 
these scholars, Pufendorf bases his theory on the idea that since God 
has implanted in every human being an inclination which makes them 
put their personal well-being and preservation above everything else, 
it can be concluded that God also wants human beings to take care of 
themselves. The natural helplessness of human beings, their ability to 
survive by the mutual exchange of services, and their strong proclivity 
to hurt especially those they see as a threat to their own interests are, 
then, factors which make it obvious that individual human beings 
cannot achieve the end God has ordained for them unless they practice 
sociality towards other people. Hence, it can be concluded that this is 
how God wants each human being to behave. 
A justification for this type of interpretation has been found 
especially in the second edition of De jure naturae et gentium, where 
Pufendorf strongly emphasizes the compatibility of sociality and 
rational self-interest. A case in point is the addition at the end of 
paragraph II.3.16: 
34 	 Among modern commentators this view has been supported by Horst Denzer 
(1972, pp.93-96). 
35 	 JNG I1.1.6; II.3.14; OHC Prefatio. 
36 	 JNG 1684 II.3.16: "Nam etiam ideo animal sociabile hominem diximus, quod 
homines mutua commoda, magis quam ullum aliorum animantium, promovere 
idonei sint; sicuti contra nullum animal plus commodi ab homine experiri potest, 
quam ipse homo." 
Reason plainly declares that he who regards his well-being and 
survival cannot renounce the care of others. For since our safety 
and happiness depend in a large part on the goodwill and assistance 
of others, and the nature of men is such that they desire for their 
good deed some like return, and when this is not forthcoming make 
and end of their benefactions, no sane person can propose to protect 
himself on the theory that he renounce the respect for all others. 
But, on the contrary, the more he loves himself the more he will 
endeavour by kindly deed to get others to love him. For no one can 
hope with any reason that men will want, of their own accord, to 
make any effort to increase the happiness of those whom they know 
to be malevolent, perfidious, ungrateful, and inhuman: sure one 
must rather believe that other men will watch their opportunity to 
repress and destroy such persons.37 
In another addition to the second edition Pufendorf points out that 
actions which are in conformity with the principle of sociality are not 
only honorable but also beneficial for the individual who commits 
them, i.e. "they procure some advantage and reward for a man, and 
contribute to his happiness." Actions repugnant to this law, on the 
other hand, "may at times return some utility, and more often some 
pleasure, which, however, never endures for long, and is followed by a 
throng of much greater ills."38 
These remarks have made a number of scholars to hold that 
Pufendorf bases the content of natural law on its utility to individual 
survival. According to Richard Tuck, Pufendorf "believed that what 
was right (honestum), was so because it was fundamentally profitable 
(utile) to an individual in need of protection from his fellow men."39 
37 	 JNG 1684 II.3.16: "Quin hoc ratio satis dictitat, quod cui salus et conservatio sua 
cordi est, aliorum curam abdicare non possit. Cum enim nostra incolumnitas et 
felicitas magnarr partem a benevolentia et auxiolio aliorum dependeat, et vero ea 
sit hominum natura, ut pro benefactis paria sibi reponi velint, ubi id non sit, 
animum benefaciendi exuant: utiqie nemo sanus sui conservationem ita sibi pro 
scopo proponere potest, ut aliorum omnium respectum exuat. Sed potius quo 
magis se cum ratione amat, eo magis officiis nuis ut alii ipsum ament, curabi. 
Postquam nemo cum ratione sperare potest, homines its beandis libenter operam 
impendere velle, quos norunt in se esse malevolos, perfidos, ingratos, inhumanos: 
sed credendum potius sit, alios homines ad istos coercendos et extripandos esse 
incubituros." 
38 	 JNG 1684 I1.3.10: "Habent quippe hoc actiones legi naturali congruentes, ut non 
solum honestae sint, i.e. quae ad honrem, existimationem et disginatem hominis 
concervandam et augendam faciant, sed utiles, eadem existant, seu quae 
commodum aliquod et emolementum homini concilient, et ad felicitatem ipsius 
conferant. ... Sed quae actiones legi naturali repugnant, semper quidem turpes 
sunt, aliquando tarnen utilitatis quid saepius jucunditatis producere videntur, sed 
quae neque ad diuturnitatem valet, et quam longe majorum moles malurom a 
tergo sequitur." 
39 	 Tuck 1987, p.I05. 
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Similarly, Istvan Hont sees Pufendorf's theory as a result of an 
"attempt to reconstruct Grotius' jurisprudence by applying the 
intellectual method of Thomas Hobbes." This means above all that 
Pufendorf's account of socialitas is "build firmly on the notion of self-
preservation."40 Finally, Fiammetta Palladini's entire monograph 
Samuel Pufendorf, discepolo di Hobbes can be seen as a prolonged 
argument in favor of the same thesis4' 
Now, it is obvious that Pufendorf sees a close connection between 
natural law and individual security and well-being. However, several 
passages in De jure naturae et gentium seem to speak against the view 
that Pufendorf derives the fundamental principle of natural law from 
the requirements of individual self-preservation. First of all, Pufendorf 
explicitly denies this idea. This happens in JNG 11.3.16 - immediately 
after the deduction of the fundamental principle — when he comments 
on Hobbes' method of deducing natural law from the requirements of 
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self-preservation.42 Pufendorf is ready to admit that Hobbes' 
procedure shows "how conductive it is for the safety of man that 
human beings live according to such dictates of reason."43  However, 
Hobbes method cannot be used to demonstrate natural law: 
It cannot be concluded straight away that man has a right to use 
such dictates as a means for his preservation, and that therefore he 
is also bound to observe them as by some law. If these dictates of 
reason are to have the force of law, they must certainly be deduced 
from an entirely different principle.44 
40 	 Hont 1987, p.253, 267. 
41 	 Palladini 1991. Especially chapter two in Parte prima. 
42 	 In De dive Hobbes derived natural law from the observation that all human beings 
regard death as the greatest of all evils. This is something everyone avoids by a 
similar "necessity of nature" which makes a stone move downwards. (1.7.) On 
this basis Hobbes defined natural law as "the dictate of right reason conversant 
about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant 
preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies." (2.1.) He then derived 
the fundamental principle of natural law from the famous claim that the natural 
state of humankind is that of war. The first principle of this law was "that peace is 
to be sought after, where it may be found; and where not, there to provide 
ourselves for helps of war." (2.2.) From this Hobbes derived twenty precepts of 
natural law, the most important of which was the requirement to stop the war of 
all against all by creating a civil power. 
43 JNG II.3.16: "Quod autem ex sola propriae salutis curae Hobbesius leges 
naturales sat argute deduxit; circa earn demonstrationem initio est notandum; id 
quidem liquido ex illa constrare, saluti hominum expedire, ut ab hominibus juxta 
ista rationis dictamina vita agatur." 
44 	 JNG 11.3.16: "Non tarnen statim ita concludi posse; jus est homini ista media ad 
sui conservationem adhibere; ergo ad eadem observanda velut ex lege aliqua 
tenetur: Inde ut illa rationis dictamina vim legum accipiant, omnino ex alio 
principio est deducendum." 
This does not only mean that in order to be truly laws the dictates of 
reason must be seen as commands of God — a point Pufendorf makes a 
little later in paragraph II.3.20. Also, the content of these dictates must 
be deduced by a different principle. 
In order to illustrate the unacceptable character of Hobbes' method, 
Pufendorf asks his readers to imagine a nation which is so powerful 
that it can do whatever it wants to the neighboring countries without 
having to fear their revenge. He points out that if the citizens of this 
country respected peace and justice in their internal affairs, but 
simultaneously "harried, plundered, killed, and dragged others into 
slavery, just as they felt it to be their profit," we would most certainly 
say that they infringe natural law. Nevertheless, these people would be 
perfectly able to preserve themselves 45 
The judgement by which we condemn the nation described above 
follows, according to Pufendorf, from the fact that natural law wants 
us to consider also such human beings as our kinsmen and equals who 
have nothing good nor bad to offer us, or from whom we have nothing 
to gain or fear for. He remarks that this reason alone, even if there 
were no others, should make the human species cultivate friendly 
social relations 46 The same point is stated even more strongly in an 
addition Pufendorf made to paragraph II.3.18 in the second edition of 
De jure naturae et gentium. Here he emphasizes that although a 
friendly attitude towards others is most often beneficial for our own 
interests, as a command of natural law it must be deduced not from 
such prudential considerations, but from common humanity: 
Although by the wisdom of the Creator the natural law has been so 
adapted to the nature of man, that its observance is always 
connected with the profit and advantage of men, and therefore also 
this general friendship tends to man's greatest good, yet, in giving a 
reason for this fact, one does not refer to the advantage acquiring 
therefrom, but to the common nature of all men. For instance, if a 
reason must be given why a man should not injure another, you do 
45 	 JNG II.3.16: "Unde si foret populus aliquis, intemam inter se pacem et justitiam 
colens, tantisque pollens viribus, ut reliquis omnibus queat esse formidabilis; 
adeoque ab aliis laedendis hautquidquam isto metu reprimatur, ne fors sua in 
ipsum exempla redicant: is tarnen populus in alios imbecilliores pro lubitu 
grassaretur, ageret, raperet, occideret, in servitutem abstraheret alios, prout sibi 
expedire judicaret, utique ab hoc directe jus naturae violari dicemus. Et poterat 
tarnen iste, (quod supponimus) se conservare, etiamsi nullum fors jus adversus 
alios adhiberet." 
46 	 JNG II.3.16: "Immo si vel maxime ab aliquo neque boni quid, neque mali in me 
proficisci possit, nihilque, in se is habeat, quod vel metuam, vel desiderem; tarnen 
hunc tantum cognatum et aequalem haben natura vult. Quae etiam sola ratio, si 
caeterae deficerent, ad amicam societatem collendam humano generi sufficit." 
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not say, because it is to his utility, although in fact it is most 
advantageous, but because the other person also is a man, that is, an 
animal related by nature, whom it is a crime to injure 47 
The second edition of De jure naturae et gentium includes also 
another remark which contradicts with the view that Pufendorf derives 
natural law from the requirements of individual self-preservation. This 
is the addition at the end of paragraph II.3.14, in which Pufendorf 
defends his decision to give "in the investigation of the human 
condition the first place to man's self-love". He emphasizes that by 
doing so he does not mean that "man should under all circumstances 
prefer only himself before all others or measure everything by his own 
advantage, distinguishing this from the utility of others, and setting it 
forth as his highest goal." There are, however, two reasons which 
speak strongly in favour of his decision. First, human beings are so 
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formed by nature that they necessarily think of their own advantage 
before the well-being of others.48 Second, a moderate self-interest is in 
fact necessary for the attainment of the end of natural law: 
Furthermore, it is no one's business so much as my own to look out 
for myself. For although we hold before ourselves as our goal the 
common good, still, since I am also a part of the human race for the 
preservation of which some care is due, surely there is no one on 
whom the clear and special care of myself can more fittingly fall 
than upon my own self.49 
47 	 JNG 1684 II.3.18: "Quanquam autem per Creatoris sapientiam lex naturalis ita 
humanae naturae sit adaptata, ut ejus observatio semper cum utilitate et commodo 
hominum sit conjuncta, eoque communis ille amor hominibus maximo bono 
cedat; tarnen in assignanda hujus ration non ad commodum inde proveniens, sed 
ad communem naturam solet provocari, v.g. si ratio reddenda sit, quare homo 
homini nocere non debeat, non solet dici, quia id utile est, etsi revera id sit quam 
utilissimum; sed quia alter homo, i.e. natura cognatum animal est, cui nocere 
nefas." 
48 	 JNG 1684 II.3.14: "Quo loco tarnen illud monendum, nos in eruenda hominis 
conditione amori proprio priorem locem assignasse, non quod quilibet seipsum 
solum reliquis omnibus ubique praeferre debeat, aut ominia propria utilitate 
metiri, eamque, quatenus ab aliorum commodo separata est, summum sibi 
scopum proponere. Sed quia amorem proprium naturaliter homo prius sentit, 
quam aliorum curam eo ipso, quod naturaliter prius est sentire sui, quam aliorum 
existentiam." 
49 	 JNG 1684 1I.3.14: "Deinde quia ut ego mei ipsius curam habeam, ad neminem 
proprius, quam ad meipsum spectat. Licet enim scopum nobis praefigamus 
bonum commune, tarnen cum ego quoque generis humani pars sim, cujus saluti 
aliqua etiam cura debetur, nemo sane est, cui distincta magis et specialis mei cura 
incumbere possit, quam mihimetipsi." 
According to this passage, the end of natural law — the purpose of its 
existence — is not the survival or well-being of the individual but the 
preservation of humankind in general. To take care of one's personal 
security and well-being is in accordance with natural law only because 
it contributes to the achievement of this more general end. 
The same idea is affirmed in Pufendorf's discussion of the 
legitimacy of suicide and other self-destructive behavior in chapter 
II.4., entitled The duties of man towards himself. In the first edition of 
De jure naturae et gentium Pufendorf opens the whole chapter with 
the following remark: 
It is apparent that man loves himself and his conservation, and puts 
this love above all else. But there is some doubt whether it is only 
the natural instinct he has in common with animals which propels 
him to this, or whether there is in addition to this some command of 
natural law.5° 
In other words, the fact that God has installed a desire for self-
preservation in human nature cannot as such be seen as proof that God 
also commands human beings to follow this instinct. Pufendorf 
continues by arguing that the duty to preserve one's life follows from 
the fact that "the sociality, for which human beings were created by 
God, cannot be preserved and exercised to good advantage unless 
every man improves and preserves himself to the best of his ability." It 
is this observation, not the natural desire for self-preservation, which 
makes it apparent that "if an individual neglects his own care, he 
inflicts an injury not only on himself, but on God and the human 
race."5' 
* * * 
Does the foregoing mean that there is a genuine inconsistency at the 
heart of Pufendorf's theory of natural law? Does he fail to observe that 
the argumentation by which he deduces the fundamental principle is 
50 	 JNG II.4.1 (JNG 1684 II.4.16): "Hominen seipsum amare, conservationemque, et 
amorem sui omnia habere, manifestum est. Verum an solus ille naturalis 
instinctus, quem cum brutis habet communem, eum ad id propellat; an vero 
insuper accedat aliquod jussum legis naturalis, dubio non caret." 
51 	 JNG II.4.1 (1684 II.4.16): Sed cum ex omnium sapientum consensu Creator O.M. 
hominem condiderit, ut ipsi inserviat, excultisque bonis, ab ipso sibi concessis, 
ejusdem gloriam redderet illustrorem, cumque socialitas, ad qaum homo conditus 
est, exerceri commode et servari nequat, ni quilibet seipsum quantum in se, 
excolat, et servet; adparet abjecta plane sui cura hominen non sibi quidem, sed 
Deo creatori, sed genen humano facere injuriam." 
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incompatible with his moral intuition which suggests that the end of 
the law which God has imposed on human beings must be something 
more general than individual survival? Or does he actually support 
some sort of Hobbes-inspired conception of natural law but find this 
too controversial to be presented without some more conventional 
remarks to soften its more disturbing consequences? Or are there some 
unstated presuppositions which make these two seemingly 
irreconcilable accounts of natural law ultimately compatible with each 
other? 
Two commentators have suggested that in De jure naturae et 
gentium Pufendorf presents two incompatible accounts of natural law, 
and that only one of them represents his true position. According to 
Hans Welzel, in JNG I1.3.15 Pufendorf attempts to demonstrate 
natural law in a "naturalistic" fashion starting from the instinct for 
self-preservation, but leaves unexplained how self-preservation itself 
70 
	
	
receives its normative status (Welzel neglects the deontological 
character of Pufendorf's moral theory). The attempt fails conclusively 
when Pufendorf comes to the question of suicide and is forced to 
admit that the requirement to preserve one's life must be deduced from 
the principle of sociality. However, paragraphs 1I.3.16-18, in which 
the general friendship between people is based on common humanity, 
show that Pufendorf was aware of the limitations of the naturalistic 
method right from the beginning. Seeing Pufendorf as a predecessor of 
eighteenth-century German moral philosophy Welzel interprets these 
remarks to mean that the ultimate criteria of natural law is the value of 
human nature (Würde der menschlichen Natur) which requires one "to 
respect the humanity in every person".52 
Fiammetta Palladini has offered what might be characterized as an 
inverted version of the interpretation given by Welzel. According to 
Palladini, Pufendorf's conscious intention in the first edition of De 
jure naturae et gentium was to follow Hobbes in deducing natural law 
from the requirements of self-preservation. However, because of the 
highly controversial character such an enterprise had in the 
seventeenth century, Pufendorf felt himself forced to soften the most 
disturbing consequences of such a manner of deducing natural law. 
With this end in mind, he added the idea of general friendship which 
nature requires from us towards every human being. And when he 
justified this with the example of the evil but unbeatable nation, he 
appealed to commonly shared moral intuitions instead of 
demonstrable certainties. Palladini points out how these remarks in 
52 	 Hans Wetzel 1958 Der Naturrechtslehre Samuel Pufendorfs. Ein Beitragezur 
Ideengesichte des 17. und. 18. Jahrhunderts. Berlin 1958. pp.43-47. 
JNG II.3.16-18 were only slightly altered quotations from the early 
Elementorum juresprudentiae universalis, where Pufendorf still 
followed (according to Palladini) Grotius in founding natural law on a 
natural inclination to social life. While being comprehensible in this 
earlier work, the remarks became misleading in De jure naturae et 
gentium, where Pufendorf did not anymore regard sociality as a 
natural inclination, but as a moral imperative deduced from the 
requirements of self-preservation.53 The initial idea was even more 
seriously distorted in the second edition of De jure naturae et gentium, 
since the severe criticism directed against his work made Pufendorf 
distinguish himself from Hobbes by remarks which were inspired by 
Richard Cumberland's openly anti-Hobbesian De legibus naturae.54  
A third solution to the problem presented above has been offered by 
J.B.Schneewind, who holds that in JNG II.3.15 Pufendorf does not 
follow Hobbes in deducing the fundamental principle from the desire 
for self-preservation, but only regards human self-love as "an 
important fact about us to be considered in deriving natural law."55  
The starting point of Pufendorf's theory is idea that God is good and 
benevolent. From this he concludes that "at least the main features of 
things of each kind were created for some good purpose", and that 
"those features can be used to indicate how God meant things of that 
kind to behave or operate." This means, in tum, that the manner in 
which God wants human beings to behave can be known by 
examining what special features God has given them. These are their 
intellectual abilities, their self-love and strong desire for self-
preservation, their inherent weakness, and their ability to help one 
another. According to Schneewind, Pufendorf thinks that we discover 
the fundamental principle of natural law, when we "consider these 
features together, and ask how they can best work for the advantage of 
human, which is how God must have meant them to work." The 
fundamental duty to cultivate sociality follows, then, from the 
observation that these human characteristics "work for our advantage 
when we live socially, in mutually helpful groups."56  Schneewind 
thinks, in other words, that in Pufendorf's theory the principal end of 
natural law is not the security or well-being of an individual, but the 
well-being of the whole of the human species. This explains 
53 Fiammetta Palladini Samuel Pufendorf, disceplo di Hobbes. Per una 
reinterpretazione del giusnaturalismo moderno. Bologna 1990, pp.193-194, 254-
270. 
54 	 Palladini 1990, p.193-194,I89-243. 
55 	 J.B. Schneewind "Pufendorf's place in the history of ethics", Synthese, 72, 1987, 
p.133. 
56 	 Schneewind 1987, pp.134-135. 
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Pufendorf's remark that when we give a reason for the general 
friendship which ought prevail between human beings, we do not refer 
to its utility but to the common nature of all men.57 
Of the three interpretations presented above it is that of 
Schneewind's which, in my opinion, hits closest to the mark. I fully 
agree with Schneewind that Pufendorf's starting point in the deduction 
of natural law is the assumption that God has imposed the law on 
human beings in order to advance the survival and well-being of the 
whole of the human species. However, it seems to me that Schneewind 
somewhat undermines the Lutheran aspect of Pufendorf's theory. 
When Schneewind holds that in Pufendorf's eyes all salient human 
features were given "for some good purpose" and "work for the 
advantage of humans", he neglects the fact that Pufendorf mentions 
the tendency to hurt other members of one's species as one of the most 
significant human characteristics. Moreover, Schneewind's inter- 
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pretation leaves unexplained Pufendorf's refusal to deduce the duty to 
preserve one's life from the instinct for self-preservation. If we assume 
that the manner in which God wants human beings to live can be 
known by contemplating the central features God had given them, it 
seems natural to think that the strong instinct for survival proves that 
God wants human beings to preserve themselves. But as we saw 
above, Pufendorf explicitly rejects this idea. And in what follows I 
will argue that his reason for doing this is the assumption that the 
human species is corrupt, and that no human inclination as such can, 
therefore, be seen as a sign of the manner in which God wants human 
beings to behave. 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL 
INCLINATIONS 
Pufendorf's refusal to derive the duty to preserve one's life from the 
instinct for survival is not an isolated slip of the tongue. On the 
contrary, his works include several remarks which make it clear that 
the mere fact that we have a natural desire or aversion to do something 
cannot prove that this is how natural law commands us to behave. This 
idea is expressed, for example, at the beginning of Pufendorf's 
extensive discussion on the question whether incestuous marriages are 
forbidden by natural law. There he mentions that some have solved 
57 	 Schneewind 1987, p.136. 
this problem simply by appealing to the abhorrence human beings 
usually feel towards such unions. According to these writers, "all men 
not corrupted by bad education or vicious habits observe by their 
senses something repugnant in such marriages, which is a sure witness 
that natural law forbids it "5ß To this Pufendorf answers, first of all, 
that the revulsion people feel towards incestuous marriages is not 
necessarily an instinctual reaction, but might as well be the result of 
custom and education. However, even if this aversion were a natural 
human feature, we would still not be allowed to draw the conclusion 
that such marriages are forbidden by natural law. For it is not "safe, in 
eliciting natural law, to consult the mere judgement of senses and 
passions, since the opposite conclusion can be reached, that all things 
to which senses and passions are strongly attached are enjoined by the 
law of nature, while most of them are in fact clearly opposed to that 
law."59 
Behind such a remark is, of course, Pufendorf's Lutheran view of 
human beings as animals "seething with evil desires". Since human 
nature is fundamentally corrupt, there is no guarantee that our inherent 
proclivities and sentiments agree with the manner in which God wants 
us to behave. Most likely it is the other way around. Nevertheless, 
Pufendorf admits that there are a few instincts which bend us to the 
same direction as natural law. These are the natural desire for the 
proliferation of offspring and the instinct for self-preservation. 
However, the explanation Pufendorf gives to these exceptions is rather 
peculiar and does not involve the idea that natural law could be 
derived from the inclinations in question. 
Pufendorf explains the origin of the instincts which agree with 
natural law in Elementa, when he argues against the view that since 
human beings are naturally inclined to seek sexual intercourse, 
offspring, and self-preservation, there is no need for natural law to 
command them to do this.60 Pufendorf agrees with this view in so far 
58 	 JNG VI.1.28: "Nonnulli heic simpliciter ad abhorrentiam affectuum humanorum 
confugiunt, quasi omnes, qui per pravam educationem aut vitiosum habitum non 
sunt corrupti, in ipsis sensibus deprehendant aliquid, tali commixtioni repugnans; 
id quod claro sit indicio, eandem naturali jure prohiberi." 
59 JNG VI.1.28: "Neque vero circa jus naturae eruendum adeo tutum est solum 
judicium sensuum atque affectuum consulere; cum ex adverso concludi posset, 
illa quoque jure naturali praecipi, in quae sensus et affectus acerrime feruntur; 
quorum tarnen pleraque isti juri adversari manifestum est." 
60 	 The only example Pufendorf gives of someone who holds this view is Seneca, 
who remarks in De beneficio (IV.17) that "lilt is superfluous to force us into the 
path which we naturally take, just as no one needs to be urged to love himself, 
since self-love begins to act upon him as soon as he is born." See JNG I1.4.1 
(1684 II.4.16). 
73 
as "natural instincts and the dictates of reason, or natural law, are two 
quite distinct things." Moreover, he holds it obvious that "in most 
matters these two tend in the opposite directions so that instincts leads 
us away from the honourable course which reason urges."6t However, 
Pufendorf insists that in the case of the two instincts mentioned above 
it happens "that we are obliged to do something to which we are also 
inclined by instinct, because the dictate of reason prescribes the 
same."62 This is so because these particular instincts were not direct 
consequences of the fall, but something which God found necessary to 
add to human nature after it had become corrupt and mortal. 
The reason why God implanted in the human species an 
exceptionally strong sexual desire and a natural affection for their 
offspring was, according to Pufendorf, that as intelligent creatures 
human beings are able to contemplate on the burdens involved in 
marriage and in the raising of children.63 Because of the hardships 
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involved in these practices human beings would be unwilling to have 
descendants, if only natural law impelled them to do so. Therefore, 
God found it necessary to enforce his commands with instincts which 
have the same direction. The desire for self-preservation, on the other 
hand, was made necessary by the miserable character of human life. 
The pleasures which accompany the worldly life are usually so small — 
at least when compared to the hardships — that without an inherent 
dislike of dying the mere command of natural law could not prevent 
human beings from killing themselves at the first opportunity.64 
61 	 Elementa II.Obs.4.9: "Novimus quidem longe distinctissima esse, instinctum 
naturalem et dictamen rationis seu legem naturae. In compluribus etiam haec duo 
in contrarium tendunt, ita ut instinctus ab honestate abducat, quam ratio suadet." 
62 	 Elementa II.Obs.4.9: "Et quanquam solus instinctus nunquam ad aliquid agendum 
obligat; contingit tarnen, ut ad aliquid obligemur, ad quod per instinctum quoque 
inclinamur, quia idem rationis quoque dictamen praescribit." 
63 	 Pufendorf holds that without natural desire for sexual intercourse and offspring 
wiser men would find a companionship with women worthless and repulsive 
(JNG VI.1.3). 
64 	 Elementa II.Obs.4.9: "Enimvero usque adeo non sequitur, jus naturae ista non 
praecipere, quia instinctus naturalis in ea jam antea sat acriter feratur, ut potius 
naturam eadem, tanquam seminarium generis humani servantia, quam maxime 
observari voluisse luculenter adpareat; dum velut diffisa soli rationis dictamini, 
eidem succenturiari jussit instinctum naturalem ita vehementem, ut difficulter 
admodum homo in contraria niti possit. Quod si enim accurate expendantur 
molestiae, quae vitam humanam necessario comitantur, longe excedentes 
exiguum illud et vile volumptatum; ac quam multis vita producatur, ut fortunae 
materiam saeviendi praebeant: quotusquisque non primo quoque tempore vitam 
hanc abrumperet, si sola ratio earn servari suaderet, nec instinctus naturalis ejus 
amorem tam anxie commendaret?... Sic quotusquisque liberis operam daret. qui 
saepe materiam dolendi, aut saltem certissimam curarum ac laborum causam 
praebent, ni super rationem etiam inclinatio naturalis eo propelleret? Intercedente 
praeprimis actu tam parum decoro, et consotio mulierum, quod sapienti vile juxta 
ac taediosum citra istas illecebras foret." 
The same explanation for the existence of instincts which agree 
with natural law is affirmed in De jure naturae et gentium, when 
Pufendorf deals with the question of whether human beings who are 
fit to marry and to have children are also obligated to do so: 
For no less upon this than upon other things to which man is borne 
by his natural appetite, such as self-preservation and the love and 
the rearing of children, some men raise a doubt that they are not 
sanctioned by natural law. They claim that there was no need for 
nature to do so, since instinct and sense appetite alone sufficiently 
incite men to it. But, granted that natural instinct tends towards 
such things, it does not follow that the law of nature does not for 
that reason command them. In fact it appear from this very 
consideration that nature wishes65 them to be observed as carefully 
as possible, as directly leading to the preservation of mankind, 
while distrusting, as it were, the mere dictate of reason she ordered 
so violent an instinct to come to man's aid that he can only with 	 75 
difficulty make headway against it.66 
Similarly, in his discussion of the legitimacy of self-destructive 
behavior Pufendorf rejects the idea that since human beings have an 
instinct for self-preservation, natural law does not have to command 
them to preserve their lives. Actually, the instinct for self-preservation 
"appears to have been enlisted as an aid to the dictates of reason, as if 
the latter by itself alone would not constitute a support adequate to 
sustain mankind."67  Again, Pufendorf refers to the miserable character 
of human existence: 
65 	 When Pufendorf here and elsewhere says that "nature wishes" (or "nature 
commands") human beings to behave in a certain manner, he is not speaking of 
some intention inherent in nature itself, but of the will of God as it can be 
recognized trough the natural features he has given to human beings. 
66 	 JNG VI.1.3: "Nam non minus circa hoc, quam alia, ad quae naturali adpetitu 
homo fertur, ut est conservatio sui ipsius, amor et educatio sobolis, quidam 
dubium movent, quasi isthaec lege naturali non sanciantur. Eo quippe opus non 
fuisse, cum jam antea instinctus, et adpetitus sensitivus in talia sat valide 
propellat. Enimvero usque adeo non sequitur, jus natuare ista non praecipere, quia 
in eadem instinctus naturalis fertur; ut potius exinde adpareat, naturam ista quam 
accuratissime voluisse observari, utpote incolumitatem genens humani immediate 
conservantia: dum velut diffisa soli rationis dictamini eidem succenturiari jussit 
instinctum ita vehementem, ut difficulter admodum homo in contrarium niti 
queat." 
67 	 JNG II.4.1 (JNG 1684 II.4.16): "Deinde usque adeo non sequitur, jus naturae 
istud non praecipere, quia instinctus jam ante in id satis acriter ferebatur; ut potius 
iste dictamini rationis velut succenturiari videatur, quasi hoc solum non solum 
sufficiat fundamento genens humani continendo." 
Surely if we consider the troubles which accompany human life, 
troubles that far surpass those small and worthless joys which recur 
constantly but faintly and not without disdain; and how many men 
there are for whom life is prolonged that they may encounter more 
misfortunes; who would not, at the first opportunity, take his own 
life, did not the instinct so forcefully commend it [JNG 1684: or 
were not death accompanied by ideas of such bitterness]? Or who 
would not overcome the instinct, did not the commands of the 
almighty Creator stand in his way?68  
The last remark in the passage cited above is highly curious. It seems 
to indicate that human beings do not feel that worldly life is in any 
way valuable or worth living. Without the idea that God has forbidden 
suicide, the instinct for self-preservation could not prevent them from 
ending their lives. It must be noted, however, that Pufendorf is 
speaking here of people who are concerned with their future lives as a 
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	 whole and who also have realistic expectations concerning the 
hardships and joys they are likely to encounter. For such people, 
Pufendorf seems to say, the mere instinct for self-preservation does 
not offer a sufficient incentive for living. They also need the idea that 
God : commands them to preserve their lives. The great majority of 
human beings do not, however, have such a rational comprehension of 
future events. Pufendorf holds that as a result of bad education and 
evil habits most people "are usually stirred on by what strikes their 
senses, and do not care much for their future" 69 It seems possible to 
think, therefore, that for this great majority the instinct for self-
preservation alone offers a sufficient motive for protecting their lives 
by all possible means. 
Be this as it may, what the remarks cited above show for sure is that 
our comprehension of the fact that God is concerned with the 
preservation of humankind and wants individual human beings to 
preserve their lives is, according to Pufendorf, independent of the 
existence of the corresponding instinct. Human reason would 
recognize that God forbids self-destructive behavior even if instinct 
were lacking, although in such a case the ability of human beings to 
68 	 JNG II.4.1 (JNG 1684 II.4.16): "Sane enim si considerentur molestiae, quae vitam 
humanam commitantur, longe superantes exiguum illud et vile voluptatum, 
eodem tenore, sed languidus fere et non citra fastidium recursans: ac quam multis 
vita producatur, ut plura excipere mala possint; quotusquisque non primo quoque 
tempore vitam abrumperet [1684: ni instinctus tantopere eadem commendaret; aut 
ni morti tanta opinio acerbitatis esse conjuctal: aut quotusquisque instinctum 
istum non vinceret, ni omnipotentis Creatoris jussa obstarent?" 
69 	 JNG VII.1.11: "Tum quod magna pars mortalium praesentibus tantum imminet, 
futuri parum curiosa, ac illis fere movetur, quae in sensus incurrunt, ac sublimiora 
aegre adsurgat." 
observe this rule would be very limited. Correspondingly, it is only 
because we already understand that God wants the human species to 
continue its existence that we are able to gather that unlike most of our 
desires, the instinct for self-preservation is in accordance with God's 
will. In what follows I will maintain that this idea is in perfect 
agreement with the argument by which Pufendorf deduces the 
fundamental principle in De jure naturae et gentium. Before that I will 
show that already in Elementa Pufendorf's theory was not based on 
any correspondence between natural inclinations and natural law. 
THE FOUNDATION OF NATURAL LAW 
IN ELEMENTA 
Superficially, the argument by which Pufendorf derives natural law in 
Elementa appears to be a mixture of the theories of Grotius and 
Hobbes. This impression follows, in the first place, from the fact that 
Pufendorf opens the discussion of natural law in the third 
Observation70 by naming two natural human inclinations. These are 
self-love, which includes the tendency to protect one's life by all 
possible means, and the inclination to enjoy living with other human 
beings, for which Pufendorf also uses Grotius' expression appetitus 
socialis.71 At the beginning of the fourth Observation Pufendorf then 
gives the following description of the manner in which human reason 
discovers natural law: 
By experience, therefore, it is well established that, when, out of a 
state of infantile ignorance, the light of reason in man reveals itself 
with a little greater clarity, and turns itself to the contemplation of 
its own nature, his reason which has not been corrupted by passions 
or vicious habits, dictates to him that it is right, indeed, for him to 
care for and save himself as far as he can; nevertheless, because he 
has observed that he has been destined by the creator to cultivate 
society with other men, it is necessary so to modify his care for 
himself as not to become himself unsociable with others, or not to 
70 	 While writing Elementa, Pufendorf was so impressed by the certainty offered by 
the mathematical sciences that he organized his work in the form of twenty one 
definitions, two axioms, and five, what he called "observations". The actual 
theory of natural law was presented mainly in Observations three to five. 
71 	 Elementa II.Obs.3.1-3. 
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have society among men disturbed. It is this very thing that we call 
the law of nature.72 
A little later Pufendorf declares that there are two fundamental 
principles of natural law, from which all other principles follow. The 
first one orders human beings to protect themselves and what belongs 
to them, while the second commands that they must not do anything 
whereby "the society among men is less tranquil." These two precepts 
can be combined into the principle: "Each ought to be zealous to 
preserve himself so that the society of men is not disturbed."73  
Now, all this certainly looks as if Pufendorf deduced natural law 
straightforwardly from the two natural tendencies God has implanted 
in human nature. This impression is, however, deceptive. In the first 
place, when Pufendorf later in the fourth Observation gives a more 
detailed justification for the first fundamental principle, the instinct of 
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	 self-preservation is not even mentioned. That natural law requires 
human beings to take care of themselves and forbids suicide and other 
self-destructive behavior can be gathered from the fact that God has 
destined people to cultivate human society, which goal they are not 
allowed to abandon "after the fashion of a deserter or a soldier who 
fails to appear "74 
 And in another passage Pufendorf makes it clear that 
the requirement to cultivate society is actually the foundation of the 
whole of natural law. We understand that God commands us to obey 
this law, because he has "so formed the nature of man as to make it 
apparent that man has been destined to cultivate society."75  
72 	 Elementa II.Obs.IV.1: "Per experimentiam igitur constat, quod ubi ex infantili 
ignorantia sese rationis lumen in homine paulo clarius exserit, atque ad 
contemplationem suae naturae se convertit, ratio ipsi per affectus aut vitiosos 
habitus non corrupta, dictitet, par quidem esse, ut ipse se, quantum potest, curet et 
conservet; quia tarnen a Creatore ad societatem cum aliis hominibus colendam 
destinatum ses animadvertit, necessum esse, ita curam sui temperare ne cum aliis 
insociabilis fiat, aut ne societas inter homines turbetur. Id ipsum est, quod 
vocamus legem naturae." 
73 Elementa II.Obs.IV.4: "Sunt auten leges naturae fundamentales, ex quibus 
reliquae omnes fluunt duae: 1. Ut quilibet vitam et membra sua quantum potest 
tueatur, segue ac sua conservet. 2. Ut ne perturbet societatem humanam, seu, ne 
facit aliquid, quo minus tranquilla inter homines societas esse queat. Haec ita 
inter se conspirare, et invicem velut implaxae esse debent ut in unam velut 
coalescant legem, scilicet: Ut ita quisque; conservare se studeat, ne societas inter 
homines turbetur." 
74 	 Elementa II.Obs.4.10: "Quod autem ad se ipsum conservandum quis obligetur ex 
lege naturae, ejus rei istam rationem videri, quod a Creatore ad colendam 
societatem humanarv sit destinatus, quam transfugae aut infrequentis multis instar 
pro lubudine deferere hautquidquam possit." 
75 	 Elementa II.Obs.4.3. "Obstinet auten distamen illud rationis, seu lex naturae, vim 
obligandi homines ex autoritate Creatoris, tanquam supremum in ipsos imperium 
The foregoing does not, of course, disprove the possibility that in 
Elementa Pufendorf follows Grotius in deriving natural law from a 
natural inclination to social life. For in the third Observation, where 
the aim is to show that human beings are destined for social life, 
Pufendorf not only speaks of appetitus socialis but also remarks that 
"nature has ordered us to unite to form a peaceful society."76 It would 
seem, thus, that he deduces the requirement to cultivate society from a 
corresponding inclination. 
Here we must notice two things. First, already in Elementa 
expressions like "nature orders", "nature wants", and "nature 
commends" do not refer to a natural proclivity to behave in a 
particular manner, but to the will of God as it can be read from the 
features he has implanted in human nature. This becomes apparent, for 
example, when Pufendorf in the third Observation says that nature has 
"intended" and "commended" human beings to follow their self-love 
in a manner which does not conflict with their inclination for 
society.77 Unless we assume that Pufendorf introduces here a third 
natural inclination which directs the two already mentioned, we must 
conclude that he is speaking of the manner in which God wants human 
beings to harmonize the two natural inclinations he has given them. 
Second, there is a crucial difference between the social inclination 
on which Grotius founded his theory and the one Pufendorf speaks of 
in Elementa. In De iure belli ac pacis Grotius derived natural law from 
a human appetitus for a peaceful and rationally organized social life.78  
No inclination of this type is presumed by Pufendorf in Elementa. 
This becomes evident when we examine closely his comments against 
the argument by which Hobbes in De cive refuted the idea than human 
beings are animals "born fit" for society. Since I wish to show that the 
disagreement between Pufendorf and Hobbes on this issue is merely 
verbal, I am forced to try the patience of the reader by giving two 
extensive quotations. The first of these is from the footnote in 
gerentis. Qui cum hominis naturam ita formarit ut ad societatatem colendam 
ipsum esse destinatum satis adpareat, eaque de causa eidem animum istarum 
fecerit notionum capacem; intelligitur sane eundem quoque voluisse, ut homo fini 
ab ipso praescripto sese attemperet." 
76 	 Elementa II.Obs.3.2. 
77 Elementa II.Obs.3.3: "Duss hasce inclinations, quibus homo seipsum amat, et 
societatem appetit, ex intentione naturae ita temperare debere, ne per illam huic 
aliquid decedat. Scilicet homini ita sui amorem natura commedavit, ut ne tamen 
propter eundem aliqui committat, quod inclinationi ad societatem repugnet vel 
ipsam societatis naturam laedat." 
78 	 IBP Prolegomena (§ 6): "Inter haec autem quae homini sunt propria, est appetitus 
societatis, id est communitatis, non qualiscunquae, sed tranquillae, et pro sui 
intellectus modo ordinatae, cum his qui sui sunt genris." Grotius' theory is 
treated in more detail below in chapter 3.2. 
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paragraph 1.2 of De cive, where Hobbes explains what exactly he is 
rejecting: 
It is true indeed, that to man by nature, or as man, that is, as soon as 
he is bom, solitude is an enemy; for infants have need of others to 
help them live, and those of riper years to help them to live well. 
Wherefore I deny not that men (even nature compelling) desire to 
come together. But civil societies are not mere meetings, but bonds, 
to the making whereof faith and compact are necessary; the virtue 
whereof to children and fools, and the profit whereof to those who 
have not tasted the miseries that accompany its defects, is 
altogether unknown; whence it happens, that those, because they 
know not what society is, cannot enter into it; these, because 
ignorant of the benefits it brings, care not for it. Manifest therefore 
it is, that all men, because they are born in infancy, are born unapt 
for society. Many also, perhaps most men, either through defect of 
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mind or want of education, remain unfit during the whole course of 
their lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a 
human nature. Wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, 
but by education.79 
In other words, Hobbes did not deny that human beings want to live in 
the company of other members of their species. On the contrary, he 
admitted that they do so "even nature compelling". All Hobbes 
claimed was that the ability of human beings to behave according to 
the rules required in peaceful social life — which for Hobbes was 
identical with civil life — is totally dependent on the education they 
happen to receive. Therefore, it cannot be said that human beings are 
animals bom fit for society (animal aptum natum sociatatem). To this 
Pufendorf answers: 
79 	 De Cive 1.2. The original latin text goes: "Verum quidem esse homini per 
naturam, sive quatenus est homo, id est. statim atque est natur, solitudinem 
perpetuam molestam esse. Nam infantes ad vivendum, adulti ad bene vivendum 
aliorum ope indigent. Itaque homines alterum alterius congressum natura cogente 
appetere non nego. Sociatates autem civiles non sunt meri congressus, sed 
foedera, quibus faciendis fides et pacta necessaria sunt. Horum, ab infantibus 
quidem et indoctis, vis; ad its auteur, quid damnorum a defectu societatis inexperti 
sunt, utilitas ignoratur: unde fit ut illi, quia quid sit societas non intelligunt, earn 
Mire non possint; hi, quia nesciunt quid prodest, non curent. Manifestum ergo est 
omnes homines, cum sint nati infantes, ad societatem ineptos natos esse: per 
multos etiam, fortasse plurimos, vel morbo animi, vel defectu disciplinae, per 
omnem vitam ineptos manere. Habent tarnen illi tarn infantes quam adulti 
naturam humanam. Ad societatem ergo homo aptus, non natura, sed diciplina 
factus est." 
It is instantly apparent that the colour of the objection rises pretty 
much from a quibble about the Greek word "pephyke", which Latin 
translators commonly tum "aptus natus est". By this is properly 
signified a natural inclination towards something together with a 
natural potentiality for receiving an actual fitness for exercising that 
thing, even if the actual aptitude should not be in him immediately 
by birth, but have to be introduced by industry alone. And so the 
meaning of the common saying "man is by nature a social animal" 
is this: Man is destined by nature to society with his like, and this is 
most suitable and useful to him. Moreover, man has been endowed 
with such inborn disposition that by cultivation he can receive an 
aptitude for acting right in that society; nay more, this is perhaps 
the principal fruit produced by societies, namely that the recently 
born, in whom no actual understanding of these things has been 
implanted by nature, may, within societies, be fashioned into 
suitable members of the same.80 
The noteworthy thing in Pufendorf's above argument is the distinction 
he makes between the inclination for society on the one hand, and the 
ability to behave according to the rules of social life, or even the 
potentiality of receiving such a capability, on the other. The saying 
aptus natus est refers to two things: 1) "[A] natural inclination towards 
something", and 2) "a natural potentiality for receiving an actual 
aptitude for exercising that thing", which in the case we are speaking 
of is introduced by education alone. In other words, Pufendorf's 
natural inclination to social life includes no inherent proclivity 
whatsoever to behave in a manner required by peaceful and ordered 
social life. It is nothing else than the same general wish to live in the 
company of other human beings the existence of which Hobbes had 
admitted in De cive. The sources of this inclination are the well-known 
facts that "nothing is more gloomy for a man than perpetual solitude," 
and that if not "united to a mutual task," human beings can survive 
only "with the utmost difficulty."81  
80 Elementa II.Obs.III.4: "Sed facile patet objectionis colorem fere orm ex 
cavilatione vocabuli Graeci pephyke, quod Latinis interpretibus solemne est 
vertere aptus natus est: quo propre significatur naturalis inclinatio ad aliquid, cum 
naturali potentia recipiendi actualem aptitudinem illi rei exercendae; etiamsi ista 
actualis aptitudo non statim per nativitatem insit, sed per industriam demum sit 
introducenda. Sensus itaque triti istius, homo natura est animal sociale, hic est: 
hominem a natura destinari ad societatem sui similium, eamque ipsi quam 
maxime congruam esse atque utilem; eundemquetali praeditum ingenio, ut per 
culturam possit recipere aptitudinem recte versandi in ista societate; immo hunc 
ex societatibus vel praecipuum enasci fructum, ut recens nati, queis per naturam 
actualis istarum rerum intellectus non est insitus, in istis in idonea earundem 
membra efformentur." 
81 	 Elementa II.Obs.3.2. 
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The foregoing means that it is not possible for the young Pufendorf 
to derive the requirement to cultivate society from a corresponding 
natural inclination. What he sees as natural for a human being is the 
general desire to live in the company of other members of one's 
species and the ability to become a decent member of peaceful human 
society. The actual proclivity to cultivate social life, on the other hand, 
is totally a product of education and so in no way natural for a human 
being. 
But if this is the case, what proof is there that God wants people to 
cultivate society? In Elementa Pufendorf's answer to this question is 
highly unsystematic, to say the least. However, his central idea seems 
to be the observation that the existence of society is a necessary 
prerequisite for any distinctively human way of living. This is 
indicated, for example, in the justification Pufendorf gives for his 
claim that "nature has ordered" human beings "to unite to form a 
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peaceful society". Pufendorf does not derive this conclusion from any 
inclination to tranquil social life but from the observation that society 
is a necessary requirement for any distinctively human way of living. 
If social life totally collapsed, human beings would "not only be the 
prey of the beast, but would also rage against one another in the 
manner of wild monsters."82  The same idea is affirmed in Observation 
four, where Pufendorf remarks that since "the life of men without 
society is destined to be like the life of the beast, so the law of nature 
is principally founded upon the principle that social life among men is 
to be preserved."83  This argument relies, of course, on the assumption 
that God wants human beings to live differently than beasts. But this is 
something Pufendorf thinks nobody seriously contests. For to do so 
one would have to maintain that the special intellectual abilities which 
make human beings capable of an ordered social life were given to 
them by God without any purpose. Since this is unthinkable, 
everybody has to agree that God would not "have given men reason, 
had He not wished to destine them to cultivate society."84 
82 	 Elementa II.Obs.3.2: "Quid, quod non solum bestiis praede essemus futuri, sed 
bellarum more in nos ipsos invicem grassaturi, ni in pacificam societatem omnino 
coire nos natura jussisset." 
83 	 Elementa II.Obs.4.5: "Stat ergo, uti vita hominum sine societate bestiarum vitae 
similis est futura; ita legem naturae in eo praecipue fundari, quod socialis inter 
homines vita sit conservanda." 
84 	 Elementa II.Obs.3.6: "Nam neque hominibus rationem dedisset Creator, nisi 
societati colendae eos destinari voluisset." 
THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE 
As we saw above, in Elementa Pufendorf named two fundamental 
principles of natural law, but actually based his account on the even 
more elementary but somewhat imprecise demand to "cultivate 
society". In De jure naturae et gentium Pufendorf makes this duty the 
fundamental principle of his system by giving it a more concrete, rule-
like content and by founding it on a more detailed analysis of human 
nature. In order to understand how Pufendorf does this it is important 
to notice that he now divides his argument into two parts. First, he 
proves that God has imposed a law for all human beings. This happens 
in the first chapter of Book two, entitled It is not suitable for a man to 
live without laws. The fundamental principle of natural law is, then, 
deduced in JNG 1I.3.14-15. Commentators have usually not bothered 	 83 
to distinguish between these two discussions, a practice encouraged no 
doubt by the fact that in De officio hominis et civis Pufendorf himself 
partly mixes these two arguments.85 However, if we want to 
understand what are Pufendorf's premises in his deduction of the 
fundamental principle, it is necessary to be aware what he has already 
assumed when he has proved that there is a law of nature. 
The motive Pufendorf offers for the question whether God has 
imposed a law for human beings is the fact that God has distinguished 
them from other animals by giving them a free will. It can be 
wondered, therefore, how we can know for sure that God has not also 
wanted human beings to use this faculty without any restraints.86 That 
this is not the case can be proved, according to Pufendorf, by showing 
that unlimited liberty would be disadvantageous to human beings, and 
that it is beneficial for their safety and well-being (salus) to be 
restricted by laws.87 This Pufendorf does by analysing three human 
features. 
In the first place, Pufendorf points out that the human way of living 
as we know it is totally dependent on the fact that human beings grow 
up and live in the company of other human beings: 
Imagine a man who has been nurtured by someone without using 
speech so that he is merely able to move himself where he pleases, 
85 	 OHC I.3.1-9. 
86 	 JNG II.1.1. 
87 	 JNG 1I.1.2: "Ut igitur paulo altius rem repetamus, ante omnia ostendendum 
videtur, omnimodam libertatem humanae naturae esse inutilem, ac pemiciosam; 
adeoque ad salutem ipsius conducere, ut legibus ista contsringatur. " 
a man without any information and training whose knowledge is 
limited to what has come from his own natural endowment. 
Imagine such a man left in the open, away from any assistance or 
company of his fellows. What a miserable animal you will behold. 
A dumb and ignoble creature, with no power other than to dig up 
plants and roots, to collect wild fruits, to slake his thirst at any 
spring river or pool he may happen upon, to crawl into caves so as 
to avoid the inclemency of the weather, to cover his body with moss 
and grass, to pass his time in an intolerable inactivity, to tremble at 
every sound or passing of another animal, and finally to perish of 
hunger and cold or to be tom to pieces by some wild beast.88 
It can be concluded, thus, that the reason why "the life spent by a 
human being is not the most miserable among all animals is due to the 
intercourse and society he has with others like him."89 
However, "a society between men cannot be constituted nor 
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	 maintained in a peaceful and stable condition without law."90 This is 
so, in the first place, because of the immense variety of individual 
inclinations, dispositions, and ways of living which characterizes the 
human race. Were this great diversity not controlled by a law, it would 
cause the greatest confusion in human affairs 91 Even more decisive is, 
however, the wickedness of human nature, the strong proclivity for 
human beings to hurt each other. This is so powerful that even now, 
"when law and punishment hang over them", human beings hurt the 
members of their own species more than any other animal. It can be 
concluded, therefore, that without a law which restricts their desires, 
"every man would be a lion, a wolf or a dog to his neighbour, or 
something worse than these."92 
88 	 JNG II.1.8: "Finge mihi hominem ab aliquo, nulla interveniente sermocinatione, 
nutrum, ut quo velit ambulare queat, de caetero ab omni infommatione et disciplina 
destitutum, cuique adeo nihil sit scientiae, nisi quod ex proprio velut ingenio 
pullulavit. Finge eundem ab omnium aliorum hominum ope ac societate in 
solitudine relictum. Quam miserandum videbis animal: Mutum ac turpe pecus, cui 
nihil aliud relictum, quam herbal, radicesque vellere aut sponte natos fructus 
legere, sitim fonte, flumine, aut lacuna obvia, levare, repellendis aeris injunis 
antra subire, aut musco gramineve corpus tegere, tempus taediosissimum 
perotium exigere, ad quemvis strepitum, aut animantis alterius occursum 
exhorrescere denique fame, frigore, aut lacerante fera bestia perire." 
89 	 JNG II.1.8: "Igitur quod homo non miserissimam vitam inter omnia animantia 
degit, a conjunctionne, et societate sui similium habet." 
90 	 JNG II.1.8: "Societas autem inter homines sine lege neque inin, neque tranquilla, 
et firma servari potest." 
91 	 JNG II.2.7. 
92 	 JNG II.1.6: "In isthac ergo humanorum affectuum ferocia, et varietate, qualis 
futura erat hominim vita, si nullum jus eosdem componeret? Luporum, leonum, 
canum inter se decertantium turbam videres. Imo quilibet alten leo, lupus, canis 
futurus erat, et his omnibus infestius quid; quippe cum nullum sit animans, quod 
From the foregoing Pufendorf makes the conclusion that unless it is 
desired that human beings should be "the most degraded and 
miserable of all creatures," it is indispensable that their behaviour be 
controlled by law.93 Now, in order to prove that God has imposed a 
law for human beings we need, of course, the further premise that God 
does not want human beings to be the most wretched of all living 
creatures. That this is so can be gathered from "the dignity of human 
nature". By this Pufendorf means above all those unique intellectual 
abilities which God has given to human beings: 
The more splendid the gifts which the Creator has bestowed upon 
man, and the greater the intellectual qualities with which He has 
endowed him, the more base it would be for such qualities to waste 
away in disuse, to be expected at random, and to be squandered 
without order and without seemliness. And surely it was not for 
nothing that God gave man such a soul which could recognize a 
decorous order, and the power to harmonize his actions therewith, 
but it was surely intended that man should use this God-given 
faculty for the greater glory of God and his own richer felicity.94 
In other words, since God has given human beings an ability to live an 
organized social life in which they can develop their unique human 
capabilities and advance their happiness, it is impossible to think that 
God would not have wanted them to live in this way. This is 
something no sane person seriously contests: "[A]ll wise men agree" 
that "God created men to serve him, and to make his glory greater by 
improving those good things conferred on them."95  And since this 
cannot be done without law, it can be concluded that God has inflicted 
law on the human species. 
The noteworthy thing in the foregoing is not the conclusion itself, 
but the assumption on which it relies. Pufendorf takes for granted that 
God wants the human species not only to survive but also to live in a 
homini plus, quam homo nocere possit et velit. Et cum tot mala homines nunc 
invicem inferant, quando lex et poena imminet; quid futurum foret, si omnia 
impune fierent, si hominis desideria nullum intus fraenum compesceret?" 
93 JNG II.1.8: "Igitur ne foedissumus omnium animantium, et miserrissimus esse 
homo, exiegem eundem vivere hautquidquam conveniebat." 
94 JNG II.1.5: "Jam quo splendidioribus donis Creator hominem instruxerat, quo 
plura ipsius ingenium capiebat; eo foedius erat illa incultu obsolescere, aut sine 
ordine, sine decore temere velut effundi, et consumi. Neque vero frsutra Deus 
homini dederat mentem decori ordinis intelligentem, utque eidem sese posset 
attemperare; sed par omnino erat concessis ipsium facultatibus ita uti, ut exinde 
Creatoris gloria exspledenceret, ipsique homini amplior felicitas proveniret." 
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JNG II.4.1 (JNG 1684 1I.4.16): "Sed cum ex omnium sapientum consensu Creator 
O.M. hominem condiderit, ut ipsi inserviat, exultisque bonis, ad ipso sibi 
concessis, ejusdem gloriam redderet illustriorem." 
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social condition where they have the possibility to develop their 
distinctively human faculties and use them in order to increase their 
happiness. And it is important to notice that the word used by 
Pufendorf to characterize this human condition is "salus", a word 
which plays a significant role also in the deduction of the fundamental 
principle. When Pufendorf uses the noun "salus", this is usually 
translated into English as "survival" or "security", while the adjective 
"salvum" is glossed as "safe" (as I have done so far). And in many 
instances this practice is perfectly justifiable. However, it is obvious 
that by "salus" Pufendorf does not refer simply to sheer physical 
survival. Security and sufficient nourishment are, of course, necessary 
requirements for the salus of a human being so that if they are taken 
away, the person cannot be said to be salvum. Nevertheless, alone they 
are not enough. After all, they are something which even an insane 
person locked in chains might possess. In order to be fully salvum 
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human beings must also possess those rational abilities which can 
develop only in society, and an opportunity to use these faculties in 
order to increase their happiness. 
Now we are in a better position to understand what Pufendorf is 
doing when he deduces the fundamental principle in JNG I1.3.14-15. 
The end of natural law — the purpose for which God has imposed it on 
human beings — is the salus of the human species. And as we saw 
above, the scientific presentation of natural law must be based on one 
normative principle from which the others are then deduced. Hence, 
the principal task of a demonstrative account of natural law is to 
define the most general rule of behaviour by which a human being can 
advance the salus of the human species. What has deceived 
commentators into thinking that Pufendorf somehow deduces the 
content of natural law from the desire for self-preservation is his 
understandable conviction that in order to recognize such a general 
principle we must first know what are the most elementary 
requirements for the salus of an individual human being. As he 
remarks in the second edition of De jure naturae et pentium, "the 
salus of the whole of human society is an unintelligible phrase, if it 
makes no difference whether individuals are salvum or not."96 
It is at this point that human self-love and the instinct for self-
preservation become important for the deduction of the fundamental 
principle. The requirements of both general and individual salus are 
best known "through careful consideration of the nature, condition, 
and inclinations of man." In chapter II.1. Pufendorf has already men- 
96 	 JNG 1684 II.4.16: "...; cum totius societatis humanae salus intelligi nequeat, si 
singuli salvi sint, nec ne, nihil intersit; ..:' 
tioned two of the four human features he sees as relevant in this 
respect: the proclivity of human beings to hurt each other, and the 
miseries which would accompany their lives if they would receive no 
assistance from other members of their species. In JNG II.3.14 he 
brings up for the first time the ability of human beings to increase their 
well-being by the mutual exchange of services and, above all, their 
natural self-love, which includes a strong desire for self-preservation. 
What makes self-love and the desire for self-preservation so 
important for the salus of individual human beings is the powerful 
influence these tendencies have on human relations. This can be 
illustrated by imagining a situation where human beings would not be 
zealous about their personal well-being and preservation but, on the 
contrary, naturally inclined to sacrifice these for the sake of others 
whenever required. Even in such circumstances individual human 
beings would be unable to maintain their salus, unless they lived 
together with other members of their species. However, under such 
conditions a person would not have to pay special attention to the 
manner in which he behaves towards other human beings, but could 
expect their help and goodwill regardless of his own behaviour. 
In the present condition of humankind, on the other hand, one 
cannot pass over the fact that the concern human beings by nature feel 
for their personal well-being and preservation "is usually so strong 
that all inclinations towards other people yield to it."97 This has two 
important consequences. First, people are usually not willing to assist 
others unless they believe this to be somehow beneficial for 
themselves. Second, they are inclined to show hostility towards people 
who endanger their salus: "If anyone attempts to attack a man's salus, 
he cannot fail to repel him so vigorously that hatred and desire for 
revenge usually last long after he has beaten off the attack."98  
Consequently, in the present condition of the human species it is not 
sufficient for an individual simply to "join himself with others like 
him." In order to be salvum he must also conduct himself towards 
others "in a way which does not given them any cause to do him harm, 
but rather give them a reason to preserve and increase his 
advantage. "99 
97 	 JNG II.3.14: "Et iste quidem cujuslibet erga seipsum amor regulariter tam validus 
est,ut quaevis inclinatio erga quemvis alium hominem ipsi cedat." 
98 	 OHC I.3.2: "Et quicunque hominis salutem impugnatum it, eum non potest non 
iste aversari eousque, ut etiam depulso malo intentato plerumque odium, et 
cupiditas vindictae adhuc remaneat." 
99 	 JNG II.3.15: "Ejusmodi animali, ut salvum sit, neccesarun est, ut sit sociabile, id 
est, ut conjugi cum sui similibus velit, et adversus illos ita gerat, ut ne isti ansam 
accipiant eum laedendi, sed potius rationem habeant ejusdem commoda servandi, 
aut promovendi." 
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Now we have come to what I think is the decisive twist in 
Pufendorf's deduction of the fundamental principle. From the 
observation that to be sociable in the manner described above is 
indispensable for the salus of each individual Pufendorf does not 
directly conclude that this is how God requires everyone to behave. If 
he were to do so, it would make his theory unable to explain why we 
are required to practice sociality towards those who are unable either 
to hurt us or to promote our well-being. In other words, it would leave 
his theory open to the very same critique he himself directs against 
Hobbes. The reason why Pufendorf thinks his theory avoids Hobbes' 
mistake is that when he defines the fundamental principle his principal 
concern is not what a person does to himself, but how the behaviour of 
the person affects others. The tacit inference by which Pufendorf 
reaches the fundamental principle goes, I think, as follows. Being 
sociable is indispensable for the salus of individual human beings. The 
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salus of every individual is, in turn, the central constituent of the salus 
of the human species. Thus, we understand that God wants human 
beings to behave towards others in a way which motivates others to be 
sociable towards them in turn. In order to describe this proliferation of 
reciprocal sociable behaviour Pufendorf introduces the neologism 
"socialitas" and declares that the fundamental natural duty of every 
human being is to "cultivate and conserve towards others peaceful 
socialitas in so far as in him lies".i00 
Several passages in De jure naturae et gentium support the 
interpretation presented above. To start with, immediately after 
declaring the fundamental principle Pufendorf remarks that 
"everything which necessarily makes for sociality is understood to be 
commanded by natural law, while everything that disturbs or destroys 
it is understood to be forbidden.""Ö1 In other words, everything that 
advances sociability between human beings — also those things which 
do not happen to increase one's personal security and well-being - are 
prescribed by natural law. On the other hand, everything which makes 
others less sociable, whether or not this happens to be harmful to 
oneself, is prohibited. The same idea is made more explicit when 
Pufendorf in the second edition clarifies what he means by the 
expression "so far as in him lies" included in the fundamental 
100 JNG II.3.15: "Inde fundamentalis lex naturae isthaec erit: cuilibet homini, 
quantum in se, colendam et conservandam esse pacificiam adversus alios 
socialitatem." 
101 JNG 11.3.15: "Ex quo consequitur, quia qui obligat ad finem, simul obligare 
intelligitur ad media, sine quibus finis non potest obtineri; omnia, quae ad istam 
socialitatem necessario faciunt, jure naturali praecepta, quae eandem turbant aut 
abrumpunt, vetita intelligi." 
principle. The point of this expression, Pufendorf tells us, is that since 
it is not in our power to make all others conduct themselves towards us 
as they should, we have done our duty when "we have omitted nothing 
within our power which might move others to be sociable towards 
us."102 In other words, a human being has fulfilled his natural duty not 
when he has ensured his personal salus, but when he has done 
everything within his power to make others act towards him in a way 
which does not endanger their salus. 
The interpretation I have presented above also makes the deduction 
of the fundamental principle fully compatible with the anti-Hobbesian 
remarks and appeals to common humanity which Pufendorf presents 
in JNG I1.3.16-18. If the end of the natural law is the salus of the 
human species, not the security of an individual, it is perfectly 
consistent for Pufendorf to maintain that natural law requires general 
goodwill towards other human beings not because of the personal 
advantages which may ensue from this, but because these others are 
members of the human species. Moreover, the same idea of natural 
law explains why Pufendorf does not appeal to the instinct for self-
preservation when he proves the duty to preserve one's life, but 
derives this precept from the duty to promote sociality. 
Further enforcement for my interpretation can be found in the 
arguments by which Pufendorf proves three of the central precepts of 
natural law. The first one of these is the command not to violate the 
body or possessions of another human being (without proper cause, of 
course). As mentioned already, Pufendorf criticizes Hobbes' method 
of deducing natural law for its inability to explain why this rule is not 
restricted to those who are somehow able to hurt us, but governs all 
relations we have with other human beings. In perfect agreement with 
this critique Pufendorf does not deduce the duty not to hurt other 
people from the consequences the violation of this rule might have on 
those who commit such an act. The crucial thing is what such 
behaviour does to the victim: 
This duty is of the greatest necessity, since without it the social life 
of men could in no way exist. For if a man does me no good turn, 
and does not join with me even in the ordinary duties, I can still live 
in tranquillity with him, provided he hurts me in no way. We desire 
nothing more than this from most of mankind, mutual assistance 
102 JNG 1684 II.3.15: "Diximus autem, cuilibet homini socialitatem colendam, et 
actu exercendam quantum in se. Quia cum penes nos non sit praestare, ut alii 
omnes rese erga nos, prout par erat, gerant: igitur officio nostro satisfecimus, si 
nihil eorum, quae in nostra erant facultate omisimus, quod istos, ut vicissim erga 
nos sociabiles essent, permovere posset." 
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being rendered only to a limited circle. But how can I live in peace 
with him who does me injury, since nature has bred into each man 
so tender a love for himself and his own possessions that he cannot 
help using all possible means to ward off the man who is about to 
do him harm?toa 
In other words, that I am obliged not to injure others can be gathered 
from the fact that if I do, this makes it psychologically impossible for 
the injured party to be sociable towards me. Hence, even if the person 
I violate happens to be totally unable to cause me any actual harm, I 
still act against natural law. Instead of promoting sociality I provoke 
the other into abandoning his sociable attitude and in this way 
diminish sociality in human relations. 
A similar argument is in use when Pufendorf proves that natural 
law requires us to regard all human beings as naturally equal (i.e. to 
think that all power relations between human beings follow from 
contracts, not from some natural superiority). In this case the relevant 
empirical observation is the fact that besides the love human beings 
feel towards their life, body, and possessions, they also have a strong 
sense of their own value. If this self-esteem is offended, people are 
rarely less and often more disturbed than when the injury is made to 
their body and property. Pufendorf admits that culturally adopted 
features can intensify this feeling of one's own worth. Still, the 
principal source of this passion is human nature.104 The duty to hold 
every one as naturally equal follows, then, from the fact that to deny 
the humanity of another person is perhaps the gravest insult one can 
direct against his self-esteem: 
103 JNG II1.1.1: "Quin maxime necessarium idem est, quod citra illud socialis 
hominum vita nullo modo consistere queat. Qui enim nihil boni in me confert, qui 
ne vulgaria quidem officia mecum miscet, cum eo tamen tranquille vivere 
possum, modo nulla ratione me laedat. Imo a maxima mortalium perte nihil 
amplius quam isthoc desideramus: bona fere inter paucos invicem communicatur. 
Ast cum eo, qui mihi nocet, quomodo pacifere possim vivere? cum natura cuique 
tam tenerum amorem sui rerumque suarum inseverit, ut non possit non omnibus 
modis repellere eum, qui istis noxam inferre aggreditur." 
104 JNG III.2.1: "Praeter illud amorem, quo homo suam vitam, corpusque, ac res 
prosequitur, et per queam non potest non omnia, ad eorundem destructionem 
tendentia, reprellere aut refugere; deprehenditur quoque ipsius animo insita 
tenerrima quaedam sui aestimatio: cui si quis aliquid dectratum eat, non minus 
fere, imo saepe magis solet is commoveri, quam si corpori ac rebus noxa 
inferatur. Quae aestimatio licet ex variis causis intendatur; primum tarnen ejus 
fundamentum videtur ipsa humana natura." 
The expression "human being" is felt to have a certain dignity, and 
the last as well as most effective answer to rude insults of other 
people is "I am not a dog or a beast, but as much a human being as 
you are". Now, since human nature belongs equally to all people, 
and no one can maintain a social life with someone who does not 
rate him even as a human being, it can be concluded that natural 
law requires every person to esteem and treat another human being 
as his equal by nature, or as much a human being as he is 
himself.1°5  
Again the argument is not based on the consequences the violation of 
the rule possibly has for him who commits the act. We can imagine, 
for example, a powerful nobleman who denies the humanity of one of 
his slaves. In this case the offender hardly needs to fear the revenge of 
the victim. Still it is obvious, according to Pufendorf, that the 
nobleman violates natural law. By hurting the natural self-esteem of 
the slave in a most offensive way he provokes the slave to abandon 
sociality and so to endanger his personal safety. 
Lastly, I would like to point out a case which makes the structure of 
Pufendorf's theory most apparent and shows clearly to what extent the 
framework within which he reflects on natural law differs from those 
of Grotius and Hobbes. This is the argument by which Pufendorf 
proves that natural law allows violent self-protection. For both Grotius 
and Hobbes the legitimacy of violent self-protection followed directly 
from the instinct for self-preservation and was one of the most self-
evident principles of natural law. While the overall design of Grotius' 
theory was to derive natural law from the minimal requirements for 
peaceful social life, he saw the inherent inclination towards self-
preservation as the foundation for the "first duty" of a human being 
"to keep himself in the condition nature has given him."106 In 
accordance with this Grotius declared that the right to defend oneself 
by force against a violent attacker has "its origin directly and chiefly 
in the fact that nature commits to each his own protection, not in any 
105 	 JNG III.2.1: "In ipso quippe hominis vocabulo judicatur finesse aliqua dignatio; et 
ultimum simul atque efficacissimum argumentum, quo aliorum insolens insultatio 
retunditur, isthoc habetur: utique non canis aut bestia, sed aeque homo sum atque 
tu. Humana porro natura, cum omnibus hominibus aeque competat, neque 
socialem cum isto homine vitam degere quis possit; abs quo non saltem ut homo 
aestimatur; inde consequitur, jure naturali praeceptum esse, Ut quisque alterum 
hominem aestimet atque tractet, tanquam naturaliter sibi aequalem, seu ut aeque 
hominem." 
106 IBP It.l.l. See below chapter 3.2. 
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injustice or sin of the aggressor."107 The same view was, of course, 
strongly affirmed by Hobbes, for whom the right to defend one's life 
was the fundamental right of nature following from the irresistible 
force by which the corresponding instinct affected human 
behaviour. 1°8 
In Pufendorf we find a very different approach to the whole issue. 
Pufendorf admits, of course, that self-defence is recommended to 
human beings by the love they feel towards themselves. He remarks, 
however, that there are people who claim that despite this natural 
inclination, natural law denies all use of force in self-defence. This 
they justify by two arguments. First, the death of one's attacker is as 
great a loss for the human race as one's own demise. Second, by 
defending oneself by force one is likely to cause far more turmoil in 
social live than would happen, if one tried to avoid being injured by all 
means or, were this impossible, offered one's body calmly to the 
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assailant. In can be concluded, therefore, that this is what natural law 
requires one to do.109 
Grotius and Hobbes would have most likely regarded these 
arguments as not worthy of any serious consideration. In Pufendorf 
eyes, however, they are based on the right normative premises (the 
duty to protect the salus of the human species and not to diminish 
sociality) and must be answered. Correspondingly, his counter-
argument does not rely on the natural human tendency to protect one's 
107 IBP II.1.3. Grotius also presented the argument that if all use of violence were 
forbidden, this would have disastrous consequences for social life: "If the right to 
inflict capital punishment and to defend citizens by arms against brigands and 
robbers should be taken away, there would follow a riot of crimes and a deluge, 
so to speak, of evils, since even now, with regularly constituted courts in 
operation, the force of evil is only with difficulty restrained."(/BP I.2.7) However, 
Grotius made this remark not in order to prove that natural law allows violent 
self-defence but in order to refute the claim that Christ had forbidden all use of 
violence from his followers. His point was that the drastic consequences the ideal 
of non-violence would cause to social life made it obvious that if Christ had really 
denied all use of arms, he would have done this "with the most direct and explicit 
words." Yet everything the Saviour had said on the issue was, according to 
Grotius, "either exceedingly general or obscure." Therefore, no requirement to 
abstain from all use of force could be read into the Holy Scriptures. 
108 	 De cive 1.7-8. 
109 JNG II.5.1: "Isthaec defensio duplici modo instituitur, vel sine laesione ejus, qui 
malum nobis machinatur, vel cum ejusdem laesione ac pemicie. ... Circa 
posteriorem autem nonnullis ideo scrubulus fuit obortus, quod per ipsam utique 
laedetur aut perdatur nostri similis homo, quicum ad colendam vitam socialem 
adstringimur, et quo extincto parem jacturam videtur facere genus humanum, 
quam si ipsi pereamus. Et quod majores turbae societatem humanam videatur 
invadere, si vim intentantem vi repellamus, quam si vel per fugam malum 
declinemus, aut ubi id non datur, corpus nostrum patienter invadenti 
praebeamus." 
life but on the consequences the requirement of non-violence would 
have for the well-being and survival of the human race. If righteous 
people were not allowed to protect themselves by force against wicked 
ones, all the benefits which human beings have received from nature 
(i.e. from God) or by their own labour would have been conferred in 
vain. Moreover, in such a case upright human beings would fall prey 
to bad ones, which would ultimately cause total chaos in human 
affairs. This means that "to forbid the use of force in self-defence, far 
from being conducive of peace, would mean the end of the human 
species." to 
* * * 
I will now sum up the argument by which Pufendorf deduces the 
fundamental principle of natural law. The starting point of Pufendorf's 
theory is the observation that God has created the human species and 
equipped it with unique intellectual and social capabilities. It can be 
concluded, therefore, that God wants the human species to survive and 
prosper by using the abilities peculiar to it. This, in turn, is possible 
only if people live in society with other members of their species. We 
know, however, that the human species is characterized by such 
diversity of individual inclinations, dispositions and ways of living 
that it makes an ordered social co-existence much more difficult to 
them than is the case with other social animal species. When we add 
to this that human beings are inherently wicked and inclined to hurt 
each other, it can be concluded that God has not left it to human 
beings themselves to decide how they should act towards each other, 
but has given them a law which restricts their destructive tendencies. 
In order to give a scientific presentation of the content of the law 
God has imposed on human beings, we must first define the most 
general rule of behaviour which is necessary for maintaining the salus 
of the human species. With this purpose in mind Pufendorf asks what 
are the most basic requirements for the salus of an individual human 
being. At this point four features of human nature become relevant. 
First, the salus of human individuals is dependent on the help they 
receive from other people. Second, in all their dealings with other 
people human beings are concerned predominantly with their own 
110 JNG 1I.5.1: "Alias quippe omnia bona, quae natura aut industria nobis dedir, 
frustra forent concessa, si alten injuste illa invadenti vim non liceret opponere; et 
parata praede improbis exposit forent probi, siquidem ille hisce vim nunquam 
deberent opponere. Sic ut violentam sui defensionem plane proscribere, 
hautquidquam paci, sed exitio generis humani conducat." 
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well-being and security. Third, human beings are usually willing to 
help others only if they believe that others are on their part ready to 
help them. Finally, human beings are inclined to behave aggressively 
towards those who they see as a threat to their own well-being or 
security. From these features Pufendorf gathers that the most 
elemental requirement for the salus of individuals is that they are 
sociable, i.e. that they not only live with other human beings but also 
behave in a way which does not give to others any cause to do them 
harm but rather makes others inclined to preserve and increase their 
advantage. It can be concluded, therefore, that God wants every 
human being to cultivate such behaviour among the human species. 
This means not only that they are obliged to maintain a friendly 
attitude towards those of whom their personal well-being and security 
are dependent. It also indicates that they are forbidden to act 
aggressively towards those who are in no position to advance or 
94 
	
	
damage their personal interests or security. For even if such behaviour 
does not endanger one's personal well-being, it still makes it 
impossible for the injured party to maintain his friendly attitude and so 
diminishes the general sociality among the human species. The more 
particular precepts of natural law are then demonstrated by showing 
that they are a necessary means for preserving sociality between 
human beings. 
Part Three 
The Normative Character of 
Natural Law 
In Part two I argued that the idea that natural law is a command of 
God plays a central role in the argument by which Pufendorf derives 
the fundamental principle of natural law. Such an understanding of 
natural law does not automatically indicate that one sees the morality 
of human acts as being totally dependent on the commands of God. 
One could think that even though there now is natural law instituted 
by God, human beings would recognize the same or at least some 
principles as their moral standards even if there were no God. 
Pufendorf, however, rejects this possibility, maintaining that without 
God's precepts all human behaviour would be morally neutral, neither 
right nor wrong. In what follows, I will try to answer what made 
Pufendorf hold such a view. First, however, I will examine Pufendorf's 
theory of obligation. For this has given commentators a reason to 
suggest that his views concerning the foundations of morality were 
seriously inconsistent, or that he did not present a genuine divine 
command theory of morality at all. 
THE THEORY OF OBLIGATION 
The locus classicus for the view that there is some confusion in 
Pufendorf's theory of obligation is the influential critique Leibniz's 
directed against it. This he presented in a letter sent in 1706 to 
Gerhard van den Muelen, Abbot of Locum, who had requested 
Leibniz's opinion about the suitability of De officio hominis et civis 
for educational purposes.' This letter became widely known when 
1 	 An English translation of the letter is included in The Political Writings of Leibniz 
ed. and tr. by Patrick Riley, Cambridge 1972. 
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Barbeyrac added a major part of it to his French translation of the 
work in 1718. In the following I will not go through all the 
philosophical disagreements between Leibniz and Pufendorf. What I 
am interested in are the internal inconsistencies Leibniz claims to find 
in Pufendorf's theory of obligation. 
In both De jure naturae et gentium and De officio hominis et civis 
the discussion of obligation takes place in chapters devoted to the 
general character of law. In the latter work, which is the only one 
Leibniz comments on, Pufendorf defines law in purely voluntarist 
terms as "a decree by which a superior obliges one who is subject to 
him to conform his actions to the superior's prescripts."2 This is true 
also in the case of natural law, which would not be an obligating rule 
were it not a command of God.3 For Leibniz, who supports a 
rationalistic conception of morality, this already is a totally 
unacceptable position. He admits, however, that it is not an inherently 
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inconsistent view, if by "superior" is meant someone who has the 
strength to punish those who disobey his commands. In this case 
obligation means nothing more than the necessity to conform one's 
actions to the orders of someone whose punishments one cannot 
escape. 
What, then, is a mark of total confusion in Leibniz's eyes is the 
definition Pufendorf gives to superior: 
An obligation is introduced into a man's mind by a superior, i.e. by 
one who has not only the strength to inflict some injury on the 
recalcitrant, but also just cause to require us to curtail the liberty of 
our will at his discretion. When a person in this position has 
signified his will, fear tempered by respect must arise in man's 
mind — fear from power, respect from reflection on the reasons 
which ought to induce one to accept his will even apart from fear. 
For anyone who can give no reason except mere strength why he 
will impose an obligation upon me against my will can indeed 
terrify me, so that I think it better to obey him for the time being to 
avoid a great evil, but when the threat is gone, nothing any longer 
prevents me form acting at my discretion rather than his. On the 
other hand, if a person has reasons why I should obey him but lacks 
the strength to inflict injury on me, I can disregard his orders with 
2 	 OHC 1.2.2: "Norma illa vocatur Lex, quae est decretum, quo superior sibi 
subjectum obligat, ut ad istius praescriptum actiones suas componat." 
3 	 OHC I.3.10; JNG II.3.20. 
impunity, unless one more powerful than he comes to assert the 
authority I have flouted .4 
Leibniz finds two inconsistencies in this passage. The first one of 
these is Pufendorf's insistence that the superior must have just causes 
for his power. The problem with this statement is that elsewhere in the 
work Pufendorf makes perfectly clear that what is just depends always 
on the law and so ultimately on the will of the superior.5 Of course, 
this raises no difficulties in the case of human authorities, whose 
power receives its justice ultimately from natural law. What is 
problematic, however, is the claim that God's power to command 
human beings is also based on just reason. According to Leibniz, to 
hold such a view consistently requires that at least that part of justice 
which characterizes the causes God has for his power must be 
independent of his commands. If, however, one holds that the ultimate 
source of all law and justice is the command of God, as Pufendorf 
seems to do, "a circle is created, than which none was ever more 
manifest."6 
The other inconsistency Leibniz finds in the definition of superior 
is to be found in the arguments by which Pufendorf justifies that the 
superior needs both just reasons for his power and the ability to punish 
in order to introduce an obligation. Leibniz understands these 
arguments as attempts to solve the above first mentioned inconsistency 
and remarks that they both fail to do this and bring forth a new 
contradiction: 
Indeed, if neither coercion without reasons, nor the latter without 
force is sufficient, why — I ask — when force ceases and reason 
alone remains, shall I not return to that liberty which it is said I had 
4 	 OHC I.2.5: "Introducitur obligatio in animum hominis proprie a superiore, i.e. 
tali, cui non solum vires sunt malum aliquod repraesentandi contranitentibus; sed 
cui justae sunt causae, quare postulare queat, ex suo arbitrio voluntatis nostrae 
libertatem circumscribi. Talia enim ubi in aliquo fuerint, postquam quid velit 
significavit, necessum est in animo hominis oriri metum reverentia temperatum: 
ilium quidem ex potentia, hanc autem ex consideration causarum, quae etiam 
remoto metu allicere aliquem debebant ad istius voluntatem amplectendam. Qui 
enim nullam rationem allegare novit, quare mihi invito obligationem velit 
impingere, praeter solas vires, is terrere quidem me potest, ut effugiendo majori 
malo ipsi tantisper parere satius ducam. Sed eo metu remoto nihil amplius obstat, 
quo minus meo potius, quam illius arbitrio agam. Contra qui rations quidem 
habet, quare ego ipsi parere debeam, a viribus tarnen malum aliquod mihi 
imponendi destituitur, ejus jussa impune a me possunt negligi, ni potentior aliquis 
hujus auctoritatem proculcatam adsertum eat." 
5 	 OHC I.2.11-13. 
6 	 The Political Writings of Leibniz, p.73-74. 
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when, before the application of force, reason alone was present? 
What the author says, in fact — that, failing fear, no one can stop me 
from behaving according to my will rather than according to 
someone else's — would be valid even if reasons existed. On the 
other hand, if reasons restrain even by themselves, why did they not 
already restrain by themselves, before fear arose? Or will this not 
very durable sentiment impress some indelible character on 
unwilling minds?7 
Leibniz thinks, in other words, that Pufendorf is defending his position 
by two incompatible claims. On the one hand, Pufendorf maintains 
that the just reasons a superior has for his power are not enough to 
impose an obligation on his subjects, but that this requires also an 
ability to punish those who disobey. On the other hand, he 
distinguishes obligation from coercion by remarking that the former 
does not cease, even if the superior happens to lose his ability to 
punish. To this Leibniz remarks that one has to choose one or the 
other: either the reasons oblige prior to force, or they do not oblige 
any longer when force ceases.8 
Does Leibniz's critique point to real inconsistencies in Pufendorf's 
theory of obligation? I will deal first with the inconsistency Leibniz 
saw in Pufendorf's claim that in order to introduce an obligation the 
superior must have both just reasons for his power and the ability to 
punish those who disobey. Here we should notice that Pufendorf uses 
the word "obligation" in two closely related but still different senses 
and often fails to make clear which one of the two meanings he is 
using. In some instances he speaks of obligation as an awareness of 
what is right and what is wrong. The most obvious example is the 
definition of obligation he gives in De officio hominis et civis just 
before the definition of the superior: 
Obligation is commonly defined as a bond of law by which we are 
constrained by the necessity of making some performance. That is, 
obligation places a kind of bridle on our liberty, so that though the 
will can in fact take different directions it yet finds itself imbued by 
it with an internal sense (so to speak), so that it is compelled to 
recognize that it has not acted rightly if the subsequent action does 
not conform to the prescribed rule. Consequently, if anything bad 
happens to man for that reason, he judges that he deserves it, since 
7 	 The Political Writings of Leibniz, p.74. 
8 	 The Political Writings of Leibniz, p.75. 
he could have avoided it by following the rule, as he should have 
done .9 
Here obligation is primarily an inner bond which tells how one ought 
to behave in order to do what is right. A reference is made also to the 
evil consequences following from the violation of the rule. These, 
however, are presented not as an indispensable element of the 
obligation itself, but as something a person is ready to accept as just, 
because he is aware of his obligation to follow the rule in question. 
This idea of obligation is also used a little later in De officio hominis et 
civis, when Pufendorf characterizes the powers possessed by the 
legislator: 
The power of creating an obligation (vis obliganda), that is, of 
imposing an internal necessity, and the power to compel (vis 
cogendi) or to enforce observance of the laws by means of 
penalties, lie properly with the legislator, and with him to whom the 
protection and execution of the laws is committed.'° 
Here again the ability of the superior to create an obligation as an 
"internal necessity" is distinguished from his ability to punish. 
In the former of the two passages cited above Pufendorf is 
explaining what is commonly meant by the word "obligation". In this 
everyday sense obligation is conceptually distinct from the fear of 
punishment. However, as both of the cited passages suggest, in reality 
obligation as an inner bond always goes hand in hand with such a fear. 
Why this is so is explained in paragraph I.6.12 of De jure naturae et 
gentium, entitled What force adds to an obligation. Here Pufendorf 
starts by describing the just reasons from which "flows the force of 
obligations, which are understood to restrain our liberty as by an inner 
bond." I These internal moral ties are not, however, enough to ensure 
"the external end of law", that is, the goal for which the law has been 
9 	 OHC L2.3. "Vulgo igitur obligatio dicitur vinculum juris, quo necessitate 
adstringimur alicujus rei praestandae. Scilicet injicitur per earn quasi fraenum 
aliquod nostrae libertati, ut quamquam de facto voluntas in diversum tendere 
queat; intriseco tarnen per eandem velut sensu imbutam se deprehendat, ut, ni 
praescriptae normae conformis sit actio edita, non recte se egisse cogatur 
agnoscere. Adeoque si quid mali eo nomine homini eveniat, non immerito id sibi 
accidere judicet, cum normam prout par erat sequenti istud evitasse licuerit." 
10 	 OHC I.2.7: "Vis autem obliganda, i.e. intrisecam necessitatem adferendi, et vis 
cogendi, seu per poenas ad observationem legum adigendi proprie est in 
legislatore, et cui legum custodia atque exsecutio est comissa." 
11 	 JNG I.6.12: "Ex hisce duobus fontibus manare arbitramur vim obligationum, quae 
intrisecum velut vinculum voluntatis nostrae libertati injicere intelliguntur, ..." 
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introduced. This cannot be achieved unless laws are mingled with a 
force to compel the unwilling.12 The reason for this is that the great 
majority of human beings are governed by passions which easily 
overcome all considerations of the just reasons the superior has for his 
power.13 The only thing which is able to control these passions is a 
fear of some future evil that is expected to follow from the violation of 
the obligation. "Thus", Pufendorf concludes, "in the final analysis 
obligations get their strength (firmitas) from force, and from the 
consideration that the one who desires to produce their observance has 
so much strength, either inherent in him or given by others, that he can 
bring some grave evil upon the disobedient."14 Therefore, a law must 
always consists of two parts. One defines what must be done and what 
must be avoided, the other tells what punishments are prescribed for 
those who disobey.15 
Thus, although there is an inner bond of obligation which is distinct 
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from the fear of punishment, in practice the ability of laws, both 
natural and civil, to affect human behaviour requires also this fear. 
What makes Pufendorf's theory seem confused is that he uses the 
word "obligation" also when he refers to this practical efficiency of 
laws. In this case the relationship between the inner bond and the evil 
consequences is different. A case in point is the following comparison 
between obligation and coercion in De jure naturae et gentium: 
What most of all distinguishes obligation from coercion is that 
while both ultimately point out to some object of fear, the latter 
shakes the will only with an external force, and impels it to choose 
some undesired object only by the sense of an impelling evil; while 
an obligation in addition forces it to admit that the evil, which has 
12 	 JNG I.6.12: "Scilicet finem suum extemum vix assequuntur leges, ni viribus sint 
succinctae, quae invitis quoque fibulam injicere possint." 
13 	 JNG I.6.12: "Enimvero quia naturalis humanae voluntatis libertas nullo morali 
vinculo extinguitur, ea quoque in plurimis mortalium est animi levitas aut malitia, 
ut istas imperii rationes insuper habeant: igitur aliud accedere oportet, quod 
validiore momento enormes libidines, quam pudoris et decori sensus, premat. 
Idque eo magis est necessarium, quod pleraque hominum malitia aliis damno 
vergit. Nam alias facilius sibi quisque poterat relinqui, si nemo peccando, nisi sibi 
noceret." 
14 	 JNG 1.6.12: "Istum porro effectum nihil habere deprehendimus, praeter metum 
mali alicujus, ob violatam obligationem infligendi ab aliquo valentiore, cujus 
intererat ab ista non fuisse discessum. Sicut demum ultima velut firmitas 
obligationibus accedat a vi, utque qui earundem observationem procurare velit, 
tanta sit potentia instructus, domestica, aut ab aliis collata, ut grave aliquod 
malum detrectantibus inferre possit " 
15 	 JNG I.6.14: ".., ita quaelibet lex ex duabus partibus constare intelligitur. Per unam 
definitur, quid faciendum, quidve omittendum: per alteram significatur, quodnam 
malum praeceptum intermittenti, et iterdictum facienti sit propositum." 
been pointed out to the one who deviates from the announced rule, 
falls upon him justly, since he might have avoided it by acting in 
accordance with it.t6 
Here the fear of punishment is an essential element of obligation, and 
the inner moral bond is merely an element which distinguishes 
obligation from compulsion. 
It seems, thus, that Pufendorf has two concepts of obligation. The 
first one is what we nowadays usually call a moral obligation, i.e. an 
inner sense which tells how one ought to behave in order to do the 
right thing. The other concept of obligation refers to those things 
which make it possible for laws to achieve the ends for which they are 
imposed. This can be called an effective obligation. It consists first of 
the moral obligation following from the just reasons the superior has 
for his power, and second of his ability to punish those who disobey. 
The foregoing makes understandable the argument by which 
Pufendorf in OHC I.3.5 (and in the corresponding paragraph I.6.9 in 
JNG) justifies his claim that the superior needs both just reason for his 
power and the capability to punish. The subject matter in this 
discussion is to define what is needed to impose an effective 
obligation. As we saw above, Pufendorf explains the need for 
sanctions by saying that "if a person has reasons why I should obey 
him but lacks the strength to inflict injury on me, I can disregard his 
orders with impunity, unless one more powerful than he comes to 
assert the authority I have flouted." Leibniz understood this statement 
so that if someone has only just reasons for his power but not an 
ability to punish, one is still under no obligation to obey him. What 
Pufendorf seems to have in mind is, however, that the inner moral 
bond which follows from just reasons is not enough to create an 
effective obligation which ensures the external end of the law. 
Understood in this way, his remark does not contradict the observation 
that if someone has only an ability to punish and then looses it, 
"nothing any longer prevents me form acting at my discretion rather 
than his."17 
Of course, the above does not mean that Pufendorf's use of the 
word "obligation" is not somewhat confusing. As Barbeyrac remarked, 
16 JNG I.6.5: "Et in hoc praecipue obligatio differs a coatione, quod licet ultraque 
ultimo metum aliquem ostentet; haec tarnen extrinsecus tantum voluntatem 
concutiat, et in electionem rei ingratae per solum sensum imminentis mali 
impellat: obligatio auteur insuper efficiat, ut quis ipse adigatur agnoscere, sibi non 
immerito accidere malum, quod a proposita regula devianti est propositum, cum 
ultro eandem sequenti istud declinare licuerit " 
17 	 An interpretation along similar lines am be found in Schneewind 1987, p.146. 
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Pufendorf could have made his point much clearer, if instead of trying 
to define obligation in a way which explains how the law is able to 
achieve its external end, he had distinguished between the reasons 
which give a superior the right to command his subjects and the 
factors which make a superior able to command effectively.18 
However, what is significant in this context is that Pufendorf has the 
idea of obligation as an inner moral bond, which is independent of the 
ability of a superior to punish and follows solely from the "just 
causes" a superior has for his power to command. 
I will now turn to the inconsistency Leibniz found in Pufendorf's 
theory of obligation as an inner moral bond. As mentioned already, on 
this issue Leibniz criticized Pufendorf's theory for its circularity. By 
maintaining simultaneously that God has just reasons for his power, 
and that God's commands are the source of all law and justice, 
Pufendorf made the ultimate foundation of morality unintelligible. 
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On this question Stephen Buckle has recently suggested that 
because Leibniz was familiar only with the De officio hominis et civis, 
he actually missed the point of Pufendorf's theory of law and 
obligation. According to Buckle, a closer look at De jure naturae et 
gentium reveals that "Pufendorf's appeal to the twin elements of the 
will of a superior and the existence of just reasons in his account of 
law is ... an attempt to specify two different kinds of elements, both of 
which are necessary for the existence of law." In this endeavour 
Pufendorf "employs a version of the traditional Aristotelian notion of 
formal and material causes." What Pufendorf claims, according to 
Buckle, is that a law consists of the will of a superior, which is 
necessary for the act of imposition (the formal element), and just 
reasons for its imposition (the material element). An imposition has 
just reasons when it "reinforces or protects the beneficial structure of 
the natural state of affairs." Buckle summarizes Pufendorf's position 
in the following way: "The will of a superior, without just reasons, is 
only coercion; while just reasons, without the will of a superior, are 
only reasons for law, but not law itself. (They are not compelling.)" 
What, then, makes natural law a true law is that it is imposed by God, 
and that God has just reasons for imposing it, which follow from the 
fact that it is necessarily beneficial for the human race in general.19 
18 	 "Le judgement d'un anonyme sur ('original det cet abrege" in Samuel Pufendorf, 
Les Devoirs del'homme et du citoyen tel qu'ils sont prescipts par loi naturelle, 
Amsterdam 1718, p.491: "J'avone neanmoins, que les pensees de notre Auteur 
[Pufendorfl ne sont pas ici assez degagees, et qu'il autroit du mieux distinguer, ce 
qui donne proprement au Superieur le Droit de commander, d'avec ce qui le met 
en etat de commander efficacement." 
19 	 Stephen Buckle Natural Law and the Theory of Property. Grotius to Hume. 
Oxford, 1991, pp.60-61. 
If I understand Buckle correctly, he suggests that actually Pufendorf 
does not present a genuine divine command theory at all but thinks 
that there is a criterion of justice which is independent of God's 
commands. Human beings are able to estimate that God's commands 
are just because they reinforce or protect "the beneficial structure of 
the natural state of affairs." The will of God is, then, not the ultimate 
source of all ideas concerning justice, but merely an element which 
makes human beings consider the laws of sociality more compelling. 
Buckle's interpretation is possibly based on the definition of the 
superior Pufendorf offers in De jure naturae et gentium, which 
includes slightly different formulations than the one presented in De 
officio hominis et civis: 
An obligation is properly laid on the mind of a man by a superior, 
that is, by one who has both the strength to threaten some evil 
against those who resist him, and just reasons why he can demand 
that the liberty of our will be limited at his pleasure. For when a 
person has such a power, after he has once signified what reward 
awaits those who obey his will, and what evil consequences those 
who resists, there must necessarily arise in the faculty of reason a 
fear mingled with reverence, a fear occasioned by such a person's 
strength, and a reverence arising from a consideration of the causes, 
which should make us obey his will even when the fear is gone, in 
the mode of counse1.20 
What might be seen here as supporting Buckle is the remark that the 
veneration towards the superior arises from a consideration of reasons 
which should make one obey his will even "in the mode of counsel." 
Following Hobbes, Pufendorf defines counsel as a precept in which 
the reason for obedience is drawn not from the authority of he who 
gives the precept but from the prescribed thing itself.21 It would seem 
possible, therefore, to understand the passage so that what generates 
the respect towards the superior is the just content of his commands. 
This, however, is not the only possible interpretation, nor the most 
20 	 JNG I.6.9: "Introducitur autem obligatio in animum hominis proprie a superiore, 
i.e. tali, cui non solum sint vires malum aliquod repraesentandi contranitentibus, 
sed cui justae sint causae, quare postulare queat, ex suo arbitrio voluntatis nostrae 
libertatem circumsribi. Talia enim ubi in aliquo fuerint, postquam quid velit, 
simulque quid voluntatis ipsius parentes boni, renitentes mali maneat, significavit, 
necessum est in facultate rationis compote oriri metum reverentia temperatum, 
ilium quidem ex ipsius potentia, hanc autem ex consideratione causarum, quae 
etiam remoto metu, per modum consilii sufficere debebant ipsius voluntatem 
amplectendam." 
21 	 JNG I.6.1: "Huc fere redeunt, quae traduntur Hobbesio De Cive XIV.1: 
Consilium est praeceptum, in quo ratio quare paremus, sumitur ad ipsa re, quae 
praecipitur." 
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plausible one. It should be remembered that in his definition of the 
superior Pufendorf is interested in the manner in which laws can 
effectively govern human behaviour. What he has in mind at the end of 
the passage cited above is, I think, the following: If we reflect the 
commands of the superior independently of his ability to punish, these 
cannot be called laws in the proper sense of the term but should be 
seen rather as moral precepts given in the mode of counsel. What they 
in this case have in common with, say, a doctor's orders is the lack of 
sanctions which compel those who are inclined to disobey. However, 
unlike true advises, which leave to the counseled party full inner 
freedom to decide whether to obey them or not, the commands of a 
superior would be, even without sanctions, something his subjects 
ought to obey because of the just reasons the superior has for his 
power. 
Be this as it may, even if the first-mentioned interpretation were the 
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correct one, this would not save Pufendorf 's theory from the charge of 
circularity. For also in De jure naturae et gentium Pufendorf makes 
perfectly clear that there can be no criteria of justice whatsoever 
independent of God's commands. It is true that in this work Pufendorf 
emphasizes that natural law consists of rules which are beneficial for 
the human species. In the second edition of the work he remarks that 
"the actions prescribed by natural law have through the determination 
of the first cause the native power to produce an effect good and 
advantageous to human beings, while actions similarly forbidden 
produce the contrary effect." Nevertheless, on the same occasion 
Pufendorf firmly maintains that "this natural goodness and badness 
does in no way constitute an action in the field of morals."22  Moral 
good and bad, right and wrong are attributes of human actions which 
arise from their conformity or discord with the law, and there can be 
no law prior to the command of the superior.23 The same is true of 
justice and injustice. What distinguishes justice from the moral 
rectitude is that while the latter expression denotes simply that an act 
is in agreement with the law, by saying that an act is just one also pays 
attention to those towards whom the action is performed.24 And since 
22 	 JNG 1684 I.2.6: "Nam alias actiones lege naturali praeceptae ex determinatione 
primae causae nativam habent vim bonum et hominibus proficuum effectum 
producendi, sicut actiones vetitae contrarium. Verum haec ipsa bonitas et malitia 
naturalis actionem per se hautquidquam in genere morum constituit." 
23 JNG I.2.6: "Cum enim honsetas sive necessitas moralis, et turpitudo sint 
affectiones actionum humanarum, ortae ex convenientia aut disconvenientia a 
norma seu lege; lex vero sit jussum superioris; non adparet, quomodo honestas 
aut turpitudo intelligi possit ante legem, et citra superioris impositionem." 
24 	 JNG I.7.7: "Differt autem justitia actionum a bonitate in hoc potissimum, quod 
bonitas simpliciter notet conveniantiam cum lege, justitia autem praeterea 
involvat respectum ad eos, in quos actio exercetur." 
the commands of God are the ultimate source of all law, there can be 
no criterion of justice prior to his will. 
Do we have to conclude, then, that Pufendorf's theory is circular in 
the way Leibniz suggested? Not necessarily. First thing to notice here 
is that there is, according to Pufendorf, a substantial difference 
between the reasons which give human superiors their authority and 
the reasons which make human beings think that God is entitled to 
command them. In the case of human authorities the reason is the fact 
that human beings consent to empower others (a person or collective 
body) to maintain peace. The just character of such an authority 
follows from natural law, which requires human beings both to 
advance peace and to keep their contracts. God's power over human 
beings, on the other hand, has quite a different foundation: 
For naturally one cannot but be won over by someone from whom 
one has received much good. And so if it appears that the same 
person wishes me well, can take better care of my future than I, and 
also lays a claim to direct my acts, there is no apparent reason why 
I should wish to question his power. And this is even more true if I 
am indebted to him for my very being. And why should not he, who 
gave man the power of free action, be able from his own right to 
limit some part of man's liberty?25  
Now, Fiammetta Palladini has pointed out that in the light of everyth-
ing Pufendorf says of the origin of human authority and the 
consequences of human beneficence it appears as a most unsatisfac-
tory justification for God's power to command.26 This is undoubtedly 
true. In the first place, Pufendorf insists that a mere superiority of 
natural characteristics can give no human being a right to command 
others: 
Since the man upon whom an obligation is to be laid, has in himself 
the ability to direct his actions, which he can feel is enough for 
himself, there is no apparent reason why he should be understood 
to be convicted by the dictate of his conscience, if he orders his 
25 	 JNG 1.6.12: "Nam uti natulariter non potest non illi quis conciliari, abs quo multa 
bona accepit; ita si constiterit eundem et bene mihi velle, et rectius, quam ipse 
valeam, mihi proscipere posse, simulque idem actu mei directionem sibi vindicet, 
nil adparet rationis, quare imperium istius detrectare velim. Idque eo magis, si 
etiam id ipsum, quod esse potuerim, eidem in acceptis referam. Et qui homini 
dedit, ut libere posset agere, quare non is jure suo aliquam ejus libertatis 
particulam circumscribere queat? " 
26 	 Palladini 1990, pp.56-58. 
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actions according to his own will, rather than that of someone who 
is by nature superior to him.27 
Furthermore, Pufendorf holds it evident that the mere fact that parents 
generate their children gives them no rights over their descendants 28 
And although great services create an "imperfect obligation" to show 
gratitude towards the benefactor, beneficence as such does not 
establish any real rights over other people: "An ungrateful mind does 
not of itself constitute an injury, since no right, in the proper sense of 
the term, is violated."29 
Palladini remarks that had this critique been presented to Pufendorf 
or his advocates, they would have answered that since God is a 
supreme being, God's power over the human species cannot be 
justified by the same criteria as the power relations which prevail 
between human beings.30 And it seems obvious that something like 
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this was assumed by Barbeyrac when he maintained that the seeming 
inconsistency in Pufendorf's use of the word `just" disappears when 
we realize that the justice of God's power is different from the justice 
which characterizes the reasons human superiors have for their power 
to command. In the latter case justice follows from the principles of 
natural law and so ultimately from God's will. God's own power to 
command, on the other hand, is based on reasons "which carry their 
justice in themselves and do not need to receive their force from 
somewhere else".3' 
Palladini holds that instead of solving the problems in Pufendorf's 
theory Barbeyrac's interpretation only pinpoints the contradiction in 
its foundations. In order to make his theory consistent Pufendorf has 
to choose, according to Palladini, between two options. The first one is 
27 JNG I.6.11: "Cum enim is, cui obligatio est imponenda, in seipso habeat 
principium regendi suas actiones, quod ipse sibi sufficere judicare potest; non 
adparet ratio, quare statim propriae conscientiae dictamine convictus debeat 
intelligi, si suo potius, quam alterius, cui natura praestantior, arbitrio agat." 
28 	 JNG VI.2.4: "Nobis quippe sola generatio non videtur sufficere ad titulum imperii 
in sobolem humanam constituendi." 
29 	 JNG III.3.17: "Porro licet in animo ingrato per se nulla sit injuria, quippe cum 
non violetur jus aliud proprie dictum." 
30 	 Palladini 1990, p.59. 
31 	 Les Devoirs del'homme et du citoyen tel qu'ils sont prescipts par loi naturella, 
Amsterdam 1718, p.489: "Tout Superieur, au dessous DIEU, a un Autorite fondee 
sur des raisons, dont la justice depend de quelque Loi du Droit Naturel, et se 
rapporte par consequent aux Regles de ce Juste dont l'obligation emane 
veritablement de la volonte d'un Superieur, on de celle de Roi Des Rois, et du 
Seigneur des Seigneurs. Mais le droit de commander qu'a cet Erse Souverain, est 
fondee sur des raisons qui portent leur justice avec elles, et qui n'ont pas besoin 
d'emprunter d'alleurs leur force." 
that he banishes God into the field of faith and by doing so makes God 
ineffable, a being who cannot be reflected on and judged by human 
criteria of justice. In that case, however, there cannot be any just 
causes for God's power and God is unable to offer a rational 
foundation for the moral system. The other possibility is that God is 
used as the first link in a rational argument by which one demonstrates 
the obligatory character of natural law. This requires, however, that 
God's power over human beings must be justified by the same rational 
terms as human power relations. Palladini maintains that Pufendorf 
chooses the latter alternative when he decides to include God's 
authority over human beings in his general definition of a superior and 
maintains that there are just causes for God's authority. Nonetheless, 
when Pufendorf maintains simultaneously that God's power over 
human beings cannot be justified by the same criteria as human power 
relations, he makes his justification for God's authority a mere 
tautology: God is in entitled to command human beings because God 	 107 
is God and human beings are human beings.32 
I agree with Palladini that Pufendorf's attempt to offer a general 
definition of superior, which includes both God's power over human 
beings and human power relations, makes his theory appear confused. 
However, I do not share Palladini's estimation that Pufendorf's idea of 
the origin of morality should be seen as fundamentally contradictory 
or tautological. Palladini's interpretation is based on the assumption, 
shared also by Barbeyrac, that the argument by which Pufendorf 
explains how God imposes an obligation attempts to be some kind of 
justification for God's power to command. Now, if this were the case, 
it would be difficult to save Pufendorf's position from the charge of 
circularity. It seems to me, however, that the argument is not meant as 
a justification, and that in the case of God's power over human beings, 
Pufendorf uses the expression "just causes" in a consciously rhetorical 
sense. In the following, I will attempt to show that Pufendorf puts 
forward a genuine divine command theory of morality, in which the 
will of God is the ultimate source of all ideas concerning right and 
wrong, just and unjust, and which assumes no moral criteria by which 
God's authority is justified. 
The first thing to note here is that without an idea of a commanding 
God human reason can, according to Pufendorf, have no ideas 
concerning morality and justice: 
32 	 Palladini 1990, pp.59-60. 
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If we consider reason in so far as it is not imbued with a knowledge 
and a sense of law, or a moral norm, it might perhaps be able to 
permit man the faculty of doing something more effectively and 
dexterous than a beast, and to assist his natural powers by 
skillfulness. But that reason should be able to discover any morality 
in the actions of man without contemplating a law, is as impossible 
as for a man born blind to judge between colors 33 
As already mentioned, by law Pufendorf means the command of a 
superior. All human superiors, in turn, receive their authority from 
natural law and so ultimately from the command of God. Thus, what 
Pufendorf says in the passage cited above is that the whole human 
phenomenon of morality is dependent on the fact that human beings 
have the idea of God who wants them to behave in a certain manner. If 
they were unaware of their creator, the idea that some things are right 
and just while others are wrong and unjust would never enter their 
minds. 
The above remarks are not contradicted by Pufendorf's observation 
that many people, including celebrated philosophers, live in the 
erroneous belief that there are acts which are morally good or bad in 
themselves. The reason for this phenomenon is that when people are 
from childhood on raised to curse certain acts, this hatred achieves in 
their mind the force of a natural passion. As a result, they easily 
become unable to distinguish between the physical and the moral 
elements in human acts and are inclined to believe that the wicked 
character of these acts follows from some natural feature in the acts 
themselves.34 In other words, the reason why human beings often 
support some kind of moral realism is that there are acts which are 
powerfully condemned in the society they live in. This does not 
contradict the view that if human beings were completely unaware of 
God, there could be no moral ideas at all. For in that case the thought 
that certain acts are right and others wrong could not have arisen in the 
first place, and there would be no commonly prevailing moral 
convictions to be internalized in the manner described above. 
33 	 JNG 1.2.6: "Nam si consideremus rationem, quatenus non est imbuta cognitione et 
sensu legis, seu normae moralis, potest quidem ista fortasse homini suppeditare 
facultatem expeditius aut dexterius quid agendi quam brutum, viresque naturales 
per solertiam adjuvare. Verum ut citra reflexionem ad legem in hominis 
actionibus moralitatem deprehendere possit, id aequae est impossibile, atque 
coecum natum discrimina colorum dijudicare." 
34 JNG 1.2.6: "Quodautem multi naturalem istam indifferentiam aegre concipere 
queant, inde est, quod a teneris istorum vitiorum detestatio nobis fuit inculcata; 
quae opinio simplici adhuc menti impressa, in vim naturalis cuijusdam affcetus 
videtur invaluisse; adeoque efficit ut paucis in mentem veniat inter materiale et 
formale istarum actionum distinguere." 
The foregoing has the important consequence that human beings 
are able to attribute moral qualities to God only because they are 
aware of God's commands. This, of course, leads to difficulties, if one 
also thinks that in order to hold God's commandments as a source of 
morality, human beings first need a moral justification for God's 
authority. It seems to me, however, that Pufendorf does not think this 
way, and that the explanation he gives to God's ability to impose an 
obligation is not strictly speaking a justification for God's power. In 
Pufendorf's eyes, only human power relations require justification. 
This they do because no human individual can possess such qualities 
or do such deeds which could generate in others the idea that they 
ought to obey his commands rather than their own will. In the case of 
God the situation is, however, quite different. Human beings not only 
understand that God has created them and by doing so has laid a claim 
to govern their behaviour. They also comprehend that God is 
concerned about the survival and well-being of the human species and 
is, because of his omnipotence, in an unique way able to help human 
beings. According to Pufendorf, it is not possible for human beings to 
have such an idea of God and not to think that they ought obey God's 
will. This is, in his eyes, the ultimate origin of all human ideas 
concerning right and wrong, just and unjust. Consequently, it is 
pointless to ask whether there is some justification for God's authority. 
For we are able to formulate such a question only because we have 
already adopted the idea of justice from God's commands. 
In agreement with the foregoing Pufendorf declares in JNG II.1.3 
that when he attributes the words "just" and "justice" to God, he uses 
them in a metaphorical sense. Strictly speaking these words can only 
characterize the lawful acts of human beings. Since God is not 
restricted by any law and does everything only according to his own 
will, he or his acts cannot be called just in the proper sense of the word. 
When justice is attributed to God, it must not be understood as 
inferring any obligation or right residing in another, as the nature of 
human justice implies. But since God has shown both in his acts 
and in the revelation that such a manner of acting is proper to his 
most perfect nature, we mortals apply that word to him, which we 
use to describe such things we lawfully perform towards each 
other.35 
35 	 JNG II.1.3: "Hine quando Deo tribuitur justitia, non illa est intelligenda respicere 
aliquam obligationem, aut jus in altero, sicut justitiae humanae natura id infert. 
Sed quia talem agendi modum perfectissimae suae natuare congruere ipse 
operibus, et per relevationes ostendit; inde eidem mortales id vocabulum 
adplicamus, quo, quae recte a nobis adversus alios aguntur, exprimimus." 
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In other words, to say that God is just or that God has just reasons for 
his power is an anthropomorphism. Precisely speaking, the whole 
phenomenon of morality — the idea that there are acts which are right 
or wrong, just or unjust — is but a consequences of the idea that there 
is God who wants human beings to behave in a certain way. The 
popular idea that God himself is just is simply the corollary of the fact 
that nothing in God's own deeds makes it possible for human beings 
to attach to God himself the idea of injustice they learn from God's 
commands. Similarly, the idea that God has just reasons for his power 
follows from the fact that it is impossible for a human being to think 
that there is something unjust in the situation that God commands 
human beings. That Pufendorf adopts this imprecise way of speaking 
when he characterizes the manner in which God imposes an obligation 
over human beings is hardly surprising. On this issue the significant 
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thing for him is not whether it is philosophically accurate to attach the 
idea just reasons to God. What is important to Pufendorf is that there 
is something else besides God's ability to punish which makes human 
beings think that God's commands should be observed, namely the 
idea that it is wrong to disobey these commands. 
THE DISAGREEMENT WITH GROTIDS 
Pufendorf presents, thus, a genuine divine command theory of 
morality in which the ultimate source of right and wrong, justice and 
injustice is the will of God. In the following two chapters I will try to 
answer what makes Pufendorf adopt this position. Since the majority 
of Pufendorf's explicit statements on this issue are directed against the 
theory of morality Grotius had presented in De iure belli ac pads, I 
will first examine what exactly was the source of the disagreement 
between these two men. 
As has been already mentioned, in his early De iure pradae Grotius 
also supported the divine command theory, maintaining not only that 
"what God has shown to be his will, that is law," but also that "a given 
thing is just because God wills it, rather than that God wills the thing 
because it is just."36  However, twenty years later in De lure Belli ac 
Pacis Grotius abandoned this view, claiming now that while natural 
law evidently is a command of God, its normative character is not 
dependent on this fact. In his major work Grotius defined natural law 
36 	 De lure praede, p.8. 
as "the dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, according 
as it is or is not in conformity with this rational nature [of human 
beings], has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity, and 
that in consequence such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the 
author of nature, God."37  Whereas God's positive laws and human 
legislation regulates also acts which are as such morally neutral and 
become good or bad only because they are commanded or prohibited 
by the legislator, natural law is concerned solely with acts which are 
morally good or bad in themselves and, therefore, necessarily 
commanded or forbidden by God.38 Grotius referred to Aristotle who 
had remarked that acts like murder or theft do not have a proper mean 
between deficiencies and excess, but are bad as such and therefore 
wrong in all circumstances.39 In Grotius' eyes, it was as impossible for 
God to make such acts good as it was for him to command that two 
and two does not make four.40 Thus, it could be concluded that natural 
law "would have some place, even if we should concede that which 
cannot be conceded without utmost wickedness, namely that there is 
no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him."41  
Pufendorf offers three logically separable arguments against 
Grotius' position. First, there is the simple conceptual remark that 
words like "murder" or "theft" do not refer to plain physical motions 
of human bodies, but to acts which are against the law.42 To say that it 
is no more possible for God to make murder or theft morally good 
than to change the rules of arithmetics is a purely conceptual truth. It 
does not indicate that God was under some necessity to command or 
forbid certain acts rather than others. 
37 	 IBP I.1.10: "Ius naturale est dictatum rectae rationis indicans, actui alicui, ex ejus 
convenientia aut disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, finesse moralem 
turpitudimen aut necessitatem moralem, ac consequenter ab auctore naturae Deo 
talem actum aut vetari aut praecipi." 
38 	 IBP I.1.10: "Actus de quibus tale exstat dictatum, debiti sunt aut illiciti per se, 
atque ideo a Deo necessario praecepti aut vetiti intelliguntur: qua nota ditat hoc 
jus non ab humano tantum jure, sed a divino voluntario, quod non ea praecipit aut 
vetat, quae per se ac suapte natura aut debita sunt illicita, sed vetando illicta, 
praecipiendo debita facit." 
39 	 Nicomachean Ethics 1107a8-15. 
40 	 !BP I.1.1: "Est autem jus naturale adeo immutabile, ut ne a Deo quidem mutan 
queat. Quanqum enim immensa est Dei potentia, dici tarnen quaedam possunt ad 
quae se illa non extendit, quia quae ita dicuntur, dicuntur tantum, sensum autem 
qui rem exprimat nullum haben sed Bibi ipsis repugnant: Sicut ergo ut bis duo 
non sint quator ne a Deo quidem potest effici, ita ne hoc quidem, ut quod 
intrinseca ratione malum est, malum non sit." 
41 	 IBP, Prolegomena (§ 11): "Et haec quidem quae jam diximus, locum aliquem 
haberent etiamsi daremus, quod sine summo scelere dan nequit, non esse Deum, 
aut non curari ab eo negotia humana." 
42 	 JNG I.2.6: "Quin haec ipsa vocabula non notant nudos et simples motus actusque 
physicos; sed tales, qui legibus repugnant, adeoque integras actiones morales." 
111 
112 
The second argument is concerned with the nature of God's 
freedom. On this issue Pufendorf shares the Ockhamist view, 
according to which the idea that there are acts which God had to 
command or prohibit is incompatible with God's absolute freedom: 
Those who set up an eternal rule for the morality of human actions, 
beyond the imposition of God, seem to me to do nothing other that 
to join to God some co-eternal extrinsic principle which he himself 
had to follow in the assignments of forms of things. Still all admit 
that God created all things, man included, of his free will. 
Consequently, it lay within his own pleasure to assign whatever 
nature he wished to this creature who he was about to create 43 
Pufendorf is not, however, ready to follow the Ockhamists when they 
claim that God can impose a moral order which is radically opposite 
to the one which now prevails.44  After God had created a human 
species the survival of which is dependent on the laws of sociality, it is 
not possible to think that God would change this law, unless God 
would also alter human nature 45 Behind this position is Pufendorf's 
fundamental assumption that God has created human beings to "make 
his glory greater by improving those good things conferred on 
them."46  This makes it unthinkable that God would require human 
beings to behave in a manner which is harmful for their preservation 
and well-being. 
It has been suggested that Pufendorf's commitment to a divine 
command theory of morality was ultimately a corollary of his 
theological voluntarism 47 And it is evident that Pufendorf himself 
sees God's freedom as a forceful argument against the idea that some 
human deeds could be morally good or bad independently of God's 
43 JNG 1.2.6. "Et sane qui extra impositionem divinam moralitatis actionum 
humanarum aetemum aliquam statuunt regulam, nil aliud mihi videtur agere, 
quam ut Deo adjungant pricipium aliquod coaetemum extrinsecum, quod ipse in 
assignandis rerum formis sequi necessum habuerit. Fatentur praterea omnes, 
Deum uti omnia, ita hominem liberrima voluntate creasse; cui consequens est, in 
beneplacito ejusdem fuisse, qualem ei, quem creaturus erat, naturam vellet 
assignare." 
44 	 On the Ockhamist position, see Holopainen 1991, pp.133-149. 
45 	 JNG II.3.5: "..., in voluntate divina quidem positum fuisse, tale animal, cui lex 
naturae congrueret, producere, vel non. Sed jam postquam a Deo creatus est 
homo, animal quod citra observationem legis naturalis salvum esse nequit; inde 
hautquidqaum fas est credere, eundem velle legem naturae tollere aut immutare, 
quamdiu natuare humanae nullam mutationem infert." 
46 	 JNG 2.4.1 (JNG 1684 2.4.16). 
47 	 This view is stated explicitly in Schneewind 1987, p.127. It seems to be implied 
also in Palladini 1990, pp.33-34 and Denzer 1972 pp.49-55. 
commands. Right after declaring that God was absolutely free in 
creating the human species, he continues with the following remark: 
How, then, can an action of man be accorded any quality which 
follows from an extrinsic and absolute necessity, without the 
imposition and pleasure of God? If all laws, both divine and human, 
were removed, all the movements and actions of man would be 
indifferent. Some of them are called naturally honourable or base, 
because the condition of nature, which the Creator freely bestowed 
upon man, most rigorously requires either their execution or 
avoidance. It does not follow, however, that there is, without any 
law, some morality in the motion and application of the physical 
power itself.4S 
It must be noted, however, that although Pufendorf here closely 
connects the divine command theory of morality with theological 
voluntarism, the former is not a necessary consequence of the latter. 
Pufendorf could maintain quite consistently that God was absolutely 
free at the moment of creation, but then decided to create a human 
being who is able to find moral qualities even without the idea of God. 
In this case it would still be wrong to hold with Grotius that it was 
necessary for God to command or prohibit certain acts because they 
are morally good or bad in themselves. Nevertheless, there would be 
nothing incorrect in the idea that even in the imagined situation where 
there were no God, human beings would think that certain acts are 
right and others wrong. But as has been mentioned already, Pufendorf 
denies also this. If human beings were totally unaware of the creator 
and his commands, the idea that some acts are morally good or bad 
would never have entered their minds 49 It seems to me, therefore, that 
the central issue of disagreement between Grotius and Pufendorf is not 
the character of God's freedom but the origin of morality as a human 
phenomenon. Grotius holds that human reason would have some idea 
concerning right or wrong, even if it knew nothing of God, whereas 
Pufendorf maintains that in such an imagined situation reason could 
discover nothing morally laudable or blameworthy in human 
behaviour. 
48 	 JNG I.2.6: "Quo ratione igitur actioni hominis possit competere aliqua affectio, 
qaue ex necessitate intriseca et absoluta, extra Dei impositionem et beneplacitum, 
promanet? Sic ut revera omnes motus et actiones hominis, remota omni lege tam 
divina quam humana, sint indifferentes; earum autem aliquae ideo tantum 
naturaliter honestae aut turpes dicantur, quod eas fieri aut omitti quam maxime 
requirebat conditio naturae, quam Creator homini libere attribuit. Non auteur, 
quod citra omnem legem in ipso motu et adplicatione potentia physicae per se 
insit aliqua moralitas." 
49 	 JNG I.2.6. See above pp.I08-109. 
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What made Grotius and Pufendorf adopt dissimilar views on this 
particular issue? Richard Tuck has suggested that this divergence of 
views was concerned with the question of whether a belief that some 
course of action is profitable for the survival and safety of an 
individual "was in itself sufficient to induce a belief in an agent that 
the course of action was morally obligatory." Tuck holds that "Grotius 
apparently believed that it was, and that an accurate assessment of 
social realities was enough to give rise to knowledge of obligatory 
moral law." Pufendorf, on the other hand, "observed that men can 
often act quite knowingly against their own interests, and that 
therefore knowledge of what is in our interests cannot be sufficient to 
make us believe we are under an obligation to perform the actions"5o 
Tuck is right, of course, in holding that Pufendorf argues forcefully 
against the idea that the benefits following from the observance of 
natural law would be the source of its moral character.5' It is also true 
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that Pufendorf hints at the possibility that Grotius had based his 
position on the utility of natural law.52 I do not, however, think this is 
the real issue of disagreement between Pufendorf and Grotius. It 
seems to me that even though Grotius emphasized the utility of natural 
law, in De iure belli ac pacis his theory of the normative character of 
natural law was based ultimately on a teleological conception of 
human nature. 
The idea that Grotius derived the morally obligating character of 
natural law from its utility for the safety and survival of the individual 
seems to find confirmation in the remarks at the beginning of the 
second chapter of Book one of De iure belli ac pacis. There Grotius 
not only speaks of the first principles of nature which make all 
animals from the moment of their birth impelled to seek those things 
which preserve their life. He also says that from this condition arises 
the first duty (primum officium) of a human being to keep himself in 
the condition nature has given him and to pursue that which is in 
accordance with his nature and to avoid that which contradicts it 53 A 
little later Grotius then remarks that the purpose of social life is to 
secure the salus of each individual 54 
50 	 Tuck 1987, pp.105-106. 
51 	 JNG II.3.20. 
52 	 JNG II.3.19. 
53 	 IBP I.2.1: "Prima naturae vocat, quod simulatque natum est animal, ipsum sibi 
conciliatur et commendatur ad se conservandum, atque ad suum statum et ad ea 
quae conservantia sunt ejus status diligenda: alienatur autem ab interitu iisque 
rebus quae interitum videatur afferre. ... ; primumque esse officium ut se quis 
conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat quae secundum naturam sint, 
pellatque contraria." 
54 	 IBP I.2.5: "Nam societas eo tendit ut suum cuique salvum sit communi opera 
conspiratione." 
The foregoing as such gives the impression that the moral 
obligation to obey the rules which are necessary for peaceful social 
life follows from the fact that they are profitable for one's survival and 
safety. It must be noted, however, that at the beginning of chapter I.2. 
Grotius is paraphrasing Cicero's presentation of the Stoic philosophy 
in the third book of De finibus. And in the Stoic theory the mere fact 
that an action accords with primary inclinations of human nature 
which are common to all animals did not give it any peculiar moral 
value (honestum). Such a quality belonged to deeds which follow from 
the use of the distinctively human faculty of reason. This seems also to 
be the opinion of Grotius, who continues in IBP I.2.1 — still rephrasing 
Cicero's exposition in De finibus— with the following remark: 
But after these remarks [concerning the naturalness of the instinct 
for self-preservation] have received due consideration, there follows 
a notion of the conformity of things with reason, which is superior 
to the body. Now, this conformity, in which moral worth 
[honestum] becomes the paramount object, ought to be accounted a 
higher importance than the things to which the first inclination of 
the soul directs itself, because the first principles of nature 
commends us to right reason, and right reason ought to be dearer to 
us than those things through which we have been brought to it.55  
This remark is a corollary of the teleological idea — generally shared in 
classical philosophy — that since reason is the feature which 
distinguish human beings from all other animals, it is obvious that the 
proper way of living for a human being, one which is in agreement 
with his nature, is to follow reason. 
The idea that human beings ought to behave in a distinctively 
human way plays a central role in the critique Grotius directs against 
the ancient sceptic Cameades in the Prolegomena to De iure belli ac 
pacis. Cameades had refuted the existence of natural law on the basis 
that like all other animals human beings always seek their own 
utility.56 To this Grotius answers, first of all, that the claim that every 
living creature is impelled by nature to seek only its own good is not a 
universal truth. Even many animals are ready to make sacrifices for 
the sake of their offspring or members of the same species. Grotius' 
central argument against Cameades is, however, that while a human 
55 IBP 1.2.1: "At post hae cognita sequi notionem convenientiae rerum cum ipsa 
ratione quae corpore est potior; atque earn convenientiam, in qua honestum sit 
propositum, pluris faciendam quam ad quae sola primum animi appetito 
ferebatur: quia prima naturae commendent nos quidem recta rationi, sed ipsa recta 
ratio carior nobis esse debeat quam illa sint a quibus ad hanc venerimus." 
56 	 See above p.31. 
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being is an animal, he is "an exceptional animal, much further 
removed from all other animals than these are from one another." And 
one of the central features which distinguishes a human being from 
other living creatures is a desire to live in a society with other 
members of their own species, "not", however, "of any sort, but 
peaceful, and organized in accordance with his intellect" 57 Moreover, 
of all animals only human beings have been endowed with the ability 
to communicate their ideas and to know and to follow general rules of 
behaviour. Grotius emphasizes, pace Carneades, that when human 
beings use these faculties, they do not act in a manner common to all 
animals, but in a way which agrees with human nature.58 Based on 
these observation, he then concludes that "the care for social life 
which agrees with human intelligence" is the source of natural law "in 
the proper sense of the term" (i.e. with precepts which are absolutely 
indispensable for any kind of organized social life and which human 
116 	 beings can, therefore, be forced to obey) 59 
Grotius continues in Prolegomena by remarking that the fact that 
individual human beings are in need of many things has given rise to 
another, more extensive conception of natural law. This consists of the 
idea that one should always act in a way which is in accordance with 
one's long-term interests. However, also in this case the source of 
natural law is the fact that by observing it one behaves in a 
distinctively human way. Grotius points out that just like the desire for 
a peaceful and ordered social life, the ability to estimate what is 
beneficial and what is harmful for oneself in the long-run is something 
unique for the human species. It is this observation which causes the 
thought that if a person does not follow a well-tempered judgement, 
57 	 IBP Prolegomena (§ 6): "Nam homo animans quidem est, sed eximium animans, 
multoque longius distans a caeteris omnibus, quam caeterorum genera inter se 
distant: cui rei testimonium perhibent multae actions humani generis propriae. 
Inter haec autem quae homini sunt propria, est appetitus societatis, id est 
communitatis, non qualiscunquae, sed tranquillae, et pro sui intellectus modo 
ordinatae, cum his qui sui sunt genens." 
58 	 IBP Prolegomena (§ 7): "Idemque de infantibus dicendum, in quibus ante omnem 
disciplinam ostendit se, ad bene aliis faciendum propensio quaedam, prudenter a 
Plutarcho observata: sicut in ea aetate misercordia sponte prorumpit. Homini vero 
perfectae aetatis, cum circa similia similiter agere norit, cum societatis appetitu 
excellente, cujus peculiare solus inter animantes instrumentum habet sermonem, 
finesse etiam facultatem sciendi agendique, secundum generalia praecepta, par est 
intelligigi, cui quae conveniunt ea jam sunt non omnium quidem animantium, sed 
humanae naturae congruentia." 
59 	 IBP Prolegomena (§ 8) : "Haec vero, quam rudi modo jam expressimus, sociatatis 
custodia, humano intellectui conveniens, fons est ejus juris, quod proprie tali 
nomine appellatur: quo pertinent alieni abstinentia, et si quid alieni habeamus, aut 
lucri inde ferecimus restitutio, promissorum implendorum obligatio, damni culpa 
dati reparatio, et poenae inter homines meritum." 
but is lead astray, for example, by fear, the temptation of an immediate 
pleasure, or rash impulse, he acts in a way which does not agree with 
human nature and which is, therefore, against natural law.6° 
The same teleological idea of human nature is in use when Grotius 
a little later in Prolegomena comments on Horace's saying: Utility is 
the mother of justice and fairness. In De iure pradae Grotius had 
remarked that Horace should not be censured for claiming this 61 But 
by that time this remark was based on the assumption that the ultimate 
source of all morality is God's will, which can be derived, at least 
partly, from the fact that God has implanted in human beings a strong 
desire for self-preservation. When Grotius in De iure belli ac pacis 
abandons the divine command theory, he also feels the need to qualify 
his previous statement concerning Horace's saying. He now remarks 
that it "is not true if we speak accurately": 
For the mother of natural law is human nature itself, which, even if 
we had no lack of anything, would create in us a mutual desire for 
society. The mother of civil law is that obligation which raises from 
mutual consent; and since this obligation derives its force from the 
law of nature, nature may be considered, so to say, the great-grand-
mother of civil law. But utility is added to natural law: for in order 
to make us more eager to cultivate society, the author of nature 
wished that as individuals we should be weak, and should lack 
many things needed in order to live properly.62 
In other words, utility is merely a factor which God has connected to 
natural law in order to make human beings better motivated to obey it. 
What makes human reason recognize the normative character of this 
law is that it is something distinctively human to seek peaceful and 
60 IBP Prolegomena (§ 9): "Ab hac juris significatione fluxit altera largior: quia 
enim homo supra caeteras animantes non tantum vim obtinet socialem de qua 
diximus, sed judicium ad aestimanda quae delectant aut noten, non praesentia 
tantum, sed futura, et quae in utrumvis possunt ducere; pro humani intellectus 
modo etiam in his judicium recte comformatum sequi, neque metu, aut voluptatis 
praesentis illecebra corrumpi, aut temerario rapi impetu, conveniens esse 
humanae naturae, et quod tali judicio plane repugnat, etiam contra jus naturae, 
humanae scilicet, esse intelligitur." 
61 	 De iure pradae, p.9. 
62 !BP Prolegomena (§16): "Quod ergo dicitur non Carneaditantum, sed aliis, 
Utilitas justi prope mater et aequi, si accurate loquamur, verum non est; nam 
naturglis juris mater est ipsa humana natura, quae nos etiamsi re nulla 
indigeremus ad societatem mutuam appetendam ferret: civilis vero juris mater est 
ipsa ex concensu obligatio, quae cum ex naturali jure vim suam habeat, potest 
natura hujus quoque juris quasi proavia dici. Sed naturali juri utilitas accedit: 
voluit enim naturae auctor nos singulos infirmos esse, et multarum rerum ad 
vitam recte ducundam egentes, quo magis ad collendam societatem raperemur." 
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organized social life for its own sake, regardless of its necessity for 
one's survival and material well-being. 
To sum up: in De iure belli ac pacis Grotius grounded the normative 
character of natural law on the classical teleological idea that what is 
natural for human beings are not only those features which every 
member of the human species receive by birth, but also a way of living 
which is based on those rational and social abilities which dist-
inguishes them from other animals. Unlike Aristotle and his followers, 
Grotius did not think that reason recommends for human beings some 
specified way of living (say, a life of contemplation). In his eyes, there 
are numerous life-forms which are equally agreeable with reason. 
However, what always characterizes a rational human being is a desire 
to live in a peaceful and ordered society with other members of one's 
species. Therefore, human reason understands — even without the idea 
of God — that a person who acts in a way which is destructive of 
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peaceful social life does not behave in accordance with human nature 
and does, therefore, something wrong and morally blameworthy. 
It is now possible to see why Pufendorf rejects (and hardly 
comprehends) Grotius' account of the moral character of natural law. 
Pufendorf agrees with Grotius in so far as it is rational to live in 
society with other human beings and to behave towards them in a way 
which does not endanger the tranquility of social relations. He also 
agrees that rationally organized social life is something which 
distinguishes human beings radically from other animals. What he 
does not share, on the other hand, is the idea that the foregoing could 
serve as the basis for thinking that to live a rationally ordered social 
life is somehow natural for human beings. In Pufendorf's eyes human 
beings can be called social creatures only in the sense that they are 
able both to help and violate each other more than any other animal 63 
Moreover, if there is something which can be called natural in the 
behaviour of human beings, it is their uniquely strong tendency to hurt 
each other.M Therefore, the mere fact that rational social life is 
something peculiar to human beings cannot as such be the basis for 
the moral idea that human beings ought to cultivate peaceful sociality. 
In order to reach this conclusion the faculty of reason requires, in 
Pufendorf's opinion, the further premise that there is a God who has 
given human beings their special intellectual and social abilities in 
order that they should use them. 
63 	 JNG 1684 II.3.16: "Nam etiam ideo animal sociabile hominem diximus, quod 
homines mutua commoda, magis quam ullum aliorum animantium, promovere 
idonei sint; sicuti contra nullum animal plus incommodi ab homine experiri 
potest, qaum ipse homo." 
64 	 JNG II.1.6. 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
CONSEQUENTIALISM 
Pufendorf's non-purposeful conception of nature and his idea of 
human nature as corrupt make understandable his disagreement with 
Grotius. They do not, however, explain why he also rejects the 
possibility that human reason could discover moral qualities in human 
behaviour by contemplating its consequences on human well-being 
and happiness. After all, Pufendorf not only holds that in all their 
behaviour human beings seek what they see as good for themselves 65 
He also emphasizes repeatedly that to observe the rules of sociality is 
beneficial for the well-being and happiness of human beings, while 
disobeying these rules is harmful to these ends. It can be wondered, 
therefore, why Pufendorf insists that the non-moral good and bad (or 
natural good and bad as he calls it) following from the observance or 	 119 
violation of the rules of sociality cannot serve as the basis for moral 
evaluations. In what follows, I will first examine Pufendorf's remarks 
concerning the utility of natural law and then suggest a possible 
explanation for his non-consequentialist position. 
The idea that observing natural law is always the best way to 
advance one's well-being is not so clearly expressed in the first edition 
of De jure naturae et gentium, where Pufendorf speaks mainly of the 
disadvantages which would follow if all human beings neglected the 
rules of sociality.66  This leaves open the possibility that in the present 
reality, where the rules of sociality are generally observed, individual 
well-being is sometimes better served by violating them. However, in 
the second version of the work Pufendorf makes it clear that this is not 
the case: 
The actions prescribed by natural law have through the 
determination of the first cause an inherent power to produce an 
effect good and advantageous to human beings, while actions 
forbidden produce the contrary effect.67 
By this Pufendorf means not only that actions which are in conformity 
with the rules of sociality are advantageous for the human species in 
general but also that they are beneficial for the individual who 
65 	 JNG II.3.14. 
66 	 JNG II.3.10. II.3.16. 
67 	 JNG 1684 I.2.6: "Nam alias actiones lege naturali praeceptae ex determination 
primae causae nativam habent vim bonum et hominibus proficuum effectum 
producendi, sicut actiones vetitae contrarium." 
commits them. Actions in accordance with the rules of sociality 
"procure some advantage and reward for a man, and contribute to his 
happiness," while actions repugnant to these rules "may at times return 
some utility, and more often some pleasure, which however never 
endures for long, and is followed by a throng of much greater ills"68 
Thus, "in the last analysis human actions which fall under the 
direction of the-law of nature can be reduced to the natural power they 
possess to cause advantages or harm to men, considered either as 
individuals or in general."69  
This almost causal relationship between the acts which agree with 
the rules of sociality and the promotion of personal well-being is 
somewhat qualified in the discussion of natural sanctions which 
Pufendorf added to the second edition of De jure naturae et gentium. 
Here he admits that those who claim that "many are returned for their 
benefactions only hatred, envy, and other ills, while others enjoy 
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without punishment the fruits of their evil deeds" are not totally 
mistaken 70 It is true, Pufendorf agrees, that morally good deeds "do 
not secure everything that they were by nature fitted to secure." 
Correspondingly, the natural effects of evil acts "are sometimes 
interrupted and the crimes of some men turn to their profit."71  
The explanation Pufendorf gives to this phenomenon is that the life 
of human beings is affected not only by the advantages and burdens 
which God has ordered to follow by natural consequences from the 
observance or violation of the rules of sociality (natural sanctions) but 
also by benefits and hardships which people receive from God or other 
human beings regardless of their own merits or faults.72 Pufendorf 
68 	 JNG 1684 II.3.10: "Habent quippe hoc actiones legi naturali congruentes, ut non 
solum honestae sint, i.e. quae ad honorem, existimationem et diginatem hominis 
concervandam et augendam faciant, sed utiles, eadem existant, seu quae 
commodum aliquod et emolementum homini concilient, et ad felicitatem ipsius 
conferat. ... Sed quae actiones legi naturali repugnant, semper quidem turpes sunt, 
aliquando tarnen utilitatis quid saepius jucunditatis producere videntur, sed quae 
neque ad diuturnitatem valet, quam longe majorum moles malurom a tergo 
sequitur." 
69 	 JNG 1684 1.2.6: "Unde actionum humanarum, de quibus lege naturali disponitur, 
ultima resolutio fieri potest in vires earundem naturales ad commodum aut noxam 
hominibus, sigillatim aut conjunctim spectatis, conciliandam." 
70 	 JNG 1684 11.3 .21: "Quanquam autem haec praemia, et mala quibusdam idea 
parum certo ex actionibus bonis atque malis provenire dicantur, quod multis pro 
benefactis odium, invidia, et alia mala reponantur, alii contra scelerum suorum 
fructu, impune gaudeant." 
71 	 JNG 1684 II.3.21: "Ac licet non semper omnia illa bona consequantur, quae alias 
per rerum naturam consequi idonea erant." "... , praesertim postqum 
animadvertitur, effectus malatom actionum naturales quandoque intercipi, et 
quibusdam scelera sua ex parte lucro cedere." 
72 	 JNG 1684 1I.3.21: "Ac bonorum quidem alia ex liberali donatione Creatoris, aut 
ultronea aliorum hominum benevolentia proficiscuntur, aut etiam per industriam 
insists, however, that while these undeserved advantages and 
misfortunes make the outcome of morally good and bad actions less 
certain, they do not abolish the utility of natural law. 
In the first place, this uncertainty concerns only those external 
advantages and drawbacks which are dependent on the manner in 
which others behave towards us. Natural rewards include, however, 
not only "innumerable advantages which can be attained by the good-
will of other people and the mutual exchange of services", but also "a 
serene and secure conscience" plus "a well-ordered and calm soul". 
Similarly, among the natural punishments there are not only the 
"countless evils which arise from the provoked violence of other men, 
and the withdrawal of their aid", but also "the uneasiness of 
conscience" and "the distress and corruption of the soul".73  Unlike 
external sanctions, these inner rewards and punishments are free from 
the disturbing effects of the undeserved advantages and drawbacks. 
Although the realization of external rewards is always uncertain, "the 
fruit" that our morally good deeds produce "within ourselves is never 
subject to interruption."74 
The foregoing seems to open up the possibility that the utility of 
natural law is ultimately dependent on the existence of morality and 
religion as social institutions. For conscience is not, according to 
Pufendorf, an inborn human disposition. It is an awareness of the 
moral law which human beings internalize in the process of 
socialization.75 Its force to generate mental tranquility or discomfort 
follows from the assurance that God shall punish, in one way or 
another, those who disobey his commands, even if they happen to 
hominis, ad quam is libere et ultro sese determinavit, adquiruntur. Quae legum 
observantiae non deberi adparet. Alia autem ex actione legibus pracepta per 
naturalem consecutionem promanant dum Creator certo actui legibus congruo 
perpertuum et naturalem effectum, bono hominis cedentem, assignavit. ... Sic 
malorum alia ipsam naturam hominis, et conditionem sequuntur, abstrahendo 
unde ea conditio primitus orta sit, aut citra peculiarem culpam ejus, cui 
incumbunt, contingerunt. ... Alia per naturalem consecutionem et connexionem ex 
peccatis proveniunt." 
73 JNG 1684 II.3.21: "Ac observantiam quidem legum naturalium comitatur 
serenitas et securitas conscientiae cum bona fiducia conjucnta, bona constituio et 
tranquilitas amini, conservatio corporis a multis malis non fatalibus, ac infinita 
commoda. quae ex benevolentia et mutuis officiis aliorum hominum conciliari 
possunt. ... Contra ex violatione ejusdem legis per naturalem connexionem oritur 
inquietudo conscientiae, perturbatio et corruptio animi, destructio corporis, ac 
infinita mala, quae ab irritata violentia aliorum hominum, et a subtractione auxilii 
eorundem provenire possunt." 
74 	 JNG 1684 II.3.21: "...; adeoque infallibiciter non praesciatur pro meritis nostris 
paria nobis ab albs hominibus repositum iri, (nam qui in nobismetipsi producitur 
fructus, nunquam intercipitur)." 
75 	 JNG I.3.4; II.3.13. 
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avoid all human penalties. Consequently, if human beings were 
unaware of God and his commands, they would have no pains of 
conscience.76 This means that the only part of natural sanctions which 
is unaffected by undeserved benefits and hardships is dependent on the 
fact that human beings have already internalized the rules of sociality 
as commands of God. 
However, although Pufendorf holds that human beings ought to be 
brought up so that they find happiness as much as possible from the 
awareness that they are behaving in a morally correct manner,77 the 
utility of the rules of sociality does not rely on such a feature of 
human character. The greatest part of worldly happiness is still 
dependent on the goodwill and assistance received from other 
people 78 And the observance of the rules of sociality can be seen — 
despite the exceptions — as the most efficient way of achieving these 
ends. This is so, firstly, because the undeserved benefits and hardships 
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are something which cannot be acquired nor avoided by human 
foresight and endeavour. Thus, they cannot be taken into account 
when we estimate beforehand the consequences of human acts.79 
Second, although the observance of the rules of sociality does not 
ensure the goodwill and assistance of other people with absolute 
certainty, it still does this with great probability. Consequently, it is 
most likely that such behaviour brings more benefits than the violation 
of these rules.80 
Pufendorf maintains, thus, that observing the rules of sociality is 
advantageous both for the human species in general and for the 
happiness of the individual who behaves in such a manner, while 
disobeying these rules is ultimately unprofitable for these ends, at least 
in all probability. For a modern reader this seems like a good starting 
point for a consequentialist theory of morality. Is there, then, some 
special reason which makes Pufendorf deny the possibility that this 
76 	 OHC I.4.9. 
77 	 JNG 1684 II.4.9. 
78 	 JNG 1684 II.3.16: "Cum enim nostra incolumitas et felicitas magnam partem a 
benevolentia et auxiolio aliorum debendeat, ... " 
79 JNG 1684 II.3.21: `Bene tarnen observandum, heic ubi de naturali effectu 
actionum bonarum ac malarom agitur, non attendi illa bona et mala, quae supra ad 
primam classem referebamus, et quae consilio et industria nostra vel non possunt 
adquiri, vel non possunt evitari." 
80 	 JNG 1688 II.3.21: "...; adeoque infallibiter non praesiatur pro meritis nostris paria 
nobis ab aliis hominibus repositum iri, ... id tarnen certum est, ex bonis et justis 
actionibus commoda tanta cum certitudine sequi, quanta ex oppositis vitiis cum 
ratione sperare non possumus. Ac licet non semper omnia illa bona consequantur, 
quae alias per rerum naturan consequi idonea erant; evidens tarnen probabilitas 
est, illorum non pauca secutura, aut saltem plura, quam ex malis actionibus 
sperari possunt." 
utility of natural law could serve as the foundation for its normative 
character? The only explicit statement Pufendorf gives on this issue is 
the following passage in JNG II.3.20: 
If these dictates of reason [the rules of sociality] are to have the 
force of law, there is need for a higher principle; for although their 
utility is most manifest, still it alone does not set such a bond to 
men's souls that they could not deviate from it if their desires 
arouse them to neglect this utility or if they consider that they can 
take care of their own utility more effectively by some other 
means.81  
Richard Tuck has suggested that Pufendorf's position is based here on 
the observation "that men can often act quite knowingly against their 
own interests".S2 It seems to me, however, that what Pufendorf 
maintains is that human beings often genuinely believe that their 
personal well-being is better served by disobeying the rules of 
sociality. He mentions two reasons for this. First, people erroneously 
believe that the benefits which in reality follow most likely from the 
observance of the rules of sociality can be achieved more effectively 
by violating these rules. Second, people disregard the benefits which 
are likely to follow from the observance of the rules sociality, because 
they find some other things more desirable. 
The latter observation is, I think, the key to Pufendorf's position on 
the issue we are dealing with, and I will return to it shortly. Before 
doing so it must be noted that the point Pufendorf makes in the 
passage cited above is that a mere understanding of the advantages 
which follow from the observance of rules of sociality cannot be the 
reason why these rules are regarded as morally obligating by people 
who believe that violating these rules is sometimes advantageous for 
their personal well-being. However, Pufendorf holds that what is truly 
beneficial for human beings is in no way dependent on their erroneous 
or changeable opinions but depends "on the nature of things".83 This 
81 	 JNG II.3.20: "Enimvero ut isthaec rationis dictamina vim legis obtineant, 
sublimiori principio opus est. Quanquam enim eorum utilitas sit longe 
manifestissima; illa tarnen sola tarn firmum animis hominum indicere vinculum 
non valebat, quin ab istis discedi posset, si cum utilitatem earn negligere 
allubesceret, aut alis se via utilitati suae magis consulere posse arbitraretur." 
82 	 Tuck 1987, p.105. 
83 	 JNG 1684 I.4.4: "Quo intuiu natura boni consistere videtur in aptitudine illa, qua 
res quaepiam alten prodesse, eandem conservare, aut perficere idonea est. Et quia 
haecce aptitudo ab ipsa rerum natura, et nativa aut per industriam adaptata 
habilitate dependet; ideo isthoc bonum, quod naturale possumus vocare, firmum 
est atque uniforme, et nequam ab erroneis aut variis opinionibus hominum 
dependens." 
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leaves open the possibility that a correctly operating human reason 
discovers the normative character of the rules of sociality by 
contemplating their consequences to both general and individual 
happiness. But as we have seen, Pufendorf denies even this, 
maintaining that without the idea of a commanding God the faculty of 
reason could not find any morality whatsoever in human acts. 
What makes Pufendorf adopt such a position? No direct answer to 
this question can be found in his works. Pufendorf holds it self-evident 
that human reason recognizes the existence of God. Therefore, he is 
not interested in examining in more detail what reason would be able 
to say of human behaviour, if it were unaware of God. Nevertheless, a 
closer look at what Pufendorf has to say about the human desires and 
passions reveals a feature in his thinking which makes it at least easier 
to understand his strictly non-consequentialist position. 
Above we saw that Pufendorf emphasizes repeatedly that observing 
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the rules of sociality is the best way to advance one's personal well- 
being and happiness. This gives easily the impression that he sees the 
rules of sociality as a means of achieving something which all human 
beings seek by nature. In this case the violation of the rules of 
sociality would be a result either of a miscalculation concerning the 
means by which one can advance one's happiness or of some sudden, 
unintentional burst of passion which clouds all rational judgement. 
However, while Pufendorf obviously sees these two as important 
causes for immoral behaviour, several remarks in De jure naturae et 
gentium indicate that they are not the only ones, and that the 
conception of happiness on which Pufendorf bases the utility of 
natural law is actually normative and itself in need of justification. 
Already the passage in paragraph I1.3.20 which I cited above 
showed that Pufendorf does not think that the discrepancy human 
beings often see between the requirements of natural law and personal 
happiness is solely a miscalculation concerning the means. People feel 
a tension between their own desires and the rules of sociality also 
because their passions makes them feel that there are things which are 
more desirable than those benefits which they are likely to receive by 
observing these rules. The same idea can be found in JNG 11.3.10, 
when Pufendorf characterizes two conceptions of utility which govern 
human behaviour: 
One kind is what appears beneficial for a depraved judgment of 
badly composed passions, which center upon advantages that are 
for the most part immediate and fleeting, and is little concerned 
with the future. The other kind is judged to be beneficial by sound 
reason which not only examines what lies before its very feet, but 
also weighs what will happen in the future, and then regards that as 
really useful which will be so in general and for all time, because 
on no judgement can an enjoyment of a temporary advantage which 
will entail a long series of misfortunes be seen as desirable 84 
There are two things to notice in this passage. In the first place, 
although Pufendorf characterizes reason as a faculty which enables a 
human being to do "something more expeditiously and adroitly than a 
beast",85 he does not think that reason is destined to be solely an 
instrument in the service of human desires. Reason can also play a 
role in the formation of desires. When a rational human being 
estimates what is beneficial for him, he is principally concerned about 
his future life as a whole. Thus, his first question is what is useful "in 
general and for all time". In this respect, more important than any 
particular advantage is the permanent goodwill of other human beings 
and their willingness to take part in a mutual exchange of services.86 
Consequently, in each situation the rational person tries to act in a way 
which does not endanger the future goodwill and assistance of other 
people. This is something to which all other desires are subordinated. 
The other noteworthy aspect in the passage cited above is that to 
prefer long-term security over more immediate advantages and 
pleasures is by no means a natural human feature. There are people 
whose judgement of what is beneficial "center upon advantages that 
are for the most part immediate and fleeting". And it is especially 
important to note that the source of such judgment is not any 
fundamental inability to understand the possible consequences of 
one's actions, but rather "badly composed passions". 
Now, by passions Pufendorf means "motions of the soul" which 
become exited when a person observes some particular good or bad. 
Passions have the ability to turn the will towards the object in which 
this feature is observed and in this way to obscure the judgement of 
84 JNG II.3.10: "Aliud enim utile videtur affectuum male compositorum pravo 
judicio, qui praesentibus fere, ac cito transituris commodis imminent, de futuro 
parum soliciti. Aliud sana ratio utile judicat, quae non tantum ante pedes posita 
considerat, sed quid in futurum sit inde emersurum perpendit. Cui adeo id demum 
vere est utile, quod in universum tale est, et ad diutumitatem facit: nequaquam 
autem adpetendum judicatur, momentaneo commodo frui, quod magnum 
malorum agmen post sese est tracturum." 
85 	 JNG I.2.6: "Nam si consideremus rationem, quatenus non est imbuta cognitione et 
sensu legis, seu normae moralis, potest quidem ista fortasse homini suppeditare 
facultatem expeditius aut dexterius quid agendi quam brutum, viresque naturales 
per solertiam adjuvare." 
86 	 JNG 1684 II.3.16. See above p.65. 
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the intellect.87 Since every human being is by nature directed by self-
love, in one sense all human behaviour is governed by passions. In 
another sense human beings can, however, be divided into those who 
are governed by passions and those who follow reason. The difference 
is that as a result of proper education and exercise (and by the help of 
the Holy Spirit) some are able to tame their passions so that they never 
last too long or become too strong.88 Consequently, their passions do 
not disturb the rational orientation to always prefer behaviour which 
does not endanger the future goodwill and assistance of other people. 
If, however, passions are not properly cultivated, they take the lead 
in the behaviour of the individual and start to direct his preferences. 
This is what happens, according to Pufendorf, to the great majority of 
human beings. As a result of bad education and evil habits they 
"become deaf to the voice of reason" and "take their lust as reason".89 
This means that instead of seeking that which is truly useful "most 
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human beings are led by the violence of their passions wherever their 
lust or false conception of utility take them.."90 Moreover, they lack the 
rational orientation to be principally concerned about their future life 
as whole. Instead they "are usually stirred on by what strikes their 
senses, and do not care much for their future".91 And what is more, in 
their eyes happiness does not follow principally from those moderate 
advantages which can be achieved by the goodwill of other people and 
the mutual exchange of services, nor from the assurance that the 
benevolence and assistance of other people will last. On the contrary, 
badly educated people usually measure their happiness by things which 
"the most degenerated of men often possess in large quantities."92  In 
other words, they see their happiness as being dependent on things 
such as material wealth, power, sensual pleasure, and so on. 
These remarks make it possible to conceive a person who is so 
gripped by his passion for, say, wealth that the benefits which he can 
87 	 JNG I.4.7: "Nom parum quoque voluntatem versus certas actiones impellunt 
motus animi, objecta potissimum specie boni aut mali excitati, quos affectus 
vocant; praeterquam quod iidem non parum judicium intellectus obfuscant." 
88 JNG 1.4.7: "Sed primos fillos motus, quos philosophi comparant oculorum 
nictibus, ne aut durent diu aut invalescant, diligenti attentione et exercitationem, 
ante omnia vero Dei Spiritu obtineri solere." 
89 	 JNG VII.1.11: "Idque quia multitudo non ration, sed impetu vivit, ac libidinem 
pro ratione habet, educationis fere et consuetudinis vitio, qua vis rationis velut 
obsurdescit." 
90 	 JNG VII.1.10: "Plerique inconsulto affectuum impetu feruntur, quo libido, aut 
fallacis species utilitatis subegerit." 
91 	 JNG VII.1.11: "Tum quod magna pars mortalium praesentibus tantum imminet, 
futuri parum curiosa, ac illis fere movetur, quae in sensus incurrunt, ac sublimiora 
aegre adsurgat." 
92 	 JNG VII.1.11: "... , praesertim cum etiam improbissimis saepe affatim adsit, 
quibus vulgus felicitatem metiri suevit, ..." 
expect to receive by the mere mutual exchange of services appears to 
him to be quite insubstantial. Such a person can be perfectly aware that 
if he seeks prosperity by violating the rules of sociality, he faces the 
risk of losing even that material well-being he now possess. 
Nevertheless, since he feels that both his present state and the benefits 
he can expect from the mutual exchange of services do not bring any 
real happiness, he is ready to endanger them, if he thinks that there is a 
chance to win some really gratifying advantages by violating the rules 
of sociality. For such a person acting against the rules of sociality is, 
thus, a perfectly rational means for achieving what he really wants. 
The foregoing seems to indicate that the happiness which is most 
effectively achieved by observing the rules of sociality is not 
something which all human beings naturally seek. Against this one 
could point out that human beings do not, according to Pufendorf, 
only seek what they think is good for themselves. They also have a 
strong inclination to self-preservation and try to protect themselves by 
all possible means. Therefore, even a person who otherwise disregards 
the advantages which can be achieved by observing the rules of 
sociality still sees death as the greatest of all evils and wants to avoid it 
at any cost. And since one always takes better care of one's personal 
security by observing the rules of sociality than by disobeying them, a 
person who violates these rules acts against his principal interests, no 
matter what conception of happiness he happens to have. 
However, when Pufendorf says that human beings try to protect 
themselves by all possible means he is not maintaining that self-
preservation is some kind of summum bonum to which all other 
human desires are totally subordinated. All he claims is that human 
beings are most concerned about their survival, and that when their 
feel their physical safety concretely threatened, they usually attempt 
to defend themselves in every conceivable way.93 This natural 
inclination does not make them unable to endanger their own lives 
quite knowingly in order to reach something which they strongly 
desire. On the contrary, people can learn to tame their fear of death 
and become, for example, able to risk or even sacrifice their lives in 
order to save other human beings because they value the glory which 
follows from such behaviour.94 Correspondingly, there are people who 
93 	 OHC I.3.2. 
94 JNG II.3.14: "Sed multos pro aliis sat aequo animo mortem oppetiisse constat, 
quos peculiari affectu prosequuti sunt, auf quibus sese penitus devoverunt. 
Quibuscum ita sese junctos atque unitos intelligunt, tanquam minorem partem 
totius eoque se malunt perdere, ut alterum tanquam majorem partem conservent. 
Verum talibus janctantia fidel et affectus, atque finde orta gloria ante omnia 
habetur, quaeque adeo ipsa vita bene emi judicatur." 
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can quite knowingly endanger their lives in order to satisfy their 
passion for power or wealth.95  
The foregoing makes possible the following interpretation: Despite 
his forceful rhetoric on this issue, Pufendorf does not see the rules of 
sociality as a necessary means for achieving something which all 
human beings seek by nature. To observe always these rules is a 
necessary constituent in the search for happiness only for those whose 
passions are formed so that they do not disturb their faculty of reason. 
For those whose desires are governed by passions the relationship 
between the rules of sociality and the pursuit of personal happiness is 
never so absolute. And there are some for whom to risk the benefits 
following from the goodwill of other human being and the mutual 
exchange of services can seem as the only means to achieve those 
things which really make life worth living. In other words, Pufendorf 
holds that all human beings seek happiness, but admits that there is no 
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consensus concerning the content of happiness. On the contrary, the 
happiness of those who follow reason can be incompatible with the 
happiness of those whose desires are governed by passions. This, of 
course, would not prevent Pufendorf from holding a consequentialist 
moral theory, if he only accepted the classical idea that human beings 
are animals meant to follow reason. However, since he does not share 
the purposeful conception of nature that lies behind such a view, he 
does not see how any observation of human features and abilities as 
such could lead reason to the conclusion that the desires of a human 
being ought to be governed by reason rather than passions. Therefore, 
human reason unaware of God is at most able to think that the desires 
of a person who knowingly risks his future well-being in the hope of, 
say, increasing his wealth, are governed by passions. What it cannot 
discern is that this person has done something wrong. And in 
Pufendorf's eyes the only possibility to reach this conclusion is to 
assume that there is a God who has forbidden human beings to do so. 
95 	 OHC I.4.9. This is one of the reasons why a stable civil life necessarily requires a 
collectively shared belief in punishment after death. See below p.169. 
Part Four 
Natural Law as a Social 
Phenomenon 
So far I have dealt mainly with Pufendorf's theoretical understanding 
of natural law. Now I will turn to his views concerning the manner in 
which natural law in practice achieves the end for which it has been 
imposed: the maintenance of peaceful social order. Here it must be 
first of all noted that as a social phenomenon natural law owes very 
little to the principles which govern the scientific understanding of this 
law. Pufendorf holds it obvious that only a few exceptionally 
intelligent people are able to reflect independently on how the 
individual precepts of natural law can be derived from the first 
unquestionable principles. And even though people with average 
intellectual abilities are able to understand such demonstrations when 
these are presented to them,' this requires that their minds have been 
"disciplined in the different sciences. "2  Since such higher education is 
a privilege of a chosen few, it is evident that "most men do not know 
or understand how the precepts of natural law are properly 
demonstrated. "3  However, Pufendorf's works also include a number of 
remarks concerning the manner in which the great majority of human 
beings adopt natural law as their moral standards and the factors 
which motivate them to obey these rules to the extent that an ordered 
1 	 JNG II.3.13: "Caeterum quanquam non cujusvis sit, legem naturalem artificiosa 
deductione ex principio suo eruere; ut tarnen omnibis hominibus, usu rations 
gaudentibus, illa cognita dici possit, sufficit, quod saltem mediocria ingenia earn 
demonstrationem sibi ab aliis propositam capere, et ejusdem veritatem, collata 
naturae suae conditione, liquido perspicere queant." 
2 	 JNG I.3.5: ".., quae a primis principiis longius distant, quaeque adeo operosiore 
deductione indigent; qualem comprehendere est fere supra captum eorum, qui 
scientiis variis animum non habent subactum." 
3 	 JNG II.3.13: "Neque obstat, quod qua ratione praecepta legis naturalis artificiose 
demonstrarentur, a plurimis ignorentur, aut non capiatur." 
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social life becomes possible. In what follows I will reconstruct, on the 
basis of these often disconnected remarks, Pufendorf's account of the 
average moral agent. 
THE AWARENESS OF NATURAL LAW 
In the seventeenth century most scholars supported the idea that an 
awareness of the central moral principles is somehow natural for 
human beings. This idea can be found not only in the followers of the 
traditional schools of moral philosophy but also in Grotius, who in 
Mare Liberum remarked that natural law can be discovered easily, 
because it is implanted in every human mind .4 By statements like 
these writers sometimes meant that people become aware of these 
central moral precepts automatically once they reach a certain stage of 
maturity. More often, however, the idea was that human beings have 
an inherent disposition to adopt correct moral principles. That this 
actually happens requires also proper education and even 
ratiocination. Nevertheless, the disposition to adopt the right views 
exists prior to and independently of such factors.5  
Such ideas of natural moral consciousness were challenged during 
the seventeenth century in the works of a number of "modem" 
philosophers. Today the best known of these is undoubtedly the attack 
John Locke directed against innate moral ideas in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. Locke presented the mind of a 
human infant as a tabula rasa with no inclinations to adopt certain 
moral views rather than others, and maintained that moral opinions are 
usually determined by education, custom, and fashion.6 The same 
basic idea was familiar to Pufendorf through Hobbes, who in 
Leviathan described the mind of the common people as a clean paper 
on which those who manage to attain an authoritative position are able 
to write whatever opinions they like.? 
What is Pufendorf's stand in the debate concerning the origin of 
moral consciousness? In so far as innate moral ideas are concerned, 
his position is quite clear: 
4 	 Mare liberum, p.5: "Lex illa e cuius praescripto iudicandum est, inventu est non 
difficilis, utpote eadem apud omnes; et facilis intellectu, utpote nata cum singulis, 
singulorum mentibus insita." 
5 	 On seventeenth century discussion concerning innate moral principles, see Tully 
1993, pp.185-188 and Colman 1983, pp.51-76. 
6 	 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding I.2. See Tully 1993, pp.183-201. 
7 	 Leviathan ch.30, p.233. 
... we do not feel obliged to maintain that the general principles of 
natural law come into and are imprinted in the minds of men at 
their birth as distinct and clear rules which can be formulated by 
man without further information or contemplation as soon as he 
acquires the power of speech.8  
Pufendorf also remarks that the ease by which children and 
uneducated common people usually distinguish right from wrong 
follows from habit (assuetudo) created by the fact that "from the 
earliest days, and as soon they show some use of reason, they have 
seen good deeds approved and rewarded and evil ones reproved and 
punished."9 This seems to indicate that he also rejects the dispositional 
theory. However, Pufendorf is clearly reluctant to assert that moral 
opinions would be totally determined by education or prevailing 
customs. In JNG 1.3.3 he declares that the human faculty of 
understanding and judgement has "an inherent natural rectitude, which 
does not allow us to be misled in moral questions, if proper attention 
is paid to them "I0 He especially emphasizes that he is not speaking 
here of theoretical truths, "which require for their investigation the 
most subtle resources of mind", but of the powers of understanding in 
so far as they are needed to adapt our actions to natural law)! 1 On this 
issue he holds that 
... no man of mature years, and possessed of reason, is too dull to 
comprehend at least the general precepts of natural law, especially 
those which are most commonly kept by society, and observe to 
what extent they accord with the rational and social nature of man. 
.... For these general precepts have been so fully set forth, and so 
interwoven with nature, that man can never descend so nearly to the 
level of brute beasts as to be incapable of understanding and 
8 	 JNG II.3.13: "Quam ad rem tarnen vix necessarium arbitramur praefracte 
contendere, animis hominum ab ipsa nativitate congenita, et velut impressa esse 
juris naturalis saltem generalia praecepta, ad modum distinctarum, et actualium 
propositionum, quae statim atque usus sermonis accesserit, citra ultiorem 
informationem aut meditita nem abs homine possint exprimi." 
9 	 JNG I1.3.13: "Sic quod etiam in pueris, et rudi vulgo magna deprehenditur 
facilitas aequum ab iniquo discemendi, id ex adsuetudine provenit: dum a teneris 
annis, et statim atque usum aliquem rationis exserunt, vident bona probari, mala 
improbari, et illa laudem, haec poenam sequi." 
10 	 JNG I.3.3: " ... ; pro certo statuendum est, in ipsa facultatem adprehensiva, et in 
judicio naturalem inesse rectitudinem, quae, debita adhibita attentione nos decipi 
circa res morales non patiatur." 
11 	 JNG 1.3.3: "Neque de eo sumus soliciti, an quis circa veritates theoreticas, subtili 
mentis indagine investigandas per pravam informationem falsam opinionem ita 
possit imbibere; ut ea se exvolvere nulla ratione queat. Sed agimus de viribus 
intellectus, prout illis opus est ad actiones legi naturae rite attemperandas." 
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judging between them. No outstanding mental ability is required 
for this, nor any special intellectual acumen, but the ordinary light 
of one's native reason is sufficient, provided the mind is not 
affected by some disorder.l2 
This could be understood so that even though human beings do not 
have any inherent moral consciousness, as soon as they become able 
to use their natural intellectual abilities they discover the central 
precepts of natural law and understand how these agree with human 
nature. It must be noted, however, that in JNG I.3.3 Pufendorf is not 
discussing the manner in which human beings in reality adopt and 
hold their moral convictions. His purpose is to show why all normal 
adults can be regarded as morally responsible for their actions. What 
worries Pufendorf is that if common people were unable to understand 
how natural law requires them to behave, they could not be held 
responsible for violating it: 
Of course a mistake could not be ascribed to us as a fault, if we had 
not the ability to distinguish clearly between right and wrong. And 
it would be the greatest injustice to charge us with an error which 
we could in no way have avoided.13 
It is in order to abolish this possibility that Pufendorf introduces the 
idea of the natural correctness of practical reason: 
If we do not wish to destroy all morality in actions, we must at any 
hazard maintain that the understanding of man is by nature sound, 
and that upon sufficient inquiry it apprehends clearly, and as they 
actually are, the objects which present themselves to it. And further, 
that the practical judgement, at least as it concerns the general 
precepts of natural law, cannot be so corrupted that it may not be 
held responsible for any evil actions that come from it, on the 
grounds that they proceed from an in superable error or ignorance. 
12 	 JNG I.3.3: "Ubi arbitramur nullum hominem aete matura, et rationis compotem 
tam hebetem esse, quin comprehendere queat saltem generalia juris naturalis 
praecepta, et quae in vita communi frequentissimum usum habent, quamque illa 
cum hominis natura rationali et sociali habeant convenientiam perspicere. 	 Ita 
enim ista sunt exposita, ita penitus naturae insita, ut nunquam eousque 
obbrutesceret possit homo, quin ad ista adprehendenda, ad dijudicandi sit adhuc 
idoneus. Quippe cum ad hoc non requiratur eximia quaedam ingeniis vis, aut 
peculiaris rationis solertia, sed sufficiat qualecunque nativae rationis lumen; modo 
morbo mens sit oppressa." 
13 	 JNG I.3.3: "Nec vitin nobis veni posset, quod male egerimus, si bonum et malum 
liquido discemere non datum; et non nisi per summan iniquitatem imputaveris 
errorem, quem exuisse nunquam licuit." 
... And however much a man may have failed to through indolence 
to mediate one or the other precept, or through haste and boldness 
have reached a false decision of action, or due to false information, 
or else by mind corrupted by evil habits and a vicious life, have 
brought doubt upon their truth and necessity, or have fashioned for 
his own rules of action contrary to natural law, still we do not 
acknowledge such ignorance or error to be so insuperable that 
actions based upon it cannot be imputed to the doer of the same.ta 
Pufendorf's main concern here is that unless we assume that all 
normal adults have an ability to recognize the central precepts of 
natural law, it would not be possible for human legal institutions to 
function. This worry is expressed most clearly in the corresponding 
passage in De officio hominis et civis: 
Concerning the faculty of comprehension and judgement called 
intellect, it must be taken as certain that any adult of sound reason 
has natural light enough to enable him, with cultivation and proper 
reflection, to achieve adequate comprehension of at least the 
general precepts and principles which make for a good and peaceful 
life in this world; and to recognize their conformity with human 
nature. If this is not granted, at least in the court of man, men could 
hide their wrongdoing behind a plea of invincible ignorance, since 
no one can be condemned in the court of man for violating a rule 
which is beyond his capacity to understand.15 
14 JNG I.3.3: "Ergo nisi omnem actionum moralitatem velimus evertere, omnio 
tenendum est, intellectum hominis naturaliter esse rectum, et praemissa debita 
inquisione res objectas liquido, et prout in se sunt, adprehendere. Quin nec 
judicium practicum, saltem circa generalia praecepta juris naturalis, ita posse 
depravari, ut quae inde suscipiuntur actiones pravea, ipsi nequeant imputari, velut 
ex invincibili errore aut ignorantia profectae. ... Et ut maxime quis per socordiam 
de uno atque altero praecepto nunquam cogitaverit, aut per praecipitantiam et 
temeritatem falsas de agendis opiniones conceperit, aut ex prava informatione, vel 
con-upto per vitiosam assuetudinem, pravosque affectus animo, veritatem et 
necessitatem eorundem in dubium revocaverit, aut contrarias legi naturali agendi 
regulas sibi finxerit: istam tarnen ignorantiam, aut errorem hautquidquam 
arbitramur invicibilem, quique adeo efficiat, ut inde susceptae actiones non 
possint imputari." 
15 OHC I.1.4: "Circa facultatem ergo comprehendi et dijudigandi res, quae 
intellectus vocabulo venit, id ante omnia pro certo habendum est: cuilibet homini 
matura aete et mente integra tantum superesse naturalis velut luminis, ut adhibita 
cultura, ac debita meditatione possit recte comprehendere saltem generalia illa 
praecepta et principia, quae ad vitam hancce honeste et traquille exigendam 
faciunt; simulque judicare, ista utique indoli humane congruere. Hoc enim nisi 
saltem intra sphaeram fori humani admittatur, quibuvis suis delictis homines 
ignorantiam invicibilem obtendere possent: cum nemo in foro humano argui 
possit violasse regulam, quam capere supra ipsius vires est." 
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In other words, the natural correctness of practical judgement is, so to 
say, a necessary postulate of jurisprudential reason. In the passage 
quoted above Pufendorf does not deny the possibility that people 
sometimes violate the central rules of sociality because of some 
impenetrable ignorance and that their deeds are, therefore, excusable 
in the eyes of God. He insists, however, that such a possibility cannot 
be taken into consideration in human affairs. 
It should be noted that while Pufendorf maintains that all normal 
adults must be seen as capable of discovering the central principles of 
natural law, he thinks that this faculty gives common people no rights 
to evaluate prevailing laws and customs. Pufendorf mentions three 
things which ought to make the unschooled, who learn natural law 
from "popular information", feel secure with the conventional moral 
views: 1) the authority of their superiors, 2) the fact that they can find 
no probable reasons to suspect the validity of these rules, and 3) the 
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daily observable utility of these precepts.16 Of these, the latter two 
seem to leave some room for independent reflection. However, even if 
a person happens to find a reason to doubt some prevailing custom, he 
is not allowed to present this doubt in public, unless he is able to give 
demonstrative proofs of his own position. To challenge some generally 
accepted moral view without an argumentation of this calibre is a sign 
of great impudence,17 a feature Pufendorf in another connection calls 
— citing Euripides — "the worst of all plagues infecting the human 
race."18 And since only a small well-educated minority is able to take 
part in the scientific discourse on morality, there is no alternative left 
for the uneducated but to accept uncritically the prevailing laws and 
customs. 
The natural correctness of practical reason not only fails to make 
common people competent members in moral discourse. It also has 
scarcely anything to do with the manner in which people in reality 
adopt their moral convictions. For the judgement of practical reason is 
necessarily correct only on the condition that one pays sufficient 
attention to the issue.19 This, in turn, is something most people fail to 
16 	 JNG II.3.13: "Vulgo autem, quod legem naturae ex populari informatione, usuque 
publico haurire solet, ad ejusdam certitudene satis esse debet autoritas 
superiorum, qui iliud in civitatibus exerceri curant; et quod ipsi rationes 
probabiles desint, quibus ejusdem veritas labefactari, aut convelli possit; et quod 
praesenten ipsius utilitatem quotidie deprehendit." 
17 	 JNG 1684 II.3.13: "Qui autem per ingenii hebetudinem demonstrationum nectere 
ignorat, valde impudens est, si sui cerebri dictas, quatenus a receptis sententiis 
abeunt, aliquid tribuendum postulaverit." 
18 	 JNG VI.1.31. 
19 	 JNG I.3.2-3. 
do. Pufendorf holds that people do not usually bother to use their own 
reason in moral issues at all, but accept blindly the prevailing 
opinions.20 Behind this uncritical attitude is the fact that people are 
from early childhood on habituated to observe the laws and customs of 
their society. When they get used to govern their daily life according 
to the prevailing norms, "their minds become so moulded that it 
occurs to very few of them to question whether things could be done 
in any other way."2t Pufendorf compares common people in this 
respect to artisans who learn their tools and working methods by 
imitating elder masters and leave it to scientists to prove the physical 
principles behind their art. In the same way the habits formed in 
childhood, the example of social life, and the infallible authority 
usually attached to teachers makes most people so assured of the 
validity of the prevailing moral views that they find it totally useless to 
examine them more carefully.22 
The foregoing is true even in the case where the prevailing customs 
are not completely in accordance with natural law. When a person is 
taught from infancy on to accept some opinion, this has so powerful 
an effect on his mind that even if the opinion happens to be a 
fallacious one, "the thought of questioning it scarcely ever occurs to 
him, at least if he has no more intelligence than common people in 
general."23  Understandably, Pufendorf feels a little uneasy about this 
fact and is hasty to add that we must not "attribute such strength to 
habit that it is capable of distorting and weakening the judgement of 
reason so much as to make it incapable of apprehending the truth 
concerning natural law."24 But as we have seen, the purpose of such 
remarks is to explain why people can be held responsible for their 
20 JNG 1684 II.3.7: "Praeterae in isto consensu per se parum momenti esse, 
argumento est hoc, quod plures sint stulti, quam sapientes, et pauci investigatis 
ipsarum rerum fundamentis opiniones suas conceperint: plerique caeco assensu 
citra proprium judicium atque scrutinium alios praeeuntes secuti sint." 
21 	 JNG II.3.13: "Quorum quotidianum exercitium, et totius vitae communis 
compages ad istum modum digesta, ita animos disponit, ut paucis dubitare 
succurrat, an aliter ista fieri possint." 
22 JNG I.3.5: "Plurimos vitae communis tenor, et docentium, extra fraudis 
suspicionem positorum, autoritas, et ipsa adsuetudo, et manifestus actionum decor 
aut usus ita securos reddit, ut talium rationes curiosius inquirere supervacuum 
putent. Quemadmodum magna pars artificum ad compendiosa quedam 
instrumenta opera fuexegisse satis habet; artificiosa eorundem demostratione 
mathematicis relicta." 
23 	 JNG II.3.9: "Quin tantam vim habet ab infantia alicui opinioni esse innutritum, ut 
licet illa falsa sit, vix unquam tarnen de eadem dubitare in mentem veniat iis 
saltem, queis intra vulgarem sortem est ingenii perspicacia." 
24 JNG II.3.9: "Etsi hautquidquam adsuetudini eas vires atribuamus, ut rationis 
judicium eousque detorquere ac depravare queat, quo ipsi impossibile sit 
veritatem circa leges naturales perspicere." 
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behaviour irrespective of their cultural background, not to assert that 
they actually use their reason in order to reflect critically on the 
prevailing customs. In practice, the tendency to follow the example of 
other members of one's community is so powerful that only a few 
bother to think whether there is something wrong in the prevailing 
customs. Thus, when Pufendorf discusses those ancient nations among 
whom brigandage was an accepted way to acquire property and make 
a living, he does not maintain that all members of these nations knew 
in their hearts that this practice was wrong. All he claims is that there 
were some people "human enough" to realize that such behaviour was 
against natural law.25 In other words, while there may always be 
exceptional individuals who reflect on the generally practiced customs 
and discover their possible disagreement with natural law, the majority 
adopts the prevailing views without the slightest hesitation. 
Early indoctrination to prevailing customs does not only generate 
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the tendency to accept uncritically the prevailing customs. It is also the 
source of two widespread misconceptions concerning the character of 
morality, which are held not only by many common people but by 
several distinguished philosophers as well. The first of these is the 
idea that the awareness of central moral principles is innate in human 
beings. The reason for this belief is the fact that people are unable to 
remember how they first adopted their moral views. Therefore, they 
easily come to think that the awareness of them is somehow 
inherent.26 The same childhood experiences also generate the 
erroneous belief that there are acts which are morally good or wicked 
in themselves, prior to any imposition. When small children are taught 
to curse vicious acts, this condemnation achieves in their minds "the 
force of a natural passion." As a result, only a few adults come to think 
of distinguishing between the physical and moral elements in human 
behaviour.27 
The last mentioned remark is interesting, because it indicates a 
significant difference between the philosophical understanding of 
morality and morality as a social phenomenon. As we have seen 
25 	 JNG II.2.10. 
26 	 OHC I.3.12: "Inde cum a puero ex vitae civilis disciplina eorundem sensu 
imbuamur, et vero recordari non possimus id tempus, quando primum eadem 
hauserimus, non aliter de ea cognitionem cogitamus, ac si illa nobis nascentibus 
jam adfuisset. Id quod cuilibet etiam circa liguam ipsa vemaculam contingit." 
27 	 JNG I.2.6: "Quodautem multi naturalem istam indifferentiam aegre concipere 
queant, inde est, quod a teneris istorum vitiorum detestatio nobis fuit inculcata; 
quae opinio simplici adhuc menti impressa, in vim naturalis cuijusdam affcetus 
videtur invaluisse; adeoque efficit ut paucis in mentem veniat inter materiale et 
formale istarum actionum distinguere." 
already, Pufendorf insists that human reason is able to discover 
something as being right or wrong in human acts only to the extent 
that these are in agreement with or against the commands of God. For 
philosophical reasoning the character of morality is, in other words, 
strictly deontological. In practice, however, moral evaluations do not 
follow so much from the use of the rational faculty as from socially 
produced emotions. And unlike reason, these feelings of appraisal or 
condemnation make people tempted to adopt a realistic account of 
morality. This does not mean that the idea of God would be 
unnecessary for morality as a social phenomenon. Without such an 
idea the human species would have been unable to discover any 
morality in the first place, and there would be no generally prevailing 
moral convictions to internalize. Nevertheless, as a result of the early 
adoption of moral opinions most people are inclined to think that 
some human acts were morally good or bad even if there were no God. 
* * * 
In practice the moral views of ordinary human beings are, thus, almost 
totally determined by education and custom. This raises the question 
as to how human societies have adopted customs which more or less 
agree with natural law. As we have seen, for Pufendorf one of the 
hallmarks of natural law is that it can be discovered by natural reason 
without any divine revelation. And he seems to hold it possible that 
human beings with no previous knowledge of natural law could indeed 
slowly discover the rules of sociality without any help from God. 
Pufendorf remarks that if a group of uncultivated human beings were 
dropped into the world, their life would first be most wretched and 
animal-like. Nevertheless, by helping each other and by using their 
natural ingenuity they would somehow not only manage to stay alive 
but even to advance slowly towards a civilized way of living. 
Pufendorf refers here to the descriptions of the early stages of the 
human species given by ancient writers such as Diodorus Siculus and 
Lucretius. According to them, human beings initially wandered in 
herds just like wild animals and only slowly developed language, 
laws, and other forms of civilized life. Since these ancient authors 
were unfamiliar with the true origin of the human species as narrated 
in the Bible, it "is not strange", according to Pufendorf, that they "give 
so wretched a picture of the primitive state of man."28 In other words, 
28 JNG II.2.2: "Inde minim non est, paganos scriptores, qui veras origines generis 
humani ex divinis literis ignorabant, tam foeda de primaevo hominum statu 
prodere." See also JNG IV.4.8. 
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if we did not have the historical testimony of the early stages of the 
human race as given in the Sacred Scriptures, but reflected the issue 
solely in the light of reason, we would have to adopt a position similar 
to that of Diodorus and Lucretius. 
This distinction between Biblical history and human history as 
conceived by reason alone offered a model for eighteenth century 
philosophers such as Rousseau who sought to present the "natural 
history" of morality and social institutions. Pufendorf, however, has no 
wish to question the status of Genesis as the true historical description 
of the origin of the human species. Therefore, he is not interested in 
considering the issue in more detail, but suggests that the central 
principles of sociality were most probably taught to the first human 
beings by God, "to be passed on afterwards to others by education and 
custom. "29 
The task of transmitting natural law to following generations has 
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been only a partial success. When the human species multiplied and 
separated into distinct groups, many nations lost the memory of the 
true principles of natural law and adopted many more or less corrupted 
customs. Hence, while there has been no nation which would have 
totally disregarded the precepts of sociality, there is hardly any 
individual principle of natural law which would not have been 
publicly violated in some human society.30 The dispersion of the 
human species also caused the emergence of double standards in 
morality. When nations were separated from each other, they lost the 
sense of their common ancestry and started to think of outsiders as 
less human than themselves. The classical example are the ancient 
Greeks and Romans, who regarded all other nations as barbarians.31  
As a result, it has become common to observe the rules of sociality 
when dealing with the members of one's own community, but to 
disregard them in relations with foreigners, "towards whom many 
have a general hatred and whom they do not hold improper to treat as 
enemies."32 These deviations from natural law have not, however, been 
29 	 JNG II.3.20. "Ac licet probabile sit, primis mortalium praecipua jusris naturalis 
capita a Numine fuisse tradita, quae deinde disciplina et assuetudine fuere in alios 
propagata." 
30 	 Some of the immoral customs held by various nations are presented in JNG II.3.8. 
31 	 JNG II.3.7. 
32 JNG 1684 II.3.7: "Accedit denique, quod licet de consensu plerorumque 
populorum saltem circa generalia praecepta legis naturalis sat liquido constare 
videatur, ac de eorum quoque consensu, quos ignoramus, praesumere possimus ex 
placitis eorum, qui nobis cogniti sunt, propter naturae similitudinem: tarnen ex 
hoc ipso tutius colligitur, quod isti erga cives suos observari eaquum duxerint; 
quam quit erga extraneos, in quos multis promiscue hostile odium, et quos hostili 
modo tratare nefas non fuit judicatum." 
of that magnitude that they would prevent Pufendorf from declaring 
that the rules of sociality have governed the majority of human 
customs and activities in all ages.33  
HABITUAL BEHAVIOUR 
If human beings usually adopt natural law unreflectively from 
prevailing customs, what makes them observe this law to the extent 
that ordered social life becomes possible? Before entering on a 
discussion as to the factors which motivate the great majority for 
obeying the rules of sociality, I will make a few remarks concerning 
the role habit plays in moral behaviour. As was mentioned above, 
Pufendorf gives habituation an important place in the formation of 
moral convictions. The fact that people imitate the prevailing customs 
from childhood onwards has usually so powerful an effect on them 
that only few even come to think that things could be done in some 
other way. The effects of this daily repetition are not, however, only 
cognitive. Pufendorf also remarks that most people observe natural 
law out of habit.34 But what does he mean by this? Is the idea that 
human beings follow the rules of sociality spontaneously, just because 
they have from childhood onwards been used to do so? If so, what 
should we think of the wretched description Pufendorf otherwise gives 
of human nature and of the strong emphasis he puts on the fear of 
punishment in the maintenance of sociality. After all, he often remarks 
that human beings are constantly tempted to violate natural law and 
that it is only because they are afraid of civic and divine punishments 
that an ordered social life is possible at all. 
A possible answer to this question can be found in JNG I.4.6, 
where Pufendorf characterizes habitual dispositions in the following 
way: 
What strongly inclines the will to certain acts is the frequent 
repetition of these acts, and the familiarity following from this, 
which causes the action to be undertaken easily and willingly, and 
the soul to seem, as it were, drawn to an object before it. When 
such inclinations are joined with a desire and an adroitness in 
action, they commonly go under the name habitus. These, in turn, 
33 	 Eris scandica p.163 (Specimen controversiam I.1): "Ius naturale, humano genen 
coaeuum, quod omni tempore populorum mores negotia ex plerique parte rexit." 
34 JNG II.3.13: "...; ac plerique ex adsuetudine, aut vitae communis tenore legem 
naturae addiscere et observare soleant." 
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are called either virtues or vices, in so far as they are concerned 
with morally good or bad acts.35 
The noteworthy thing here is the distinction Pufendorf makes between 
the mere inclination created by a frequent repetition of some pattern of 
behaviour and the true habitus, which also includes a conscious desire 
to follow this inclination. This suggests the following interpretation: as 
a result of daily repetition human beings are so accustomed to 
observing the rules of sociality that unless some desire especially 
inclines them to violate these precepts, they need no conscious motive 
for obeying them. In this sense they observe natural law out of habit. 
However, because of their corrupted nature and inadequate education 
most people lack the aspiration to observe the rules of sociality which 
would turn their habitual inclination into a virtue. Instead they have 
passions which make them often think that their personal well-being 
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could be served better by violating the rules which they have been 
accustomed to follow. These evil passions can, then, be effectively 
controlled only by the fear of civil and divine punishments. Hence, it 
can be said that people both observe natural law out of habit and that 
their sociality is dependent on the fear of punishment. 
I will deal with the role Pufendorf gives to the fear of punishment, 
especially divine penalties, in human sociality below in chapter The 
fear of God. Before doing this I will examine how the expectations 
concerning the manner in which other people are likely to react to 
one's behaviour motivate human beings to observe natural law. 
THE PURSUIT OF SECURITY 
As has been noted several times already, Pufendorf maintains that by 
observing the rules of sociality an individual has the best possible 
chance both to avoid the hatred and aggression of other people and to 
assure their willingness to help him in the long run. Correspondingly, 
by transgressing the central precepts of natural law a person increases 
drastically his chances of loosing the assistance of other people and 
becoming an object of their violence. Thus, Pufendorf obviously 
35 JNG I.4.6: "Valde quoque voluntatem in certas actiones inclinat frequans 
earundem actionum repetitio, et consuetudo, per quam efficitur, ut expedite et 
libenter actio aliqua suspiciatur, objectoque praesente in id velut trahi animus 
videatur. Atque ejusmodi inclinationes cum lubidine ac dexteritate agendi 
conjunctae habituum vocabulo solent vulgo venire; qui quatenus circa actiones 
morales, bonas et malas occupantur, virtutes et vitia nuncupantur." 
thinks that for a truly rational person reflections concerning the 
manner in which other people are likely to react to his behaviour offer 
a powerful motive for observing the central rules of sociality. But what 
role does such considerations play in real human behaviour? To this 
question, Pufendorf's seems to give two contradictory answers. 
In his discussion of the origins of civil society Pufendorf 
distinguishes between four types of human beings according to the 
manner in which the fear of other's aggression affects their behaviour. 
First of all, there are some for whom mere reverence for God offers a 
sufficient motive for observing natural law. These people value 
"seemliness, honourableness, innocence, and trust" above everything 
else and would therefore observe the rules of sociality even if they had 
nothing to fear from other people.36 It can be assumed that what 
Pufendorf has in mind here are true Christians, who are able, with the 
aid of the Holy Spirit, to overcome their corrupt nature and obey 
God's commands for their own sake. Pufendorf makes it clear, 
however, that the number of such genuine Christians is quite small. 
The majority of the people living in Christian states "embrace the 
Christian religion from no personal conviction so much as from the 
custom and usage of the state in which they were born." This means 
that "for the most of them it lies rather on their lips than in their soul, 
and that only a few take it to their heart to improve their soul 
according to its direction. "37 
Besides the very few truly virtuous human beings there are "not a 
few" who are ready to leave the possessions and lives of other people 
untouched, because they calculate that this is the best way to ensure 
their own security and well-being. Pufendorf cites here a passage from 
Nicomachen Ethics, where Aristotle speaks of people who "keep their 
hands off the property of others from fear, on the ground that it is not 
easy, if one takes the property of others oneself, to avoid having one's 
own taken by them; they are therefore content neither to take not to 
give."38  "If all were of this mind", Pufendorf remarks, "it looks as 
there would have been no need for states at all."39 
What makes peaceful social life impossible without civil 
36 	 JNG VII.1.1: "Equidem dantur homines, queis decus, honestum, innocentia, fides 
quam maxime cordi est, quae ne praesita quidem impunitate violare velint " 
37 JNG 1684 II.4.3: "..., quod religio Christiana, quam plerique non tam proprio 
judicio, quam adsuetudine, et ex usus civitatis, in qua nati sunt, amplectuntur, 
plurimis magis in primoribus labiis, quam in animo haeret, quodque adeo tam 
paucis cordi est juxta scita ejusdem animum suum emendare." 
38 	 Nicomachean Ethics IV.1. 1121b28-31. 
39 JNG VII.1.8: "Eo ingenio si omnes essent, non audeo civitatibus opus fuisse 
videtur." 
141 
sovereignty is, first, the existence of people who not only hold 
everything sacred as worthless whenever a hope of gain lures them, 
but also have such confidence in their own strength or wit that they 
believe they are able to repeal or evade those they have injured 40 
Second, there are only a few who are "able of their own power to see 
what is for the permanent advantage of mankind in general and of 
individuals and to be willing to persist in that knowledge."'" The 
majority of people are "deaf to the voice of reason" and "take their 
passions as reason." Instead of seeking that which is truly useful they 
"are led by the violence of their passions wherever their lust or false 
conception of utility take them." Moreover, these people are usually so 
preoccupied with "what strikes their senses, and do not care much for 
their future".42 
These remarks give the impression that most human beings are 
relatively unconcerned with the anger and aggression which violations 
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of natural law are likely to arouse in others. However, another passage 
in De jure naturae et gentium gives a very different picture of the role 
the consideration of such things plays in human behaviour. This is 
paragraph I1.2.9, where Pufendorf argues against Hobbes' famous 
claim according to which the natural condition of the human species is 
that of war. Here Pufendorf remarks that "we are not discussing the 
natural state of some animal which is directed only by the force and 
inclinations of the sensitive part of the soul [i.e. by passions], but of 
one whose principal feature which reigns over other faculties is 
reason."43  It was, therefore, an error for Hobbes in his description of 
the natural state "to suppose that at least the majority human beings 
neglect the dictate of reason which nature has set up as the final 
director of their actions "44  What made this mistake so significant was 
40 	 JNG VII.1.8: Sed quanta ex adverso eorum turba est, quibus omnia sancta vilia 
sunt, quotiens spes Iucn arriserit, et ficudia propriarum virium, aut solertiae, quae 
repellere, aut eludere laesos sese possent sperent." 
41 	 JNG VII.1.10: Paucissimis ea est ingenii felicitas, ut quid genen humano 
singulisque ad diuturnitatem conducat, proprio Marte possint perspicere, et 
perspectum constanter sequi velin[." 
42 	 JNG VII.1.10: "Plerique inconsulto affectuum impetu feruntur, quo libido, aut 
fallacis species utilitatis subegerit " V11.1.11: "Ideque quia multitudo non ratione, 
sed impetu vivit, ac libidinem pro ratione habet, educationis fere et consuetudinis 
vitio, qua vis rationis velut obsurdescit. Tum quod magna pars mortalium 
praesentibus tantum imminet, futuri parum curiosa, ac illis fere movetur, quae in 
sensus incurrunt, ac sublimiora aegre adsurgat." 
43 	 JNG I1.2.9: "Est porro hoc probe observandum, heic agi non de statu naturali 
animantis, quod solo impetu et inlinationibus animae sensitivae regatur; sed cujus 
pars praecipua, cui in caeteras facultates regimen, sit ratio." 
44 	 JNG II.2.9: "Ac ideo male circa designandum eundem statum praesupponitur, 
homines saltem plerosque ductum rationis, quam natura supremam actionum 
humanarum directricem constituit, negligere." 
that while passions draw human beings towards the total state of war 
of which Hobbes had spoken, reason tells them that to attack others is 
not only improper (indecor) but also harmful (inutile) 45 In the second 
edition Pufendorf even adds that every human being understands that 
it is good for himself to behave in a way which enables him to profit 
from the benevolence of others rather than to incur their anger. 
Moreover, everybody can also easily presume, because of the 
similarity of human nature, that others feel the same way.46 
It appears, thus, as if Pufendorf gave us two incompatible accounts 
of the role which reflections concerning other's reactions play in 
human behaviour. When he wants to persuade his readers of the view 
he shares with Hobbes, namely that insecurity has been the principal 
reason for the establishment of civil power, he claims that the majority 
of human beings are not concerned about the aggression their immoral 
behaviour is likely to animate in others. On the other hand, when his 
aim is to invalidate Hobbes' assertion that the natural condition of the 
human species is war, Pufendorf insists that most people do not 
neglect the dictates of reason and do not, therefore, behave 
deliberately in a way which is likely to cause hostility in others. 
Does Pufendorf really change his position so inconsistently 
depending on the point he wants to prove? If the remarks cited above 
are taken literally, their incompatibility is, I think, insoluble. There 
are, however, good reasons to think that in neither case Pufendorf 
means exactly what he says. This becomes evident when we examine 
what exactly is the issue in which he disagrees with Hobbes' account 
of the natural state.47  
The general claim Pufendorf makes against Hobbes in JNG 11.2.9 is 
"that the natural state of men, even when considered apart from civil 
societies, is not one of war, but of peace."48 However, by this he does 
not mean that without a civil sovereignty human relations would be 
nonviolent. What he has in mind is that the requirement to cultivate 
45 	 JNG II.2.9: "Cum igitur non solum affectuum libidinem, sed rationem, non sane 
unice suis se commodis dimetientem, audire possit homo; a bello, in quod per 
pravos affectus impellitur, quale est etiam illud quod fingitur omnium in omnes, 
per rationem duplici potissimum argumento revocatur; nimirum quod 
deprehendit, bellum altero non lacessente suspectum esse indecorum, et inutile." 
46 	 JNG 1684 II.2.9: "Et quia quilibet homo in seipso deprehendere potest, bonum 
sibi esse, si ita se gerat, ut aliis hominibus benevolis potius, quam insensis utatur: 
propter naturae similitudinem facile praesumere potest, alios quoque paria 
sentire." 
47 	 On Pufendorf's account of the state of nature in general, see Seidler 1990, pp.25-
36. 
48 	 JNG II.2.9: "Ex quibus omnibus concludimus, naturalem hominum statum, etiam 
extra civitates consideratorum, non esse bellum, sed pacem." 
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sociality obligates human beings even when there is no civil power to 
enforce it: 
Now by our assertion that the maintenance of peace towards all 
human beings is the natural state of man we mean that it has been 
instituted and sanctioned by nature herself without any human 
intervention, and that it rests, therefore upon that obligation of 
natural law by which all men are bound in so far as they are 
endowed with reason, and which does not owe its original 
introduction to any human convention.49 
The target here is the conditional formulation Hobbes had given of 
natural law. In Leviathan, for example, Hobbes declared that the 
fundamental law of nature dictates "every man" either "to endeavour 
Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it" or, if this is not possible, 
to "seek, and use, all helps and advantages of Warre."50 And since 
Hobbes held that a trustworthy peace can be attained only by 
establishing a civil power, the foregoing meant that in so far as people 
do not live under a common sovereign, natural law dictates them to 
treat other people as enemies with whom they are at war. 
The arguments by which Hobbes justified his position were slightly 
different in each of his three works on political theory. The main 
strategy, however, was the same each time. Hobbes asked his readers 
to imagine a situation where human beings with no previous 
engagements are not controlled by any form of political power. Then 
he pointed out human features which have a tendency to create violent 
conflicts even within civil societies and argued that in the natural state 
these would inevitably lead to general warfare. The features which 
Hobbes mentioned were the tendency not to tolerate opinions which 
differ from one's own, the pursuit of glory and pre-eminence, and the 
desire to possess the same material objects as others. Hobbes admitted 
that a considerable number of people would understand the 
inconveniences which are likely to follow from attacking others and 
would, therefore, in principle be ready to abstain from such acts. The 
problem was that there are always people who either estimate their 
powers wrongly and put themselves above others or quite simply find 
49 	 JNG II.2.11: "Caeterum eo ipso quod afferimus, pacem adversus omnes homines, 
ut tales, exercendam, esse statum hominis naturalem; innuimus illam ab ipsa 
natura institutam et sancitam, citra aliquod factum humanum; adeoque eandem 
niti sola illa legis naturalis obligatione, qua omnes homines, ut sunt ratione 
praediti, stringuntur, neque ut illa ab initio introducatur, abs convention 
hominium oriri." 
50 	 Leviathan, ch.14, pp.91-92. 
pleasure in hurting and oppressing other people. These would force 
even the moderate to join the battle. As a result, there would be a 
situation in which people could rely on nobody's intentions. They 
would have to regard everybody else as a potential aggressor who they 
must eliminate as soon as possible: 
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any 
man to secure himself, so reasonable as Anticipation; that is, by 
force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till 
he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no 
more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally 
allowed.51  
Hobbes never claimed, of course, that the human race as a whole had 
ever been in such a state of total warfare. Human beings have always 
lived either in patriarchal families or in civil societies. He insisted, 
however, that the same state of war which would prevail in the 
hypothetical natural state characterizes in reality the relationships 
between distinct human associations. 
Pufendorf finds Hobbes' account of the natural state tolerable in so 
far as it is taken as a hypothesis concerning an imagined situation in 
which people are considered as totally isolated individuals with no 
engagements with each other. What he finds totally unacceptable, on 
the other hand, is that Hobbes unhesitatingly applied the results of 
such a thought-experiment to really existing human relations and even 
to natural law.52 Pufendorf himself does not, of course, identify natural 
law with the requirements of individual safety but with rules which are 
necessary for the advancement of the salus of the human species. 
Nevertheless, since this also includes the security of individual human 
beings, he must — in order to maintain convincingly that the rules of 
sociality obligate even outside civil society — disprove Hobbes' 
argument for the rationality of violent anticipation. 
Pufendorf's starting point is the evident observation that in so far as 
Hobbes spoke of individual human beings with no engagements with 
each other, his state of nature was a purely hypothetical construction 
which has never existed among the human race nor ever will exist. In 
reality human beings always grow up in communities bound together 
by kinship ties. These usually create affection between human beings 
and in this way "often precludes or abates many symptoms of the 
51 	 Leviathan ch.13, pp.87-88. 
52 	 JNG II.3.7. 
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natural state."53  Moreover, an awareness of the misery which would 
characterize the life of human beings if they received no help from 
each other, promotes a fellowship between those who exchange 
commodities and services 54 Pufendorf admits that the bonds 
following from these things are never as secure and reliable as those 
created by a common civil power. They do, however, make it fully 
irrational to regard the other party as an enemy, unless he shows some 
explicit signs of evil intentions. 
But why should this conclusion be avoided even in the case of those 
with whom one has no personal engagements? Pufendorf himself 
admits that human beings are usually so preoccupied with their own 
advantage and glory that "they pay small regard to anyone with little 
or no ability to benefit them:' As a result, "friendships held together 
by a bare and in all respects sterile benevolence are exceedingly rare 
among the mortals."55 Moreover, the same self-love which motivates 
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human beings to maintain peaceful relations with those with whom 
they have mutual interests often inclines them to hurt those whom they 
regard as non-beneficial for themselves: 
Thus what is more common in the human species than trying to 
expel someone else from his possessions in order to augment one's 
own wealth, than causing many thousands of others to lose 
something outstanding in order to acquire power and glory for 
oneself, and finally, than amusing oneself by insulting others out of 
natural spite, and seeking pleasure for oneself from their pain?56 
Pufendorf also admits that this human wickedness often forces those 
who otherwise would be inclined to act peacefully to "break peace and 
to fortify themselves against it by whatever means."57  All this has the 
result that 
53 	 De statu § 7. 
54 	 De statu § 6. 
55 	 De statu § 16: "Ex adverso constat, homini amorem proprium suamque utilitatem 
et gloriam fere inter prima haberi. Eoque istius, ex quo nihil aut parum in nos 
proficisci videtur posse, exigua fere habetur ratio. Nam quae nuda, eaque 
undiquaque sterili benevolentia continentur amicitiae, inter morales oppido quam 
rarae sunt." 
56 	 De statu § 16: "Sic quid vulgatius est in genere humano, quam ut quis ad proprias 
opes cumulandas alterum fomitus evertere aggrediatur: ut ad potentiam et gloriam 
sibi parandam multa hominum millia perdere egregium facinus ducat: ut denique 
per ingenii malignitatem aliis insultare pro delectamento habeat, et ex aliorum 
dolore voluptatem sibi quaerat?" 
57 	 De statu § 16: "Quae pravitas id quoque mali parit, quod per eandem etiam 
modestioribus ingeniis, et qui alias libenter suis rebus contenti allena non 
adpeterent, et quieti suae incumbentes aliis nihil negotii facesserent, tantum non 
necessitas adferatur pacem abrumpendi, et quibuscunque mediis contra istam sese 
muniendi." 
... nearly constant suspicions and mutual distrust thrive among 
those who live in a natural state with each other, especially if their 
situation provides them with opportunities for harming one another. 
And many of them evince a desire to undermine and impede the 
growth of others's strength, to augment their own strength out of 
the latter's ruin and when an occasion is finally given, to beat them 
to the blow and crush them.58  
The conclusion Pufendorf makes from the above remarks is that life 
outside civil societies is most insecure. He even justifies a sovereign's 
right to demand the citizens to risk their lives for their country by the 
fact that without the protection given by the state they would be dead 
anyway.59 
But if relationships between people who are not bound by kinship 
ties or mutual interests are so full of violence in the natural state, why 
is it not rational in such a state to hold everybody else as one's enemy, 
except a close circle of relatives, friends, and people with whom one 
exchanges commodities and services? The answer Pufendorf gives is 
that none of the reasons which make human beings inclined to hurt 
each other characterize human relations universally and constantly. 
Fierce confrontations concerning opinions, for example, are something 
peculiar to the intelligent and well-educated elite and almost non-
existent among the unschooled majority. Correspondingly, there is no 
such universal shortage of the basic material necessities that human 
beings would constantly desire the same commodities. And even 
though there is an inherent wickedness in human nature which enjoys 
harming others as much as possible, in most people this feature is not 
actualized perpetually.60 
The foregoing means, according to Pufendorf, that a mere 
contemplation of human nature and condition never makes it rational 
to regard another person as one's enemy. Even in the case of total 
strangers a violent attack against them becomes reasonable only when 
they have shown some signs of evil intentions.61 The practical 
58 	 De statu § 16: "Inde est, quod inter eos, qui in naturali statu invicem vivunt, 
praesertim si per opportunitatem Situs nocendi fit invicem facultas, tantum non 
perpetuae vigeant suspiciones, ac mutua diffidentia. In multis quoque 
deprehendatur cupiditas alforum vires subruendi, et incrementa praepediendi, ex 
aliorum mina vires suas augendi, data denique occasione alios praeveniendi et 
opprimendi." 
59 JNG VIII.2.4: "Quin cum beneficio civitatis vitae nostra per longum temporis 
spatium set servata, quae dudum periisset, si in naturali statu fuissemus expositi: 
non gravis jactura est habenda pro civitate vitam effundere, cui praesertim tam 
multae alia beneficia debemus." 
60 	 JNG II.2.8; De statu § 17. 
61 	 See JNG III.5.6. 
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conclusion one should make from the darker features of human nature 
is not the violent anticipation suggested by Hobbes but rather a 
vigilant friendliness. A rational person maintains two attitudes towards 
other human beings. In so far as they show no signs of willingness to 
do him harm, he regards them as friends and tries to maintain peaceful 
relations with them. However, he knows enough of human nature in 
order to understand that others may at any moment become his 
enemies, wherefore his attempts to maintain peace are always mingled 
with the precaution to defend himself in case he becomes an object of 
attack.62 
It is now possible to suggest an interpretation which makes the 
seemingly contradictory remarks cited at the beginning of this chapter 
compatible with each other. In the first place, it seems that in his 
discussion of the reasons for the establishment of civil society 
Pufendorf makes a distinction between those human beings who 
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believe they can repel or evade those they hurt, and the great majority 
which is governed by badly composed passions. While both groups 
are a threat to peaceful social life, the latter still understands that by 
transgressing natural law they endanger their own security. The 
problem with them is that when they encounter the possibility of 
acquiring something which strongly excites their passions, their desire 
for that object easily sets aside all such considerations and they "take 
their passions as reason". 
Correspondingly, when Pufendorf in JNG II.2.9 says that the 
majority of human beings do not neglect the dictate of reason, and that 
they understand the benefits following from the benevolence of other 
people, he is not maintaining that people in general act rationally. 
Pufendorf's idea seems to be rather that Hobbes' claim, according to 
which it is rational to hold everyone as one's enemy in the state of 
nature, would make sense only under the assumption that most human 
beings are totally irrational and, therefore, quite unconcerned with the 
reactions their behaviour might arouse in others. If this really were the 
case, the only rational thing to do in the state of nature would be to 
suppress others whenever this is possible. What Pufendorf points out, 
then, is that it was an error for Hobbes to assume that the majority of 
human beings totally omit all use of reason. While it is true that their 
corrupt nature and poorly composed passions makes them easily 
inclined to violate the rules of sociality, they still understand that 
62 JNG II.2.12: "Ergo uti probi est hominis rebus suis ciontentum aliso non 
lacessere, nec aliena adpetere: ita cauti est viri, suasque salutis amantis, ita omnes 
homines amicos credere, ut tarnen iidem mox hostes fieri queant; ita pacem istam 
cum omnibus habere, quasi ques mow in bellum erumpere possit." See also De 
statu § 18. 
doing so involves great risks for themselves. As such, without the 
enforcement of civil sanctions, the awareness of these risks does not 
ensure security in human relations. It has, however, the effect of 
making people so cautious in violating natural law that it is never 
rational to regard other people as one's enemies without some specific 
sign of their evil intentions. 
THE DESIRE FOR APPRECIATION 
Thus, while a concern about the aggression which violations of natural 
law are likely to animate in others has some effect on most human 
beings, for the great majority of people it offers a rather weak 
incentive for observing natural law. However, Pufendorf mentions also 
another factor which makes human beings concerned with the 
reactions of other people. This is the desire to be esteemed by others. 
The idea that the veneration and contempt shown by other people 
has a considerable influence on human behaviour was not rare in the 
seventeenth century. Perhaps the best-known example is the 
jurisprudential formulation Locke gave to this idea in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. In this work Locke distinguished 
three types of norms which govern human behaviour. First, there is 
divine law, either promulgated through the Bible or known through 
natural reason. This is sanctioned by punishments in the afterlife. The 
second norm is the civil law, which gets its governing power from the 
ability of the sovereign "to take away Life, Liberty, or Goods, from 
him who disobeys." To describe the third norm Locke used the 
expressions "the law of opinion", "the law of reputation", and "the law 
of fashion". This rule consists of the commonly prevailing opinions 
concerning what is virtuous and what is vicious and is sanctioned by 
the commendation and disdain shown by other people.63  
Locke not only recognized the importance of the law of opinion but 
maintained that it has a stronger influence on moral behaviour than the 
fear of civil or divine penalties. According to Locke, most human 
beings do "that which keeps them in Reputation with their Company, 
little regard the Laws of God, or the Magister." In the case of civil 
laws the reason for this indifference is that people "frequently flatter 
themselves with the hopes of impunity." Of course, no such hopes can 
be cherished in the case of divine penalties. This does not, however, 
prevent people from taking a rather relaxed attitude towards the divine 
63 	 An Essay concerning Human Understanding II.28.8-10. 
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law. In the first place, they seldom reflect seriously on the penalties 
following from its violation. And even when they do so, they are 
inclined to comfort themselves with the idea that they can become 
reconciled for their present sins at some future date. On the other 
hand, no one believes that he can escape the censure and dislike of 
those with whom he keeps company. And to be under the constant 
disdain of others is something most human beings want to avoid by all 
possible means. As a result, the greatest part of human beings govern 
themselves "chiefly, if not solely" by the law of fashion .64  
Pufendorf offers no systematic treatment of the phenomenon Locke 
called the law of fashion. However, he seems to think that the esteem 
and contempt people show for each other has a considerable influence 
on human behaviour, and that this influence is mainly conductive to 
sociality. This is indicated, in the first place, in his remarks concerning 
the sense of shame in JNG I.2.7. 
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Pufendorf's main purpose in paragraph I.2.7 is to refute the popular 
view according to which the tendency to blush after one has 
committed some morally bad deed proves that these acts are morally 
bad in themselves, independently of all imposition. In order to 
invalidate this idea he offers a short presentation of the psychological 
and social character of the sense of shame. Pufendorf's understanding 
of this sentiment relies largely on Descartes's analysis of pride and 
shame in Les passions de l'ame. In this work Descartes presented both 
pride and shame as corollaries of human self-love. Pride is a kind of a 
joy "based on self-love and results from the belief or hope that we 
have of being praised by certain other people." Correspondingly, 
shame is sadness "based also on self-love, which proceeds from the 
expectation of fear of being blamed. "65 
 According to Descartes, shame 
is natural for human beings in the sense that in youth everyone thinks 
that to be praised by others is good, whereas being an object of 
disgrace is bad. There are, however, two ways in which a person can 
lose this original sensitivity to acclaim and disapproval. First, if the 
person is frequently an object of grave insults he begins to see himself 
completely stripped of honour and detested by all. As a result, he loses 
all interest in the opinions others have of him and adopts the attitude 
of impudence. The same happens also if his self-esteem for some 
reason becomes too great. In this case it becomes impossible for him 
even to imagine how anyone could despise him 66 
64 	 An Essay concerning Human Understanding II.28.12. 
65 	 Les passions de lame, § 204-205. The translation is from The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes vol.1, Cambridge 1985. 
66 	 Les passions de l'ame, § 206-207. 
Pufendorf refers approvingly to Descartes's definition of shame and 
also to his explanation of impudence. Nevertheless, Pufendorf's own 
theory of the psychological origin of shame differs slightly from that 
of Descartes. According to Pufendorf, shame is related not only to the 
fear of being the object of other's disdain but also to the fear of losing 
their esteem. The ultimate origin of shame is in the ambitious 
character of human nature. By this Pufendorf means that human 
beings do not only want to be accepted by other people. They also 
want to possess qualities which gives them some pre-eminence 
(praestantia) in the eyes of other people. They "feel the greatest 
pleasure if they can discover in themselves something, which gives 
them a possibility to raise themselves in front of others and to 
boast."67  Moreover, they usually regard the honour and glory 
following from pre-eminence as the most marvelous of all worldly 
ends 68 The reaction called shame takes place, then, when a person 
fears that the opinion other people have of his pre-eminence is going 
to be lowered. This causes in him deep sadness, "a manifestation of 
which is visible in the special seat of man's dignity, when the heart 
suddenly sends blood to the face."69  In other words, shame is sorrow 
which takes place when the hope of being regarded as better than 
others is for some reason frustrated. 
This theory of shame has, in Pufendorf's eyes, the advantage that it 
explains why people are ashamed of many things which do not meet 
with any actual condemnation from other people: "Shame arises not 
merely because of some base action, but also from anything, even 
though not morally base, which is thought to diminish our reputation." 
The reason for this is that human beings want their pre-eminence 
measured not only by the avoidance of sinful deeds but by many other 
factors which do not involve morality.70 Thus, one sees people being 
ashamed of such things as shortness of stature, physical handicaps, 
67 	 JNG I.2.7: "Scilicet ambitiosum est animal homo, suaeque praestatiae cumprimis 
jactabundum, quoque maximam animi voluptatem in eo repositam habet, si talia 
in se deprehendat, quibus se prae aliis efferre, ac gloriari queat." 
68 	 JNG 1684 II.4.9: "Inter eas igitur judicatur vel splendidissima, et quae erectoris 
homines indolis pracipue solicitare idonea sit, opinio praestantiae et excellentiae, 
unde honor et gloria progignitur." 
69 	 JNG I.2.7: "De cujus praestantiae opinione, ubi quid apud alios sibi decesturum 
metuit, penitissimam animo concipit tristitiam, cujus singum in propria velut 
humanae dignitatis sede adparet, dum cor repente sanguinem versus faciem 
propellit." 
70 JNG I.2.7: "Probe autem observandum, pudorem oriri non ex sola actionum 
turpitudine, verum ex quay is re, etiam moraliter non turpi, quae existimationem 
nostram laedere creditur. ... Ast non ex sola peccatorum abstinentia praestantiam 
suam vult aestimsari homo, sed ex aliis quoque rebus, quibus moralitatis nihil 
inest." 
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poverty, poor clothes, harmless mistakes, and so on. 
The idea that the feeling of shame is a consequence of the human 
desire for pre-eminence does not prevent Pufendorf from sharing the 
popular view that shame is beneficial for the moral order. God has 
planted this sentiment in the human soul to act as "a guardian of 
virtue" and "a bridle for restraining evil." Had God not wished 
mankind to govern their actions according to law, he would most 
probable not have implanted this sentiment in human beings, "since 
only on such grounds does it serve any use."71 In fact, Pufendorf sees 
the sense of shame as a necessary constituent of human sociality. A 
person who is totally unconcerned about what others think of him 
lacks most of the inner restraints on evil behaviour and is in principle 
ready to undertake all possible crimes 72 In other words, the aspiration 
for pre-eminence and glory, which are the desires behind the feeling of 
shame, are predominantly positive forces in social life. This appears to 
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put Pufendorf in strict opposition with Hobbes, who had presented 
these passions as one of the principal reasons for human conflicts. It is 
interesting, therefore, to compare more closely Pufendorf's and 
Hobbes' views on this issue. 
* * * 
Hobbes' negative assessment of the role which the aspiration for pre-
eminence and glory plays in social life relied largely on the 
assumption that in human societies the striving for these things 
happens without any moral criteria. In Leviathan Hobbes maintained 
the bases of all honour human beings show towards other people is 
power. By power (potentia in the Latin translation) he meant in this 
context all things which enable a person to obtain the objects of his 
desire. Power consists, thus, not only of physical strength but also of 
all those things which make a human being equipped to manipulate 
others and in this way to achieve what they want. For example, 
prudence, wealth, eloquence, and good looks are all forms of power.73  
71 	 JNG I.2.7: "Ubi fatemur quidem, sapientissimum Creatorem animis hominum 
indidisse affectum pudoris, qui esset velut custos virtutis, et validum fraenum 
reprimendae malitiae. Probabile quoque videtur, ni Deus voluisset hominem suas 
actiones ad legem componere, ipsum hunc affectum animis humanis non fuisse 
insiturum; cum citra hoc nullus ejusdem usus adpareat." 
72 	 This is indicated in JNG VII., 31, where Pufendorf explains the prohibition on 
incestuous marriages by the fact that a person who has intercourse with a family 
member lacks all sense of shame and can, therefore, "be held to have a brazen 
character and such as would not stop at any other villainy as well." In this context 
he also cites approvingly Euripides' characterization of impudence (i.e. the lack 
of shame) as the worst of all plagues infecting the human race. 
73 	 Leviathan, ch. 10, pp.62-63. 
The central idea in Hobbes' theory was, then, the claim that what 
people value and honour in others is the possession of some power 
they would like to have for themselves, not the manner in which this 
power is used: 
Nor does it alter the case of honour, whether an action (so it be 
great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power) be just 
or unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of power.74 
To prove his point Hobbes referred to the ancient Greeks and Romans, 
who "did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the 
Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing Rapes, 
Thefts and other great but unjust, or unclean acts." As a more 
contemporary sign of the same attitude he saw the honour that was 
attached to the practice of dueling, despite the fact that this was illegal 
in most countries. This followed, in Hobbes' account, from the fact 
that dueling requires courage, which is a quality useful to the 
attainment of the objects of one's desire and so a form of power.75  
Already the foregoing meant that the wish to be honoured by other 
people does not necessarily motivate people to behave in a way which 
upholds peaceful social relations. Honour can be achieved by means 
of all behaviour which is seen as a sign of extraordinary power, 
including sheer violence and the suppression of others. What made 
matters even worse, according to Hobbes, was that people are most 
sensitive of their own esteem and want that those with whom they live 
value them as much as they value themselves. If they feel that some 
person despises or undervalues them, they do everything within their 
power to force that person to show a greater valuation. When we add 
to this that people usually have a considerably high opinion of 
themselves, but are reluctant to see similar excellence in others, it is 
obvious that there easily arises situations where they "must determine 
the pre-eminence by strength and force of body:'76  And in Leviathan 
Hobbes remarked that unless this tendency is restrained by civil 
power, it alone — even if there were no other causes for discord — 
would make people destroy each other.77 
Pufendorf agrees with Hobbes in holding that human beings 
possess a most sensitive self-esteem; so sensitive, in fact, that if it is 
injured, they are often more disturbed than when their body or 
74 	 Leviathan, ch.13, p.66. 
75 	 Leviathan, ch. 10, p.67. 
76 	 Elements of law I.14.4. 
77 	 Leviathan, ch.13, p.88. 
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property are violated.78 However, in Pufendorf's eyes, this human 
feature does not make the desire to win other's esteem a 
predominantly negative force in social life. This is so, in the first 
place, because in so far as this sense of one's own value is natural and 
not intensified by emotional disorder or the flattery of others, it does 
not make people regard themselves as better than other people. In this 
respect, it differs significantly from groundless haughtiness (superbia) 
which makes one feel oneself superior to others regardless of the 
opinion these others have on the issue.79 Pufendorf holds, in other 
words, that for most human beings any feeling of their own pre-
eminence is totally dependent on the valuation they receive from other 
people, not something they take for granted and then require others to 
recognize. 
Equally significant is that usually the striving for honour does not 
happen without moral criteria. This Pufendorf makes clear in his 
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theory of reputation (existimatio), i.e. the valuation human beings 
enjoy in social life according to which they are "equalled or compared 
with other persons, and ranked either before or after them."80 In 
relation to Hobbes, the distinctive feature in Pufendorf's theory is the 
idea that in social life people are usually valued according to two 
different criteria. In the first place, there is "intensive reputation" 
based on honour which generates hierarchial relations between human 
beings in which some persons are given preference over others.81  
Pufendorf agrees with Hobbes that honour always follows from 
qualities which are signs of some pre-eminence or perfection.S2 And 
the examples he offers of such features do not differ much from those 
given by Hobbes. People honour "intelligence and a capacity to master 
various skills and disciplines, a keen judgement in managing affairs, a 
78 	 JNG III.2.1: "Praeter illud amorem, quo homo suam vitam, corpusque, ac res 
prosequitur, et per quem non potest non omnia, ad eorundem destructionem 
tendentia, reprellere aut refugere; deprehenditur quoque ipsius animo insita 
tenerrima quaedam sui aestimatio: cui si quis aliquid dectratum eat, non minus 
fere, imo saepe magis solet is commoveri, quam si corpori ac rebus noxa 
inferatur." 
79 	 JNG II1.2.6. 
80 JNG VIII.4.1: "Est autem existimatio valor personarum in vita communi, 
secundum quem aptae sunt aliis personis exaequari, aut comparari, eisque vel 
antehaberi, vel postponi." 
81 	 JNG VIII.4.11: "Existimatio intensiva est, secundum quam personae, alias quod 
existimationem simplicem aequales, sibi invicem praeferuntur, prout uni prae 
altero insunt, queis aliorum animi ad exhibendum honorem permoveri solent. Est 
autem honor, qui intensioni existimationis respondet, significatio judicii nostri de 
praestantia alterius." 
82 JNG VIII.4.12: "Fundamentum intensivae existimationis in genere censentur 
omnia illa, quae insignem aliquam praestatiam aut perfectionem habent, aut 
eandem judicantur arguere." 
firm temper unshaken by external events and superior to temptation 
and fear, eloquence, physical beauty and dexterity, the good things of 
fortune, and, above all, outstanding achievements. "83 
What Pufendorf does not share with Hobbes is the latter's claim 
that such qualities are honoured even if they are used in some immoral 
manner. In Pufendorf's eyes, this is quite simply an erroneous 
sociological observation. To be sure, he admits that one sometimes 
sees how common people celebrate someone who shows unusual 
ability only in the practice of some vice.84 It may happen, for example, 
that someone is admired as a great seducer or a skilful thief. However, 
such an adoration is an exception rather than a rule. Pufendorf points 
out, pace Hobbes, that the ancient stories about gods who commit 
rapes and thefts did not represent the general opinion among the 
Greeks and the Romans. As proof of this he cites a number of ancient 
writers who condemned these stories as lies which both insult the gods 
and deceive the people.85  Similarly, the honour attached to dueling is 
not a universal human phenomenon but a perverse habit peculiar to 
Europeans, which many other nations detest.86 
Thus, in reality moral considerations play a significant role in the 
esteem and honour people show to each other and constitute a 
phenomenon Pufendorf calls simple reputation. Unlike intensive 
reputation, which follows from pre-eminence and cannot therefore be 
equally possessed by everyone, simple reputation is a quality which 
can in principle be shared by every member of the human species. 
Outside civil society it consists solely of the fact that a person is 
regarded as someone, "who is inclined to accommodate himself to the 
laws of human sociality, and therefore ready, to the best of his ability, 
to observe natural law in his relations with others."87  In civil societies 
simple reputation also necessitates that one is known as someone who 
obeys the laws and customs of the state, and that one is regarded as a 
full member of the community.88 By the latter remark Pufendorf refers 
83 	 OHC II.14.13. See also JNG VIII.4.12. 
84 	 JNG VIII.4.12: "Nam stulto vulgi judicio eos quoque interdum vides celebrari, 
qui circa vitium aliquod exercendum cumprimis sese strenuos exhibent." 
85 	 JNG VIII.4.13. 
86 	 JNG VIII.4.8. 
87 JNG VIII.4.2: "Existimatio simplex inter eos, qui in naturali invicem libertate 
sunt constituti, in hoc potissimum videtur consistere, ut quis talem se ferat, et pro 
tali habeatur quicum agi quaet tanquam cum viro bono, et ad socialitatis humanae 
leges sese accommodare prono, quique adeo legem naturalem adversus alios, 
quantum in se, observare sit paratus." 
88 	 JNG VIII.4.6: "Existimation simplex intra civitates degentium est, qua quis pro 
membro saltem vulgari, eosque integro civitatis reputatur, seu ut quis juxta leges 
et mores civitatis pro vitioso ejusdem membro non fuerit declaratus, et aliquo esse 
numero, caputque habere intelligatur." 
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to the fact that civil societies include people who are protected by the 
state, but who, because of some moral deficiency which characterizes 
their social position or occupation, do not enjoy a similar civil 
standing as other citizens.89 
Pufendorf takes the existence of simple reputation so much for 
granted that he does not bother to explain the psychological mechanism 
which upholds it. Nevertheless, given his gloomy view of human nature, 
it can be wondered what makes people condemn so unanimously those 
who violate the rules of sociality. That people feel aggrieved when 
someone does something wrong to themselves or to those who they 
regard as important for their personal happiness and well-being, does 
not need to be explained. However, as a social phenomenon simple 
reputation obviously requires that people are also disturbed when the 
harm is done to someone with whom they have no personal contacts. 
What makes them show their disapproval in such cases? 
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In the light of Pufendorf's moral theory, the idea which first comes 
to mind is that people have learned that violating the rules of sociality is 
against God's will and therefore wrong and blameworthy. Now, 
Pufendorf evidently thinks the idea that God commands human beings 
to observe natural law and will punish those who violate it offers an 
important motive for observing natural law. But why should this fact 
make people show disdain if something immoral is done to someone 
with whom they have no personal relations? Why are they not 
concerned solely with their own destiny and let others act as immorally 
as they like? 
One possible answer is that people identify themselves with other 
human beings and, therefore, feel compassion to the injured party and 
contempt towards him who commits the evil act. And Pufendorf 
indeed remarks that the mere similarity of nature — the fact that people 
recognize each other as members of the same species — is usually seen 
to foster the creation of friendly bonds between human beings 9° 
89 JNG VIII.4.6; OHC 11.14.8. To this category belong slaves and illegitimate 
children in some societies. It is also the situation of those whose occupation is 
such that it cannot be practiced without vice. To this group belong, for example, 
pimps and prostitutes who enjoy the protection of civil power as long as they are 
publicly tolerated, but are seen as people who ought to be excluded from the 
company of honest citizens. Finally, there are people such as executioners whose 
occupation arouses so much disgust in the rest of the citizens that they are 
excluded from normal social life. 
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	 De statu § 15: "Similitudinem naturae in universo genere humano etiam illi 
agnoscunt, qui ex uno pari conjugum quidquid est mortalium ortum tranxisse 
ignorant. Etsi enim mira varietas et in externa corporum habitudine, ac in animis 
deprehendatur; ea tarnen tanta non est, quo minus dici queat, unum aeque esse 
hominem quam alterum. Earn autem naturae similitudinem in quovis animantium 
genere ad conjuctionem non parum conferre, perque eandem isla inter se 
conciliari tralatitium est." 
However, in the same context he makes clear that in practice most 
people are not particularly affected by this natural similitude. They are 
usually so preoccupied with their own advantage and glory that "they 
pay small regard to anyone with little or no ability to benefit them."91  
But as mentioned already, simple reputation requires that people are 
disturbed even when the harm is done to someone who is in no way 
useful for themselves. 
Another possibility is that people condemn the violations of natural 
law because they understand that a person who does something wrong 
to others may do the same to themselves. And Pufendorf obviously 
thinks that such estimations are typical for the more intelligent and 
educated people. It seems, however, that these are not the reason for 
the general disdain shown towards evil acts. When Pufendorf wants to 
convince his readers that the uneducated majority adopts natural law 
solely through habituation he makes the following remark: 
If anyone should undertake to examine this matter in detail, he will 
discover how difficult it is to give any clear explanation for many 
things which the common throng does at once and without a sign of 
hesitation. For instance, the author of De principiis justi et decori 
[the Dutch writer Velthuysen] asserts: "If anyone is caught stealing, 
the whole multitude are of one mind and body in striving to arrest 
the thief, while if someone in a fit of anger has committed a 
murder, everyone hopes for his escape, and no one of his own 
accord lends assistance for his apprehension." The common men do 
not know the reason for this, which is: "Everyone runs for greater 
danger from a thief, who will take anyone's property, than from a 
murderer, who is only angry against the one by whom he has been 
injured. "92 
The above passage would indicate that the idea that the thief may also 
be harmful for their own personal well-being is not the main reason 
for the anger common people feel towards him. Their reaction is 
principally habitual. This suggests that simple reputation as a social 
91 	 De statu § 16: "Ex adverso constat, homini amorem proprium suamque utilitatem 
et gloriam fere inter prima haben. Eoque istius, ex quo nihil aut parum in nos 
proficisci videtur posse, exigua fere habetur ratio." 
92 JNG II.3.13: "Verum si quis accuratius ista coeperit expedere, deprehendet, 
multarum rerum rationes redde oppido quam difficile esse, quae a vulgo tarnen 
expedite, et citra haesitationem obeuntur. Exempli loco author De principii justi 
et decori assert: `Si quispiam in furto deprehensus sit, omnis multitudo animo et 
viribus annititur furem comprehendere: si autem quispiam ira percitus 
homicidium perpetraverit, omnes ejus libertatem optant, nullus saltem operam 
suam libenter ad ilium capiendum commodat.' Rationem vulgus ignorat, quae 
haec est, `quia plus periculi cuivis exfure, qui cujusvis fortunas rapere intendit, 
quam a tali homicida, qui in ilium tantum excanduit, a quo lacessitus fuerat.'- 
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phenomenon is based chiefly on the unreflected moral attitudes people 
adopt in their childhood. As was mentioned above, Pufendorf holds 
that when people are from childhood onwards taught to curse some 
acts, the condemnation of these acts becomes second nature for them 
and acquires the force of a natural passion.93 Thus, it appears plausible 
to think — although Pufendorf never explicitly says so — that simple 
reputation is principally maintained by these emotional reactions 
adopted in early childhood. While most people do not have any clear 
understanding of the foundations of natural law and easily see a 
discrepancy between its requirements and the pursuit of personal well-
being, they usually feel spontaneous reprobation when they see others 
violating these rules. 
Be this as it may, Pufendorf 's argument against Hobbes is that the 
condemnation people show towards immoral acts is usually stronger 
than their admiration for extraordinary skills and qualities as such. 
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This guarantees that the desire for pre-eminence has predominantly a 
positive effect on human sociality and that the sense of shame is able 
to act as "a guardian of virtue". Pufendorf admits, however, that at the 
same time these sentiments represent a constant danger for social life. 
Since honour and glory are generally regarded as the most illustrious 
of all worldly ends, there is always a temptation to seek them even by 
immoral means. Consequently, one of the most important tasks of 
education should be to shape the soul so that it is not too preoccupied 
with honour but "endeavours in every way to conserve simple 
reputation or the opinion that one is a good man."94 
THE FEAR OF GOD 
The desire to be esteemed by other people offers, thus, an important 
incentive for moral behaviour. It is not, however, the strongest single 
motive for obeying the moral law. This is indicated in JNG I.6.12, 
when Pufendorf discusses the reason why the lawgiver must not only 
have just reasons for his power but also be willing and able to punish 
those who disobey his commands. Here, he remarks that in order to 
93 	 See above pp.00 
94 	 JNG 1684 II.4.9: "Est quoque illa culturae maxime necessaria, ut quis justum 
pretium rebus, quae adpetitum humanum praecipue stimulant, ponere norit. Ex 
hoc quippe dependet, quantum circa quamque earum conniti deceat. Inter eas 
igitur judicatur vel splendidissima, et quae erectoris homines indolis pracipue 
solicitare idonea sit, opinio praestantiae et excellentiae, unde honor et gloria 
progignitur. Circa hanc animus iat est formandus, ut omni quidem studio 
existimationem simplicem, seu opinionem boni viri conservare laboret." 
achieve their external end the laws must have the power to control the 
corrupt passions of human beings "with a greater force" than "the 
sense of shame and morality".95 In other words, while concern about 
one's simple reputation is a necessary constituent of human sociality, 
the most powerful single motive for moral behaviour is still the fear of 
those punishments which are expected to follow from the 
transgression of natural law. What interests me in this final chapter is 
Pufendorf's opinion that in this respect the mere fear of civil penalties 
is not sufficient. A peaceful social life also necessarily requires a 
collectively shared belief in a God who will punish those who violate 
natural law. What are Pufendorf's reasons for holding such a view, and 
what kind of fear provides the required sociality? 
Unlike his divine command theory of morality, the idea that civil 
life requires a belief in a punishing God did not raise that many 
protests among Pufendorf's contemporaries. In the seventeenth 
century the fear of Hell still had a considerable impact on people's 
everyday life. Even thought atheism was not unknown and some 
Christian sects (like Socinians) rejected the idea of eternal 
punishments, the great majority internalized in one form or another 
the idea that there is a God who will punish the wicked.96 Moreover, 
the idea that such a belief is indispensable for social order was 
generally, albeit not unanimously, accepted among intellectuals. In 
order to support this view it was not necessary to think like Pufendorf 
that the whole phenomenon of morality is dependent on the idea of 
God. Grotius, for example, remarked in his commentary on the Bible 
that "without a belief in a divine providence that visits the deeds of 
men with retribution and laws to direct men in the right way, men 
cannot avoid wandering into devious and evil ways." Consequently, 
those "are considered foolish, who have no careful regard for the 
belief in God and his providence, but allow every man his own 
opinion on this point, the most pernicious thing to be found, not only, I 
maintain, to good morals, but to the state as well."97 
But as Grotius' remark indicates there were some who thought that 
what people think of God and his providence is of no consequence for 
social life. The first printed affirmation of an atheist society is usually 
considered to be Pierre Bailly's Pensees diverses sur la comete, 
published in 1682. However, already much earlier several writers had 
95 JNG I.6.12: "Enimvero quia naturalis humanae voluntatis libertas nullo morali 
vinculo extinguitur, ea quoque in plurimis mortalium est animi levitas aut malitia, 
ut istas imperii rationes insuper habeant: igitur aliud accedere oportet, quod 
validiore momento enormes libidines, quam pudoris et decori sensus, premat." 
96 	 On seventeenth century discussion on eternal punishments, see Walker 1964. 
97 	 Ad liber Sapientibus, XII.1. Cited by Pufendorf in JNG 1684 I1.4.3. 
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denied the necessity of having a generally shared belief in divine 
retribution. Of the authors Pufendorf mentions in De jure naturae et 
gentium, such ideas were presented by Paolo Sarpi, Francis Bacon, 
and Thomas Hobbes. To be sure, the first mentioned, a Venetian 
churchman and historian, did this only in his unpublished Pensieri, 
while in his published works he supported the conventional view.98 In 
print the possibility of an atheist society was hinted at by Bacon in the 
second edition of his Essays, published in 1612. While Bacon 
condemned atheism as a position which "destroys man's nobility",99 
he did not think that it would make ordered civil life impossible. In his 
essay Of superstition he declared that atheism "leaves a man to sense, 
to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation; all of which may 
be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not." 
Consequently, "atheism did never perturb states, for it makes men 
wary of themselves, as looking no further: and we see the times 
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inclined to atheism (as the time of Augustus Caesar) were civil 
times." °() 
Before Bailly the most provocative and widely-known of the public 
attacks against the conventional view was undoubtedly the religious 
doctrine Hobbes presented in Leviathan. Hobbes, of course, never 
championed for an non-religious society. In Leviathan, just as in his 
two earlier works on political theory, he declared that a well-ordered 
state includes a publicly practiced religion controlled by the sovereign. 
However, Hobbes' reason for holding religion beneficial for social life 
was not the customary one according to which the central rules of 
morality must be enforced by the fear of punishments in the afterlife. 
On the contrary, he made it clear that he not only saw the belief in 
eternal punishments as socially unnecessary but also regarded it as a 
threat to civil life. 
In Leviathan the social utility of religion followed mainly from the 
opportunity it gave to control the human tendency to superstition. 
Behind this view lay Hobbes' conviction that religion as a social 
institution (as distinct from the philosophical understanding of God) 
has its origin in the inability of human beings to understand the real 
causes of the phenomena which they observe in the world. This causes 
anxiety which easily gives rise to the belief that there is an invisible 
power or agent which is the ultimate cause of all things, including the 
good and bad fortune of human beings. Such beliefs are, then, 
transformed into a religious cult when people start to believe that 
98 	 On Sarpi, see Wootton 1983, especially pp.20-23, 131-135. 
99 	 Essay XVI, Of Atheism. 
100 	 Essay XVII, Of Superstition. 
someone is "a holy man, to whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare 
his will supernaturally."lot 
Hobbes maintained that religious cults were originally established 
by ancient rulers in order to make people "more apt to Obedience, 
Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civil Society."102 The first to use such a 
device were Judaic leaders like Abraham and Moses. But also gentile 
rulers, whose only concern was to "keep the people in obedience and 
peace," took care that their subjects believed "that the same things 
were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes." 
For the same purpose they also established "Ceremonies, 
Supplications, Sacrifices, and Festivalls," in which "the anger of the 
gods might be appeased."1°3  By all this Hobbes did not mean that the 
ancient social order would have been founded on the belief that there 
is a God who will punish those who violate the laws by something 
more terrible than that which the human sovereign is able to inflict. 
Ancient religious cults were socially beneficial mainly because they 
made people content with modest material wealth and less inclined to 
accuse rulers of their personal misfortunes. Their achievement was 
firstly "that the common people in their misfortunes, laying fault on 
neglect, or error in their ceremonies, or their own disobedience to 
lawes, were lesse apt to mutiny against their Governors" Second, 
when the people were "entertained with the pomp, and pastime of 
Festivalls and Publick Games, made in honour of The Gods" they 
"needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent, 
murmuring, and commotion against the State."104 
In this respect the situation changed drastically at the beginning of 
the Christian era, when the Catholic church started to utilize 
superstitious beliefs in order to increase its own power at the expense 
of civil sovereigns. This it did mainly by deceiving human beings into 
believing that there are powers and punishments which they should be 
more afraid of than the penalties inflicted by the civil rulers. By using 
such beliefs the clergy managed to create an independent, 
multinational power network to serve its own interests. And even 
though the power of the Catholic church was diminished by the 
Reformation, Protestant sects continued to use the same devises in 
order to uphold their authority. As a result, human beings were asked 
to serve two masters: the sovereign who commanded the temporal 
punishments and the church who claimed that it knew how to avoid 
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101 	 Leviathan, ch.12, pp.83-84. 
102 	 Leviathan, ch.12, p.79. 
103 	 Leviathan, ch.12, p.82. 
104 	 Leviathan, ch.12, p.83. 
 
the divine ones. The outcome of this were, according to Hobbes, the 
endless civil wars which had devastated European nations during the 
Christian era.1°5  
Hobbes held it possible to liberate people from the spell of the 
clergy and from the irrational fears on which its power had been 
based. He did not, however, think that this would make publicly 
practiced religion unnecessary. The sources of superstitious beliefs 
"can never be so abolished out of human nature, but that new 
Religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of 
such men, as for such purpose are in reputation."106 It was necessary, 
therefore, to control this religious inclination by the publicly 
controlled worship of God. Nevertheless, in order to turn Christianity 
into a religion without unwanted side-effects for civil life, some 
significant doctrinal changes were needed.107 And the most important 
of these was to get rid of the idea of Hell in which eternal torture 
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awaits those who violate against God's will. Richard Tuck has recently 
suggested that Hobbes' principal motive for this move was not so 
much to give the sovereign a monopoly on sanctions, but to relieve 
human beings of all unnecessary and damaging fears.108 Be this as it 
may, at the beginning of chapter 38 Hobbes made it perfectly clear 
that there also was an important political motive for this doctrinal 
correction: 
The maintenance of Civil Society, depending on Justice; and Justice 
on the power of Life and Death, and on the lesser Rewards and 
Punishments, residing in them that have the Soveraingty of the 
Common-wealth; It is impossible a commonwealth should stand, 
where any other than the Soveraign, hath a power of giving greater 
rewards than Life, and of infliction greater punishments than Death. 
Now seeing Eternall life is a greater reward, than life present; and 
Eternall torment a greater punishment than death of Nature; It is a 
thing worthy to be well considered, of all men that desire (by 
obeying Authority) to avoid the calamities of Confusion, and Civil 
war, what is meant in holy Scripture, by Life Eternall, and Torment 
Eternall; and for what offences, and against whom committed, men 
are to Eternally tormented; and for what actions, they are to obtain 
Eternall life.1°9 
105 	 Leviathan ch.29, pp.226-228. 
106 	 Leviathan, ch. 12, p.83. 
107 On the relationship between Hobbes' political theory and the Christian doctrine 
declared in Leviathan, see Johnston 1986. 
108 	 Tuck 1993, pp.131-132. 
109 Leviathan, ch. 38, pp.306-307. 
What Hobbes then presented as the correct interpretation of the Bible 
was a doctrine which not only included no penalties worse than death, 
but also broke the connection between salvation and the manner in 
which a person behaves in this life. 
According to Hobbes, the Sacred Scriptures teach that when Christ 
returns he will awaken those who believe in him, who will then 
continue their bodily existence on earth forever, while the unbelievers 
will be condemned to a second and this time a conclusive death. Such 
a conception of Christianity arguably gives God a somewhat greater 
ability to reward human beings than that which the civil sovereign 
possesses. As Hobbes himself admitted, an eternal life is a greater 
reward than the present finite existence. However, this fact had no 
practical consequences for social behaviour. While in De cive Hobbes 
had still strongly emphasized that salvation requires not only a belief 
in Christ but also correct behaviour, namely obedience to the 
sovereign,' I° in Leviathan the discussion of salvation said nothing of 
the latter issue. Hobbes only stressed that while the injustice human 
beings do to each other can be redressed, the sins the human species 
perpetrate against God cannot be undone by any human deed. 
Salvation follows from redemption, which is earned solely by the 
belief in Christi 11  
* * * 
The religious doctrine Hobbes championed in Leviathan offered, thus, 
no extra motive for observing natural law or civil laws. While it 
affirmed the existence of an afterlife, it gave God no greater force to 
threaten those who disturb peaceful civil life than what is possessed by 
the civil sovereign. Besides, by making salvation dependent solely on 
the faith in Christ it made the only special reward God had in his 
hands socially insignificant. The main social benefit following such a 
religion was that it served as a politically harmless platform for 
people's religious feelings. 
Whether or not Hobbes himself sincerely believed in the Christian 
doctrine he declared in Leviathan, for most of his contemporaries it 
was pretty much identical with atheism.112  What is Pufendorf's 
opinion on this issue is not, however, altogether clear. In his first letter 
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De cive 18.2, 18.12. 
111 Leviathan, ch.38, pp.307, 319-320. On other differences between the religious 
doctrines presented in Leviathan and Hobbes' earlier works, see Johnston 1986 
and Tuck 1993. 
112 	 See Minz 1962. 
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to Boinenburg he remarks that many of Hobbes' hypothesis seem have 
a secular flavour,113  while in the preface to De jure naturae et gentium 
he admits, after praising the merits of Hobbes' political theory, that 
the irritation Hobbes has caused by his "abominable theories in the 
field of religion" has not been without reason. In the same work 
Pufendorf also criticizes Hobbes forcefully for his claim, presented in 
De cive, that atheism is not strictly speaking a sin, because an atheist 
is not God's rebellious subject but rather God's enemy, who has never 
submitted himself to God's power.114  Yet, Pufendorf never directly 
accuses Hobbes of atheism. 
What is certain, however, is that Pufendorf himself sees tranquil 
social life as dependent on a collectively shared belief in a God who 
threatens wrong doers with greater punishments than the civil 
sovereign. This opinion is not so clearly expressed in De jure naturae 
et gentium, where Pufendorf is more interested in maintaining that the 
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fear of God's punishments alone cannot maintain peace between 
human beings. The necessity of the fear of God is, however, made 
perfectly clear in the discussion of natural religion Pufendorf includes 
— perhaps because of the charges of atheism directed against his main 
work — in De officio hominis et civis. 
As should be clear by now, for Pufendorf natural religion is not a 
doctrine which should replace Lutheran Christianity as the publicly 
maintained religious practice. Natural religion is a purely theoretical 
model the purpose of which is to define those religious ideas and 
practices which are indispensable for human society. It consists of 
"man's duties to God" in so far as "these can be traced out on the basis 
of natural reason."115  Reason, in turn, is able to gather the religious 
duties in so far as they "promote tranquility and sociality of this life". 
Whereas the duties which human beings have towards each other are 
deduced directly from the requirements of sociality, the duties they 
have towards God are deduced "indirectly" by contemplating what 
religious beliefs and practices are needed to give to the duties human 
beings have towards each other their "ultimate firmness".116 
113 	 The first letter to Boinenburg, line 116. 
114 JNG II.4.4. 
115 OHC I.4.1. 
116 OHC 1.3.13: "Quanquam autem primario et directe ea praecepta legis naturalis, 
quae ad alios homines spectant, ex socialitate, quam fundamenti loco 
substravimus, deriventur: tarnen etiam indirecte officia hominis erga Deum 
tanquam Creatorem inde deduci possunt, quatenus ultimum firmamentum officiis 
erga alios homines a religione et metu Numinis accedit; sic ut sociabilis quoque 
non esset homo, ni religione foret imbutus. Et quia sola ratio in religione ulterius 
progredi nequit, quam quousque illa inservit promovendae tranquilitati et 
socialitati hujus vitae." 
In De officio hominis et civis Pufendorf presents a considerably 
detailed account of the various religious beliefs and practices which he 
sees as indispensable for peaceful social order. What is significant for 
our present concern is that natural religion includes the idea of a God 
"who exercises direction over the world as a whole and over the 
human race." Pufendorf especially points out that to deny this has the 
same moral effect as the denial of God's existence. Both positions 
undermine all religion, because "there is no reason to fear or to 
worship a being who however excellent He may be in Himself, is 
unmoved by concern for us and neither can nor will confer either good 
or evil upon us."117  A little later Pufendorf then specifies that in order 
to give firmness to human sociality religion must teach not only that 
human beings should offer God "in all things the most humble 
obedience as creator, lord and governor and the best", but also that 
they should fear God "as most powerful, to offend whom is apt to 
incur the greatest evil."118 
Now, it is not totally unreasonable to wonder why Pufendorf thinks 
this way. For in his discussion of the origin of civil societies he 
remarks that most human beings are mainly preoccupied with the 
present and far less concerned with what shall happen to them in the 
future. This, in turn, has the consequence that even though God's 
punishments should be feared more than anything else, in practice 
most human beings are far more afraid of human penalties. t 19  But if 
this is the case, why is the fear of God's punishment needed at all? If 
the effect of these penalties is so much weaker than that of civil 
penalties, why is the belief in them indispensable for social life even 
when natural law is enforced by civil penalties? Why is the fear of 
God a necessary constituent of human sociality? 
The only place where Pufendorf answers this question is OHC 
I.4.9, where he aims to show that religion "is the ultimate and the 
strongest bond of human society." This he does by offering a portrayal 
117 OHC I.4.4: "Tertium est, Deum tum in universum mundum, tum in genus 
humanum regimen exercere. Id quod ex admirabili et constanti ordin, qui in hoc 
universo cemitur, liquodo adparet. Quoad effectum autem moralen perinde est, 
utrum quis neger, Deum existere, an ab eodem humana curari; cum utrumque 
omnem religionem plane tollat. Frustra enim metuitur aut colitur, utut in se sit 
praestantissumus, qui nulla plane nostri cura tangitur, et nihil boni malique in nos 
vult aut potest conferrer" 
118 OHC I.4.6: "...; eum timere, tanquam potentissimum, cujus offenta maximum sit 
malum conciliare apta; ei denique in omnibus humillime obesqui tanquam 
cretatori, domino ac rectori optimo maximo. 
119 JNG VII.1.11: "Tum quod magna pars mortalium praesentibus tantum imminet, 
futuri parum curiosa, ac illis fere movetur, quae in sensus incurrunt, ab sublimiora 
aegra adsurgat. Inde est, quod plurimos longe major poenae humanae metus, 
quam divini Numinis, quo tarnen nihil magis metuendum." See also OHC 1I.5.9. 
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of the calamities which would characterize human life in the situation 
where religion were abolished. The description Pufendorf gives of 
such an imagined condition is rather unsystematic and could easily be 
taken merely as a rhetorical exaggeration the purpose of which is to 
answer to the charges of atheism made against the De jure naturae et 
gentium. Nevertheless, a careful reading of this passage reveals a 
number of assumptions which are perfectly compatible with the 
general outline of Pufendorf's theory. 
Not surprisingly, the central assumption in paragraph I.4.9 is the 
idea that the human species is fundamentally corrupt. Pufendorf's 
point is that the wickedness inherent in every human being would 
make people unable to have that trust in each other's intentions which 
is necessary for civil institutions to function. This opinion 
distinguishes Pufendorf from Hobbes, who seems to have thought that 
once the proper civil organization has been established and 
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superstitious beliefs have been abolished, rulers are automatically both 
willing and able to protect their subjects. Correspondingly, in such a 
situation at least the majority of the citizens have so strong confidence 
in the intentions of the rulers and in the ability of the legal system to 
punish wrong doers that they do not regard their leaders or other 
citizens as a constant danger for their own safety. 
In contrast to this, Pufendorf maintains that because of the corrupt 
human nature even the best possible civil institutions include some 
unavoidable deficiencies which would make the whole system 
collapse without a collectively shared believe in divine punishments. 
In the first place, there is the great power necessarily possessed by the 
leaders of states. Pufendorf takes it for granted that if the passions and 
desires of civic rulers were not restrained by the fear of God's 
punishments, the temptation to use high position in order to increase 
personal wealth would be quite simply too great to resist. As a result, 
the rulers would "treat all their duties, and justice itself, as available 
for a price." This, in turn, would create a mutual circle of suspicion 
and distrust between citizens and their leaders. The former, "fearing 
oppression by their rulers, would be constantly on the watch for 
opportunities to revolt," while the rulers, "living in constant fear of 
rebellion, ... would realize that their only hope of security lay in 
making their citizens as weak as possible."120 
120 OHC I.4.9: "Nam imperantes, nullo conscientiae vinculo constricti, omnia munia, 
ipsamque justitiam venalia essent habitur, et in omnibus privatum commodum 
quaesituri cum oppressione civium: a quorum rebellion uti sibi semper 
metuerent; ita suam salutem unice in eo positam intelligerent, ut istos quam 
maxime enerves redderent. Cives contra, opressionem imperantium formidantes, 
numquam non circumspecturi forent occasiones rebellandi." 
The other unavoidable imperfection in all civil societies is the legal 
system. In human courts the penalties must always be based on 
evidence. These, in turn, are often very difficult to find. Therefore, the 
legal apparatus alone cannot create that trust in each others intentions 
which is needed in civil life. If there were no commonly shared belief 
in a punishing God, all "crimes and misdemeanors of a profitable 
nature that could be committed in secret and without witnesses would 
be taken as evidence of smart thinking on which one could pride 
oneself." As a result, "no one could be certain of another's good faith." 
Despite all the efforts of the legal apparatus, the citizens would "live 
in anxiety, a perpetual prey to fear and to suspicions that they would 
be 	 deceived or wronged by others "121 Pufendorf's scepticism 
concerning the ability of human beings to trust each other without the 
shared fear of God extends even to domestic relationships. "On even 
the smallest quarrel, husband would suspect that their wives would use 
poison or some other clandestine means of death against them, and 
wives would suspect their husbands. A similar danger would threaten 
from their dependents."I22  In fact, the mutual suspicion would be 
especially strong in domestic surroundings, since the crimes made 
there are usually especially difficult to solve and are most often 
"betrayed by an unquiet conscience and by tell-tale signs of anxiety" 
following from the fear of God's punishment.123 
To sum up: even though God's punishments have a weaker 
immediate impact on human behavior than civil penalties, they are 
still needed in order to create that minimum trust between the corrupt 
human beings without which civil institutions and civil life would be 
impossible in the first place. Because of the inevitable weaknesses in 
civil institutions it is necessary that citizens have a somewhat greater 
confidence in their rulers and in each other than would be justified 
solely on the grounds of corrupt human nature. And Pufendorf holds 
that no other thing can create the needed trust than the fact that 
121 	 OHC I.4.9. "Praeterea cives ad injurias mutuo inferendas futuri essent pronissimi. 
Cum enim in foro civili pronuncietur secundum acta et probata, omnia scelera et 
flagitia, ex quibus lucrum provenire aptum est, si occulte patrari et fine arbitris 
possent, pro dexteritate ingenii, in qua placere sibi quis posset, haberentur. ... Ex 
quo illud consequeretur, ut dum nemo in alterius fide, remotis poenis divinis, 
solidam fiduciam collocare posset, singuli perpetuo metu et suspicionibus anxii 
viverent, ne ab aliis deciperentur, aut laederentur." 
122 OHC I.4.9: "Quin conjuges, oborta vel levi querela, se invicem essent suspectari, 
ne veneno, aut alio clandestino modo necarentur. Par periculum a familia 
immineret." 
123 OHC I.4.9: "Cum enim sine religione nulla quoque futura foret conscientia, non 
facile esset occulta ejusmodi scelera deprehendere; quippe quae plerumque per 
inquietudinem conscientiae, et terrores, in exteriora indicia erumpentes, 
prodantur." 
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citizens know that most of them are at least a little concerned about 
the punishments that God shall inflict on wrong doers. 
Finally, a few things concerning the character of the fear of God 
needed in social life are worth noting. In the first place, the fear of 
God which serves as a minimum requirement for social life is in no 
way identical with sincere Christian faith. Genuine Christians obey 
natural law out of mere reverence towards God and need no other 
motive for doing so. However, the number of such true Christians is 
very sma11.124  What makes ordered social life possible is that all but 
the most corrupt human beings possess a sense "which convinces 
them that when they sin against natural law, they offend him who has 
authority over men's minds, and who is to be feared even when there 
is nothing to be feared from men."125  In other words, religion fulfills 
its most essential social function not by making people pious 
believers, but by creating in their minds a kind of "superego", a 
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picture of an all-powerful authority, who requires them to observe the 
prevailing moral code and threatens those who disobey with some 
great evil. Consequently, non-Christian religions also are able to 
maintain sociality human sociality: "A serious belief of any nature in 
the Divine Being and His providence, under whatsoever particular 
form or manner of worship, has the effect of rendering men more 
observant of their duty."126  There are people who are "addicted to a 
religion which is harmful to the welfare of their souls, such as 
Mohammedans or pagans, who, because of their belief in divine 
providence, show an active concern for honourableness and duty so 
that, so far as their outward acts are concerned, they do not seem to 
fall behind the majority of Christians."127 
What, then, is the evil which people must be afraid of? Must a 
socially effective religion contain the idea that there are penalties 
awaiting the wrong doers in the afterlife, or is it sufficient to believe in 
a God whose punishments shall be meted out in this life? 
Some of Pufendorf's comments give the impression that he supports 
124 See above p.00. 
125 OHC I.3.11: Abs quo generatur tener admodum sensus in animis hominum non 
plane con uptorum, quo convincuntur, in legem naturalem peccando offendi ilium, 
cui in animos hominum imperium est, et qui metuendus sit, etiam ubi ab 
hominibus metus non impendet " 
126 JNG 1684 II.4.3: "... : habet tarnen quaevis sena persuasio de Numine, ejusque 
providentia sub quocunque conceptu particulari, aut modo cultus hanc effcaciam, 
ut homines reddat officii observantiores." 
127 JNG 1684 II.4.3: "Argumento est, quod ohm et nunc dentur religioni pro salute 
animarum pestiferae addicti, puta Muhammendanae aut Ethnicae, quos propter 
suam providentia Numinis persuasionem non spemenda honesti et officii cura 
agitat, ut saltem quad exteriores actus plurimus Cristianorum non videatur 
concedere." 
the latter alternative. In the first place, Pufendorf holds that reason as 
such is unable to achieve certain knowledge concerning the faith of 
human beings after death. And since the study of natural law is restricted 
to things which can be known by natural reason, he insists that "the 
scope" of this discipline must be "confined within the orbit of this 
life".128 Correspondingly, in his discussion of natural religion Pufendorf 
emphasizes that "the effect" of this religion is "confined to the sphere of 
this life", and that it "has no effect on winning eternal salvation." 129 
On other occasions, however, Pufendorf clearly indicates that human 
sociality and ordered social life are dependent on the belief that wrong 
doers will be punished after their death. For example, when he lists in 
De jure naturae et gentium those features of character which make a 
person unreliable as a contracting party, those who deny the immortality 
of the soul are closely connected with those who deny the existence of 
divine providence. Both types of person know only such justice which is 
based on advantage measured by their own judgement.13° The same idea 	 169 
is affirmed when Pufendorf in De officio hominis et civis explains why 
the internal cohesion of states would be perpetually insecure without 
religion. Here he starts by remarking that without religion 
... the saying would apply, He who knows how to die cannot he 
forced. For those who do not fear God have nothing worse to fear 
than death, and anyone who had the courage to despise death could 
make any attempt he pleased against the government. And there 
might always be reasons why he would do so. He might wish for 
instance to avoid the disadvantages he perceives himself to suffer 
from being ruled by someone else, or he might aim to win for himself 
the advantages he sees falling to the possessor of power, particularly 
since he may easily persuade himself that he has the right to do so, 
either because the present sovereign seems to be running the country 
badly or because he expects to govern far better himself.131 
128 	 OHC Prefatio. See above pp.00. 
129 OHC I.4.8: "Enimvero id certum est, effectum hujus religionis naturalis, praecise 
et pro praesenti hominum conditione consideratae, intra sphaeram hujus vitae 
terminari: ad aetemam autem salutem nanciscendam nequaquam valere. 
130 JNG I1I.6.9: "Ex quo gener sunt athei, qui vel Deum esse vel divinam 
providentiam abnuunt; a quibus non longe abeunt qui animas corporisbus 
supertsites negant. Hi enim non possunt non omne jus utilitate, ad judicium 
propriam exacta, metiri." 
131 OHC I.4.9: Tunc enim revera locum haberet; qui mori scit, cogi nescit: quippe 
cum Deum non mentuentibus nihil magis quam mors metui possit. Huic 
contemnendae qui sufficeret, in imperantes quaevis tentare posset. Ut auten id 
vellet, vix causa defutura foret; puta ut declinaret incommoda, quae sibi ab 
alterius imperio videntur incumbere; aut ut ipse potiretur commodis, quae imperii 
possessorem comitantur. Praesertim cum facile judicare possit, jure se id facere, 
vel quod, qui in praesens rerum potitur, prave rempublicum videatur genere, vel 
quod ipse longe melius imperaturum sese speret." 
In this statement stabile civil order is made dependent on a religious 
doctrine which also affects those who are able to overcome their fear 
of death. And it is difficult to imagine how such a doctrine could be 
formulated without the idea that God will punish the wrong doers after 
their death. 
The discrepancy between the above remarks is not, however, as 
great as it might appear at the first sight. For it seems that by 
maintaining that the effect of natural religion is restricted to this life, 
Pufendorf does not mean that natural religion does not include the 
idea of punishments which await wrong doers in the afterlife. It must 
be noted, in the first place, that his reason for holding the above view 
is the conviction that the true requirements of salvation declared in the 
Bible cannot be known by natural reason alone: 
Human reason left to itself is quite ignorant that the depravity seen 
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in man's faculties and inclinations is the result of human fault and 
merits God's indignation and eternal death. Hence too the need of a 
Saviour, the need of His work and merit, and the promises which 
God has made to the human race and all that flows from that, are 
unknown to human reason, although it is clear from Holy Scripture 
that these are the only means by which eternal salvation comes to 
man.132 
Now, by this Pufendorf does not mean to say that the idea of 
punishments in the afterlife is totally unfamiliar to natural reason. On 
the contrary, he holds that while human reason does not — at least for 
the moment — have demonstrative knowledge of the existence of such 
penalties, the fact that violations of natural law are not always 
followed by corresponding disadvantages in this life makes reason 
strongly tempted to assume that God must have ordered some other 
enforcement for natural law.133  When we add to this the human desire 
to avoid death, we have the almost universally shared belief in 
punishments and rewards in the afterlife: 
132 	 OHC I.4.8: "Ratio quippe humana sibi relicta jam ignorant, pravitatem, quae in 
facultatibus et inclinationibus hominis cernitur per culpam humanam provenisse, 
Deique offensam et aetemum exitium meren: eoque et necessitas Salvatoris, 
ejusque officium et meritum, nec non promissa Dei human genen facta, et quae 
alia rode dependent, eandem latent: per quae so salutem aeternam hominibus 
proveniere, ex divinis literis constat." 
133 .ING 1684 II.3.21: "Et sane cum constet, Deum velle, ut istae legen ab hominibus 
observentur, et vero adpareat, a quibusdam effectus earum naturales, saltem ex 
parte eludi: valde probabile est, Deum alia via malitiam istorum multaturum." 
The human heart does indeed yearn for immortality with a burning 
passion and violently rejects its own destruction, and hence many 
nations of the gentiles have seen the rise of a belief that the soul 
survives separation from the body, and that then it will be good for 
good men and bad for evil men.134 
In other words, even though the true requirements of salvation can be 
learned only from the Bible, most human cultures still have some idea 
of penalties which follow after death. What Pufendorf seems to have 
in mind is that while the existence of punishments which await wrong 
doers in the afterlife cannot be proved by reason alone, a belief in 
them still is a necessary condition of tranquil social life. And such a 
belief is, in fact, taught in most human religions. From the Bible we 
know, however, that God's punishments cannot be avoided by the 
mere external observation of natural law. One must also be aware of 
one's sinfulness and have faith in Christ. It follows, therefore, that in 
practice the effect of every religious doctrine except the Christian one 
is "confined to the sphere of this life". 
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134 OHC Prefatio: "Quanquam enim animus hominis non solum ardenti cum affectu 
immortalitati velut immineat, suique destructionem vehementer aversetur, atque 
inde apud plerosque gentilium involverit perusasio de animae a corpore separatae 
duratione, et quod tunc bonis bene, malismale sit futurum." 
Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to explicate the conception of morality 
which guided Pufendorf's theory of natural law. I have maintained that 
while Pufendorf departed radically from seventeenth century Lutheran 
orthodoxy, many aspects of his theory are best understood against the 
background of a Lutheran world-view. Pufendorf saw natural law as a 
rule which God has imposed on the irreparably corrupt humankind in 
order to maintain social order and in this way to ensure that the human 
species is able to survive and to maintain a distinctively human way of 
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living. This fundamental assumption makes understandable both his 
low opinion of Aristotelian moral philosophy and the esteem he 
showed towards Grotius and Hobbes as his main predecessors in the 
field of natural law. It also makes the argument by which he deduced 
the fundamental principle of natural law compatible with the critique 
he directed against Hobbes' idea of identifying natural law with the 
requirements of individual self-preservation. Furthermore, Pufendorf's 
Lutheran idea of the human being as inherently evil and corrupt can be 
seen as a partial motive in his conviction that the only possible source 
of morality are the commands of God, and it certainly was his main 
reason for holding that the whole social order is dependent on a 
collectively shared fear of God. 
Within this Lutheran framework Pufendorf formulated a theory of 
morality with some unmistakably modern features. In Pufendorf's 
theory human beings seek predominantly their personal well-being 
and have different ideas of what this consists of, depending on their 
individual inclinations, education, and cultural background. Morality 
consists of obligating norms which regulate interpersonal relations, 
enabling the diversely inclined individuals to maintain peaceful co-
existence and to increase their prosperity by the mutual exchange of 
goods and services. Another "modern" aspect in Pufendorf's theory 
was his strictly non-purposeful conception of nature, which made him 
hold that the human faculty of reason is unable to make moral 
judgements simply by reflecting on the natural characteristics and 
inclinations of the human species. This position was shared later by 
thinkers such as Hume and Kant, although they rejected Pufendorf's 
conclusion that the only possible source of morality is the will of God. 
What distinguishes Pufendorf's moral theory from subsequent 
moral philosophy is, above all, the idea that morality is something 
external to human beings. Pufendorf not only thought that the whole 
phenomenon of morality is dependent on the idea that there is a God 
who wants human beings to behave in a certain manner. He also held 
that the moral consciousness of average human individuals is usually 
almost totally a product of external forces. Only well-educated experts 
are able to have truly reflected views on moral issues, whereas the vast 
majority of human beings adopt their moral convictions almost blindly 
from prevailing custom and from religious and civil authorities. 
Moreover, in Pufendorf's theory the mere knowledge of what is right 
and what is wrong is not sufficient to motivate people to act morally, if 
they happen to believe - as they often do - that their personal interests 
in worldly life would be better served by immoral behaviour. In such 
cases the incentive to obey moral law can only come from external 
sources such as the disapproval of other people, civil penalties, and 
God's punishments. 
This idea of morality as something external to the human being was 
rejected by the main moral and political thinkers of the eighteenth 
century. A clear example of this change in attitudes can be found in 
the critique Rousseau directed against the modern school of natural 
law in the preface to his Second Discourse. Here Rousseau 
complained that the "moderns" — by which he meant writers such as 
Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf, — had established natural law "upon 
such metaphysical principles that ... there are very few people capable 
of comprehending these principles, far from being able to find them 
by themselves." And what is more, when they had simultaneously 
claimed that natural law is necessary for that social life without which 
human intellectual abilities cannot develop, they had made "man a 
philosopher before making him a man," an error Rousseau himself 
was determined to avoid.' 
As an interpretation of Pufendorf, Rousseau's critique was, of 
course, misplaced, as it was perfectly clear to Pufendorf that his 
theoretical presentation of natural law was not comprehensible to the 
uneducated common folk and had very little to do with the manner in 
which people in reality adopt their moral convictions. What lies 
behind Rousseau's remarks is, in fact, a new understanding of the 
character of the moral agent and the task of moral philosophy. 
Together with thinkers such as Hume and Kant, Rousseau held that the 
roots of moral consciousness must not be sought outside human 
The First and Second Discourses, ed. and tr. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters. 
New York 1964, p.96. 
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beings but in the mental abilities possessed by every normal 
individual. Irrespective of their different theories concerning the origin 
of moral judgements, these writers held that all human beings (or at 
least all males) should be seen as capable of becoming autonomous 
moral agents who do not need authoritarian supervision by religious or 
civil authorities in order to recognize correct moral principles. 
Accordingly, the central task of moral philosophy is not to prove with 
demonstrative certainty the validity of individual moral precepts, but 
to explicate the mental procedures which give arise to moral 
estimations and which give them the force to affect human behaviour.2 
It was the triumph of this idea of the moral agent and ethical theory 
which lead to the estimation that Pufendorf had been a mere jurist and 
no moral philosopher at all. 
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2 	 On this shift, see Schneewind 1993b. 
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